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1. INTRODUCTION
One might take many angles on the effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation. 2 These turn on the method of assessing effec-
tiveness. This method might involve a legal perspective. However, one
may acknowledge the importance of other scientific disciplines to as-
sess the effectiveness of international private regulation, too. In this
respect an economic, sociological, or psychological/behavioral avenue
are all avenues for exploration. 3 Obviously, the more avenues that
demonstrate effectiveness, the more effective private regulation is
deemed to be. Moreover, an integrated approach is required to thor-
oughly assess the effectiveness of international private regulation.
However, the notion of effectiveness is unspecified. One might use this
notion of effectiveness in addition to the legal or sociological avenue or
as a synonym for impact assessment (which adopts insights from the
economic and sociological approach). I define effectiveness, in line with
my call for an integrated approach, as an overarching notion entailing
legal, economic, sociological, and psychological/behavioral avenues.
Therefore, this article outlines a methodology that adopts all of these
approaches and uses insights from all of these disciplines to find ex
ante indicators predicting the effectiveness of international private
regulation and to find instruments to measure the effectiveness
thereof ex post in comparison with other international private regula-
tion.4 Because international private regulation is omnipresent in the
international arena and might differ depending on locale, this contri-
bution will focus on international private regulation in the Corporate
Social Responsibility ("CSR") arena.5
2 International private regulation is also referred to as transnational private reg-
ulation to distinguish it from inter-state regulation. However, the term transna-
tional is also used to point at inter-state regulation. Therefore, the term
transnational does not offer more clarification. Still it is important to notice that
international private regulation is not inter-state regulation, but either regulation
set by private entities or non-binding rules/principles emanating from governmen-
tal entities or multi stakeholder initiatives.
3 See infra Part 2.2.
4 Therefore, this methodology might be less fit to assess the effectiveness of local
initiatives. Furthermore, comparing the effectiveness of international private reg-
ulation might be more viable at this stage than establishing an overarching global
framework entailing requirements for this type of regulation because relevant
stakeholders do not (yet) agree on these requirements throughout the global CSR
arena. However, eventually overarching global standards (throughout the CSR
arena) might be derived by comparing these initiatives.
5 Hence, the methodology is best equipped to assess the effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation that covers one or, preferably more, of the CSR topics
(human rights, environment, labor conditions, prevention of corruption, and eva-
sion of taxes).
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2. INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION
International (or transnational) private regulation (in the CSR
area), sometimes referred to as self-regulation (which seems to be a
narrower term), has a very broad meaning and encompasses many dif-
ferent private regulatory frameworks. 6 Self-regulation is defined as a
set of private norms that have been established, sometimes in collabo-
ration with others, by those who are bound by these rules: their repre-
sentatives or an overarching body and these norms being enforced.7
Self-regulation might also be defined as a framework in which societal
actors to a certain extent accept responsibility for establishing and/or
applying and/or enforcing such rules, if applicable, within a legislative
or legal framework.' The key actors in such regimes include both non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") and enterprises.9 Although pri-
vate regulation in many instances has a self-binding effect, in many
cases it also intentionally affects third parties.o International private
regulatory regimes are international (or transnational) in the sense
that their effects cross borders, but are not constituted through the
cooperation of states as reflected in treaties. International or transna-
tional private regulation differs from traditional domestic forms of pri-
vate regulation because of its broader scope and reduced specificity in
many cases. 1 1
Sometimes private regulation is referred to as soft law. Al-
though soft law is connected with private regulation, it is not the
same. Soft law, on the one hand, stems from public entities (the com-
mon regulator), and on the other hand is not part of public regulation
6 See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Regulator, 39 Conn. L.
Rev., 1739, 1751-60 (2007). The explanation in this contribution focuses on inter-
national private regulation which has regulatory intentions or effects on social and
economic behavior. Norms governing such matters as identity are not a subject of
research.
7 Arno Overmars, Effecten van Gedragscodes: Twee Recente Cases, in Bestuur-
swetenschappen 14, 16 (2011).
8 Ivo GIESEN, ALTERNATIEVE REGELGEVING IN PRIVAATRECHTELIJKE VCERHOUD-
INGEN 74-78 (Kluwer, Deventer, the Netherlands 2007) (advice for the Dutch Law-
yers Association).
9 Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational
Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 3 (2011).
10 Cf Anthony Ogus & Emanuela Carbonara, Self-regulation, in PRODUCTION OF
LEGAL RULES 228, 228-30 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2d ed. 2011). For example in sup-
ply chain regimes rights of third parties might be implemented or protected. See,
e.g., Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial
Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 1557, 1582, 1589 (2013).
11 Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private
Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J.L. & Soc'Y 163, 164 (2011).
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(commonly referred to as hard law). In that respect soft law is different
from private regulation that might, as will be elaborated on herein,
become part of public regulation. Furthermore, unlike soft law, inter-
national private regulation provides for hard sanctions.
Many different private regulatory frameworks exist, especially
at the global level. However, the term international, or transnational,
private regulation lacks a comprehensive and integrated set of com-
mon principles. 12 This stems from international private regulation
that rarely takes the form of formal and informal delegation of rule-
making by public entities and using a broad range of regulatory de-
vices that might be of a rather soft legal nature (such as codes), but
also of a hard nature(such as contracts).1 3 Furthermore, virtually any-
one could undertake private rulemaking because no restrictions are
imposed by law, unlike the process of formal rulemaking by public
entities.
Many examples of international private regulation are found in
the field of CSR. These regimes codify, monitor, and in some cases cer-
tify firms' compliance with labor standards, environmental, human
rights, and anti-corruption.1 4 These regimes provide a response to
broader political conflicts over the appropriate balance between states
and markets in determining such matters as the entitlement to the
protection of human rights and protection of the environment. 15
Therefore, these regulatory regimes deal with matters that used to be
the prerogative of governments, but are increasingly implemented by
enterprises. It should be noted that research has revealed the consid-
erable decrease of the number of treaties and the increase of private
regulatory frameworks since 2000. These private regimes depend on
politics and hold a kind of global governance without global govern-
ment.1 6 Beside the CSR forms of international private regulation on
which this paper focuses, international private regulation exists in
many other areas, including financial aspects of firms governed by rat-
12 Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38
J.L. Soc'y 20, 21 (2011).
13 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 164. It is pretended that regulation should
be made at the closest possible level to the regulate. See Ogus & Carbonara, supra
note 10, at 230. In between soft law and contracts are model agreements to be used
in a certain industry. See, e.g., THE MODEL MINING DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT,
MMDA (2013) available at http://www.mmdaproject.org/presentations/MMDAl_
0_ll0404Bookletv3.pdf. See also VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org (last visited March 13th 2013) which
is also connected to the extracting industry.
14 Cf. Scott et al., supra note 9, at 3.
15 Id. at 3-4.
16 Id. at 4.
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ing agencies and accounting firms.' 7 Other regimes address activities
characterized by market-oriented needs for intervention and coordina-
tion, as with technical standards regimes.
2.1 Four Types of International Private Regulation
Some CSR regimes are primarily driven by industry, while
others are driven by joint endeavor of industry and NGOs. The latter
regimes are often complimented by public intervention or public in-
volvement."8 These regimes pursue different objectives and incorpo-
rate multiple dimensions and degrees of public interest depending on
the composition of their respective governance bodies and the effects
they have on the public at large.' International private regulation in
the field of CSR clearly reflects this. Industry driven regimes focus on
rule making. These differences are reflected in the choice of govern-
ance models, the enforcement mechanisms, and particularly in the bal-
ance between judicial and non-judicial enforcement.2 ° Taking the
possibilities of enforcement and the acceptance of international private
regulation, as elaborated herein, as a baseline assessment, four models
in the CSR area are discernible: 2 '
17 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 21.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 21-23.
21 Besides these types, others are discerned outside the CSR area. One example is
a model in which monitoring standards are led by NGOs and in which these NGOs
also may set standards. An example of this model is Consumer International,
Oxfam International and Amnesty international. See, e.g., id. at 34. Another type
is an expert-led model in which the regulator is supposed to be independent from
the industry, and its legitimacy is mainly based on technical expertise. See id. at
34-35. An example is standardization by ISO. The first type in which NGOs set
standards is not common. If NGOs only monitor international private regulation,
no distinct model exists in my opinion. This is because the private regulation is set
by others, such as industry, a governing body in a multi-stakeholder model, or by
public entities. Furthermore, the distinction between the expert-led model and the
multi-stakeholder model is rather blurry, because other stakeholders participate
in the technical rule-making. This is, for example, the case in the setting of stan-
dards within ISO. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION:
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about govern-
ance.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). Its members are national standard-setting
bodies. In developed countries these national standard setting bodies are mainly
private, in developing countries they are mainly represented by governmental de-
partments or agencies. Cf Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 37; Scott et al., supra note 9,
at 11. Therefore, a clear distinction lacks between these types and the types I have
discerned.
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1) International private regulation driven by industry or a cer-
tain professional community, such as codes of conduct;22
2) A multi-stakeholder model with a governing body in which
different stakeholders participate, such as industry, NGOs,
consumer representatives, and sometimes even govern-
ments. 23 In the field of CSR, this is a well-known model;24
3) A multi-stakeholder model with a governing body (such as
model 2), whereby the governing body provides access to
scarce resources; 25 and
22 Examples of this model are the rules set to prevent child labor in the toys and
garment industry. See, e.g., Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 34; see also Ans Kolk & Rob
van Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct, 14 Transnat'l.
Corps., Dec. 2005, at 1 (discussing codes of conduct in the CSR area).
23 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 35; Overmars, supra note 7, at 19, 28 (discussing
this model outside of the CSR area). The governments might establish the norms
(either in legislation or in collaboration with stakeholders and international orga-
nizations). If the government shapes the outline of the norms in legislation, these
norms are filled in by private regulation, such as a code of conduct, meeting the
government objectives. The government might also leave the establishment of the
norms to the industry, but set requirements to be met. Furthermore, the govern-
ment might threaten to impose legislation if industry is unable to establish private
regulation. See id. at 19.
24 Examples are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, sustainable wood produc-
tion), Global Compact (all aspects of CSR) and the OECD-guidelines for multina-
tional enterprises (all aspects of CSR). FSC consists of three chambers
representing different interests (social and indigenous organizations, environmen-
tal organizations and economic organizations). These three chambers are coordi-
nated by the general assembly and fully and equally represented on the multi-
stakeholder board. The Global Compact principles are developed involving many
stakeholders, such as governments, labor and societal organizations as well as the
UN. See UN GLOBAL COMPACT PARTICIPANTS, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2013); see also
Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 37. An example in another field is the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). ISDA regulates on transactions in
swaps and derivatives and these rules are cast in a master agreement drafted by
ISDA and adapted and tailored into state legislation. Therefore there is private
regulation on an international level and hard law at state level. See id. at 36. The
ISDA example therefore may only be considered as an example of private regula-
tion on an international level. Although a master agreement is involved, it does
not fit in the contractual model because the private regulation is not spread
through contracts, but by incorporation of this international private regulation in
state legislation.
25 Sometimes such a body might govern access to financial resources. An example
is the IFC, part of the World Bank. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION:
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connectcorp-ext content/ifc-external_
corporatesite/about+ifc/organization (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). Its guidelines
are used in many loan agreements. Eco-labels using a certification scheme also
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4) A contractual model in which international private regula-
tion is spread through the use of agreements between stake-
holders, for example, between enterprises in the same
industry, in supply chains, or in loan or other financial
agreements, such as direct foreign investment.2 6 The con-
tractual model is also common in the field of CSR.
The first three models are alike in the sense that they set pri-
vate regulation through an organization.2 7 The creation and monitor-
ing of standards are implemented by using memberships and different
types of regulation, 28 frequently reaching outside the membership of
the regulatory body. It may be shaped as a federation or a multi-stake-
holder model in which both individuals and organizations participate.
Different stakeholders may be represented in the board or in the gen-
eral assembly. In such cases, power is distributed equally among the
participants.2 9 The advantage is that all parties may work together.3 °
might qualify. See, e.g., Alejandra Gandara, The Law and Economics of Eco-Labels
(Apr. 25, 2013) (Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam), available at http:l
repub.eur.nl/pub/39832. An example outside the CSR area is ICANN which regu-
lates the attribution of Internet domain names. Its board consists of technical and
non-technical members with global representation.
26 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 35-38; see also Cafaggi, supra note 10 (discussing
supply chains). An example is the Model Mining Agreement, which contains CSR-
norms in sections 22-27. THE MODEL MINING DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT, supra
note 13, §§ 22-27.
27 Cf. Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 35-38.
28 Codes of conduct, best practices, and social norms, for example, are discernible.
See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Neither 'Public' nor 'Private" 'National' nor 'Interna-
tional': Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38
J.L. & Soc'y 50, 51-52 (2011). Many of them are of a rather soft legal nature. See
Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 164.
29 In this respect, the forum and club rule-making are discerned. The forum
rulemaking consists of a formalized process in which decision-making emphasizes
political rather than technical considerations. Although consensus is sought, ap-
proval of new rules by a supermajority is formally permissible. This type of
rulemaking is generally less permeable to non-members than club rulemaking.
The club approach to rulemaking is more informal, meaning that there is greater
flexibility in the process. Decisions are more technocratic in nature, and outcomes
generally require consensus. Club rule-making processes are often more accessible
to interested non-members than forum rulemaking. See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL,
WORLD RULE 144 (The University of Chicago Press 2010). By and large, four fea-
tures of rule-making are discernible: (i) formality (how precisely is the rule-mak-
ing process stipulated in organization documents, either formal or informal); (ii)
decision calculus (what is the nature of deliberations regarding proposed rules,
either technical or political); (iii) decision rule (how is the decision to approve a
new rule made: majoritan, supermajoritan, special powers, consensus); and (iv)
inclusiveness (how open is the rule-making process to participation by nonmem-
bers, either self-contained or participatory). See id. at 145.
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In some instances, a leading constituency exists, which establishes the
regulatory regime and its enforcement mechanisms and leaves other
members a degree of control only by informal consultations or with-
drawal as a member.3 1
2.2 Public and Private Regulation
Although international private regulation has to be discerned
from, and stands next to, public regulation, this does not mean these
regulatory regimes are distinct from each other. On the contrary, one
may characterize the interaction between these two regimes as a melt-
ing pot.32 The state continues its deep involvement in the setting and
administration of norms that govern the global marketplace, in spite of
the fact that it is far from the sole author of governing regulations. 33
Markets did not simply evolve according to natural laws, but were in-
stead subject to and the result of state regulation.3 4
While the state still plays an important role, the relationship between
the private and public spheres needs further consideration. By and
large, three different forms of relationships between the public and
private dimension are discernible:3
1) Mutual Influence.
Mutual influence of public and private regulation encompasses
two directions. On one hand, administrative law principles are applied
to private organizations exercising rulemaking power at the interna-
tional level. For example, administrative rules on the preparation of
regulation and involving relevant stakeholders could be used in the
30 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 11.
31 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 35.
32 Cf Cata Backer, supra note 6, at 1768-81; Larry Cata Backer, Multinational
Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation, 14:2 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMp. L., 499, 508-23 (2007-2008); Larry Cata Backer, Rights and Ac-
countability in Development (Raid) V Das Air and Global Witness V Afrimex:
Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regula-
tion of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELBOURNE J. OF INT'L L., 1, 30-38 (2009);
Larry Cata Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: the
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Govern-
ance Order, 18 INDIANA J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 751 (2011). See GEORGIOs DIMI-
TROPOULOS, ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND AKKREDITIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN
VERWALTUNGSVERBUND 224 (Mohr Siebeck, Tuibingen, Germany, 2012).
33 Zumbansen, supra note 28, at 54.
34 Id. at 55.
35 Cf Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 44-45 (discerning four forms). See on these inter-
actions also Burkhard Eberlein, et al., Transnational Business Governance Inter-
actions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 6-
11 (2014) available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doil1O.1111/rego.12030/pdf.
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process of international private rulemaking. 6 On the other hand, in-
ternational private regulation applies to regulate enterprises and
other entities, for example through public domestic open norms. 3 7 Do-
mestic public legislation on contract and tort may be deployed to
harden international private law at the domestic level and to make
binding rules that would not otherwise be enforceable. In this respect,
national legislative instruments lend strength and legitimacy to inter-
national private regulation.38
If mutual influence exists, it is not always easy to separate pri-
vate regulation from state legislation. The rules might be set by a pub-
lic actor, such as the UN, but compliance with these rules is monitored
by private actors at an international level and often jointly by enter-
prises and NGOs. These rules might be enforced by courts at the na-
tional level. 39 The setting and dissemination of corporate governance
rules that entail the requirement of a CSR policy, for example, oper-
ates through the migration of standards and cross-fertilization of pri-
vate and public norms.4"
36 A Dutch example is provided by Section 25 of the Dutch Privacy Act. On the
basis of this Section, the public supervising body (CBP) has the power to decide (by
means of an administrative decision) whether a code of conduct on privacy protec-
tion set by a certain industry meets the requirements of the Dutch privacy act.
Section 25 of the Dutch Privacy act requires a preparation of this administrative
decision using the procedure of section 3.4 of the Dutch General administrative
law, which provides the opportunity to all relevant stakeholders to give their view
on the decision and the underlying code of conduct. The preparation of secondary
regulation in the United States also involves an opportunity for relevant stake-
holders to give their view on this regulation. This procedure might also be of use to
international private rulemaking entities in order to involve relevant stakehold-
ers. Cf GIESEN, supra note 8, at 149.
37 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 44. This raises, however, the question of interpreta-
tion of these open norms, because, unlike public regulation, easily public accessi-
ble information on the interpretation of private regulation may lack. See, e.g.,
GIESEN, supra note 8, at 121-27.
38 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 47-48. This raises the question under which circum-
stances activities can or cannot be appropriately privately regulated, and after,
the role and limits of private regulation. See Scott et al., supra note 9, at 4.
39 Regarding private regulation, specific tools to coordinate and solve conflicts are
developed. Therefore enforcement is not only a matter for the national courts.
However, private regulation does not have a common set of principles to bridge
gaps in each regime. Domestic private law is primarily deployed to perform this
function. Because of the differences between state legislation, this method gener-
ates fragmentation and inconsistencies within the same regime. See Cafaggi,
supra note 12, at 48-49.
40 Zumbansen, supra note 28, at 58, 60. An example is the Dutch corporate gov-
ernance rules, originally set by the Tabaksblat committee, in which enterprises,
labor unions, shareholders and the government have been represented, in connec-
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In such cases, the relationship between the public and private
spheres is intertwined. Because of this the relationship transforms in
a variety of ways.4 1 This often involves the mixing of public and pri-
vate legal instruments and collaboration between governmental and
non-governmental actors.4 2 This serves to improve deterrence. It in-
creases effectiveness by using targeted monitoring of transnational
rules.4 3 Collaboration favors transfer of regulatory strategies and en-
forcement from private to public and vice versa, as is the case for the
contractual supply chain approach mentioned above.4 4 This approach
may reduce the number of regulatory arrangements and increase later
recognition of privately designed standards by international
organizations.
Therefore, in the previous instances, the private and public re-
gimes remain autonomous, but their regulatory activities are mutually
influenced.4" This is the most common way in which public regulation
co-exists with private regulation.
2) Collaborative Rulemaking
In this process, the mutual influence of public and private reg-
ulation is amplified into deliberate collaboration as private and public
actors engage in the joint drafting of rules.4 6 A variant on this process
is where private actors draft rules that are subsequently approved or
promulgated by public actors. In the latter, private actors internalize
the principles upon which the public actor will promulgate the rules
tion with which rules a "comply or explain" responsibility is adopted in Section
2:391 subsection 5 of the Dutch civil code as to the financial statements of an en-
terprise. See, e.g., Overmars, supra note 7, at 23. These rules, set in 1997, were
revised and expanded upon in 2004. Therefore, a duty to disclose exists regarding
deviation from corporate governance recommendations and the legislator chose to
transpose this obligation to disclose into statutory law. See id. at 16. For legisla-
tion in other countries, see Zumbansen, supra note 28, at 60.
41 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 11.
42 Id. at 11.
43 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 45.
44 Id. An example can be seen in Dutch environmental rules which are adopted in
supply chain contracts with foreign suppliers. Because of this adoption these rules
become international private regulation on a global level.
45 Id. Private companies which monitor compliance with public regulation might
adopt privately set standards (such as ISO-standards) to perform this task.
46 Id. at 44. This might also lead to a reduction of cost for the regulatory body as
well as the regulatees. See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private
Regulation, Mapping the Labyrinth, (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working
Document No. 370, 2012) available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/public-and-private-
regulation-mapping-labyrinth.
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set by private actors.4 7 The setting of private regulation could take
place within multi-stakeholder organizations encompassing both pri-
vate and public actors, or through regulatory contracts in the form of
agreements or memoranda of understanding. s
3) Competition
Competition occurs when private actors raise the standards de-
fined by the public actor, thereby decreasing the legitimacy of public
regulation and taking leadership without being subject to the procedu-
ral requirements applied to international public law regimes. 49 Com-
petition takes place both in vertical complementarity between
transnational regulators and states and in horizontal complementarity
between international organizations and intergovernmental
organizations."0
2.3 Advantages of International Private Regulation
International private regulation is an attractive instrument in
the CSR area, and cannot be neglected as part of the regulatory frame-
work. 1 Furthermore, its importance is growing due to the future like-
lihood of a substantial increase in international private regulation. 52
Besides this, if public regulation is lacking, international private regu-
lation fulfills the need felt by enterprises to adopt certain regulation in
the area of CSR. Private regulation also may be more effective than
public regulation, because public regulation is, by its definition, invol-
untary in nature.
Besides this, consensus exits over the inability of states to reg-
ulate global markets. Even where international standards exist, they
are hardly uniformly implemented. Therefore, for example, private
47 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 44. An example outside the CSR area is the rules
applicable to the drafting and content of financial statements by international cor-
porations. These rules, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
are set by a global private organization, the International Accounting Standardi-
zation Board (IASB). These rules are binding in the European Union because of
section 3 of Regulation 1606/2002 [2002] OJ L243. See HR 24 april 2009, NJ 2009,
345 m.nt. (AFM/Spyker) (Neth.). Cf. in connection with the specifications of build-
ing products in the EU set by a private body and which have to be accepted by the
EU-member states because of (sections 3, 8, 27 and annex I). Regulation 305/2011,
2011 O.J. (L 88) 5 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:201 1:088:0005:0043:EN:PDF.
48 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 44.
49 Id. at 45.
50 Id.
51 Cf id. at 25-29; Overmars, supra note 7, at 17; Scott et al., supra note 9, at 4.
52 See Law Scenarios to 2030, LAW OF THE FUTURE FORUM, http://www.lawofthefu-
ture.org/237/law-scenarios-to-2030 (last visited March 13th 2013).
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("NGO") led forestry protection regimes and regulation of measures
preventing and diminishing the effects of climate change are imple-
mented.5 3 The European Commission has also called for self- and co-
regulation schemes in the area of CSR, as these are important means
by which enterprises seek to meet their social responsibility.5 4 Addi-
tionally, some states experience difficulties in securing compliance
with internationally granted human rights. This may, in part, be ac-
commodated by international private regulation. Furthermore, inter-
national private regulation in certain industries may be necessary to
create a level playing field in order to enable or benefit the introduc-
tion of CSR-standards.5 5 Several other advantages and drivers of in-
ternational private regulation are discerned,5 6 which also apply in the
CSR area:
1) The need for harmonization and the reduction of transac-
tion costs.
Due to divergent state legislation and codes of conduct, nor-
mative fragmentation of markets and trade barriers is an
identified rationale for international private regulation. In-
ternational private regulation may be a response to either
53 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 26.
54 Communication from the Commission on a renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for
Corporate Social Responsibility of October 25th 2011, COM(2011) 681, p. 5, 9, 10,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr/
new-csr/act en.pdf (last visited March 13th 2013). The Commission proposes a
multi-stakeholder CSR platform in a number of relevant industrial sectors for en-
terprises, their workers, and other stakeholders to make public commitments on
the CSR issues relevant to each sector and jointly monitor progress. See id. at 9.
55 Cf. KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 52, 63; Scott et al., supra note 9, at 7. However,
this raises the question whether such private regulation violates public regulation
on competition. If a level playing field is necessary to enhance the introduction of
CSR standards, it is in my opinion helpful to introduce an exemption (on competi-
tion rules) because the public good benefits, unlike most company conduct violat-
ing competition rules. At this moment (European) competition law does not
provide for such an exemption. However, if this exemption is introduced, public
supervision might be necessary. As an example of supervision section 25 of the
Dutch privacy protection act may serve. This section grants the (public) privacy
protection agency the power to take an administrative decision whether a certain
code of conduct meets the requirements set forth by the Dutch privacy protection
act. In deciding the agency has to use an administrative procedure in which all
stakeholders may give their view on the decision and through this on the code of
conduct. The competition authorities might use a comparable procedure to assess
whether certain international private regulation violates competition rules. In this
assessment might, amongst others, be considered whether the exemption is pro-
portional to the goals strived after by the private regulation.
56 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 25-30; Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 6. See also
Eberlein et al., supra note 35, at 9 and 10.
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multiplication of private regimes or diverging public
legislation.5 7
2) The weakness of public international law.
3) Change of technology.
The effectiveness of state implementation is often ques-
tioned. Monitoring at a local level frequently follows the in-
centives of individual states or litigants in courts, who may
not be aligned with international regimes. Monitoring re-
sources may be deployed in favor of domestic interest at the
expense of the protection of the global common good. This
does not mean, however, that local enforcement is unimpor-
tant even where international private regulation is
established.5"
4) The weakness of public international law.
5) Change of technology.
The Internet has provided an illustration of the role of tech-
nology in shifting rulemaking power from national to inter-
national and from public to private. The conflict between
Google and China highlights new modes of regulation at the
global level based on contracts between multi-national firms
and states.59
6) Technical standards.
For example, international public and private regulation re-
garding safety have adopted a supply chain approach driven
by the use of technical standards that are difficult for states
to monitor. Standardization bodies have increased their in-
fluence on regulatory regimes, moving from product to pro-
cess standards, and improving the quality of management
standards. These standards result in diminishing differ-
ences across sectors and the reduction of the distance be-
tween public and private regulation. Both public and
private bodies refer to the same technical standards.6"
57 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 25; PETER UTTING, REGULATING BUSINESS VIA MULTI-
STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, UNRISD RESEARCH PRO-
JECT PROMOTING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, 84
(2001). In connection with eco-labels, see Gandara, supra note 25, at 262-63.
58 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 27.
59 Id. at 28-29. Cf. Joost Pauwelyn et al., Informal International Lawmaking: An
Assessment and Template to Keep It Both Effective and Accountable, in INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 500, 505 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., Oxford University Press
2012).
60 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 29.
276 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:2
7) Sometimes the capacity for oversight in a certain matter is
best developed in private regulation.6 1
8) Flexibility.
It is contended that private regulation provides the regula-
tor with greater flexibility, both in terms of regulatory de-
sign and sanctions, while public hard law is more rigid, but
provides higher legal certainty and stability.6 2 In practice,
private regulation often operates as a partial substitute for
public regulation, because the latter is slower and may be
more costly and less effective. 3 In some instances, interna-
tional private regulation precedes public regulation. For ex-
ample, standards providing the metrics and good practices
to the targeted stakeholders are deemed necessary in sup-
port of environmental and climate change policies. In such
circumstances, public legislation may demand for interna-
tional private regulation that entails best practices and sets
goals and standards delivering the technical and organiza-
tional modalities. Such a framework has the flexibility to
adapt more rapidly to changing circumstances. 4
2.4 Disadvantages of International Private Regulation
Despite these attractive features of international private regu-
lation as compared to traditional public legislation, international pri-
vate regulation like other legal instruments, also has disadvantages.
For example, private regulation is deemed ineffective if citizens
or industries are unable to stand up for certain interests or if protec-
tion of vulnerable assets or people is involved. 6 ' This is, however, only
partially true. In the area of CSR, for example, the protection of
61 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 4 (Codes of conduct might bridge an information
asymmetry between supplier and consumer). See Overmars, supra note 7, at 17.
62 Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation:
How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127, 133-34, (D. Moss & J. Cisternino eds., 2009);
Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 47. Cf Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 234. As is
shown hereinafter in the sociological perspective, it is important for stakeholders
to accept the rules. A rapidly changing regulatory environment diminishes accept-
ance of new rules requiring flexibility from the private rulemaker. See Balleisen &
Eisner, supra note 62, at 134.
63 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 48.
64 Report of the Expert Panel for the Review of the European Standardization
System, Standardization for a Competitive and Innovative Europe: A Vision for
2020, at 21 (Feb. 2010) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/euro-
pean-standards/standardisation-policy/policy-review/express/indexen.htm.
65 Overmars, supra note 7, at 26.
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human rights is more and more accommodated in international pri-
vate regulation.
Furthermore, a disadvantage of international private regula-
tion is considered to be its lack of legitimacy because of its detachment
from traditional government mechanisms. Besides this, international
private regulation has other disadvantages such as: market disruption
(due to a restriction of competition), the voluntary nature of interna-
tional private regulation, and free-riders benefitting from the exis-
tence of international private regulation without adopting or
implementing it, consumer detriment and insufficient protection
against human rights violations, and environmental damage. These
disadvantages need to be avoided as much as possible.
3. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE
REGULATION
3.1 The Need for Assessing Effectiveness
The search for the outline of a methodology to assess the effec-
tiveness of international private regulation as compared to other inter-
national private regulation begs the question of whether a need exists
for assessing effectiveness. This is unsurprising but not self-evident.
International private regulation has many functions, including, for ex-
ample, a signaling function. Is this type of private regulation, adhering
companies on human rights and environmental issues, a bad thing?
Apart from the problems this type of regulation might generate in
terms of competition, hindering trade, and public procurement issues,
progress still must be made in the environmental, human rights, and
the rest of the CSR arena. Therefore, initiatives having a signaling
function without contributing to any change in these respects might be
considered less effective in comparison with initiatives that do contrib-
ute to this.
The need for an assessment of effectiveness of international
private regulation can be illustrated from different perspectives. Pri-
vate initiatives may learn from each other which measures or norms
are most effective. A multinational enterprise considering the imple-
mentation of international private regulation might be interested in
assessing whether implementing yet another private initiative is bene-
ficial. If a tool exists to assess the economic effectiveness of specific
international private regulation, this also might provide an important
incentive for enterprises to implement this regulation. Research has
revealed that key factors which led business to support FSC, a CSR-
initiative on sustainable wood, "were based on pragmatic evaluations
related to the possibility of either increased market access or the pro-
tection of market share and not through normative evaluations relat-
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ing to participation, transparency, and so on."6 6 Furthermore,
enterprises might be interested in learning which type of private regu-
lation to implement. For example, it might be beneficial to use the con-
tractual model through a supply chain, but also to engage in a multi-
stakeholder initiative or to establish an internal code of conduct. An
enterprise, or an industry as a whole, might need tools to assess
whether the contractual model, the multi-stakeholder initiative, or the
code of conduct delivers the best results. Assessing the effectiveness of
these options is indispensable when making an educated guess. How-
ever, to date, global operating businesses do not seem highly inter-
ested in effectiveness assessments, mainly because it considers
international private regulation as reflective of the measures it has
already taken. Because of this, in its view, international private regu-
lation does not bring about real changes in its daily business. That
said, it is important to note that many private regulatory regimes exist
in the CSR arena, and it is increasingly difficult for business to choose
between these regimes.6 7 Beyond that, effectiveness may vary among
the stakeholders involved. Self-regulation may be quite prosperous for
the manufacturers or the extracting industry involved, but the con-
trary is true for their buyers or the local communities that are affected
by their manufacturing process or mining activities. Therefore, the as-
sessment of effectiveness of international private regulation calls for
scrutinizing the effects on all stakeholders. 68
Public regulators considering the promulgation of new legisla-
tion may also benefit from assessment of the effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation. If this assessment achieves their objectives,
private regulation might become a viable solution to fulfill public pol-
icy goals.69 International private regulation may even fulfill national
66 Donal Casey & Colin Scott, The Crystallization of Regulatory Norms, 38 J.L. &
Soc'v 76, 91 (2011). Cf. Eberlein et al., supra note 35, at 12 and 13.
67 See Gabriela Alvarez & Oliver von Hagen, When Do Private Standards Work?
Literature Review Series on the Impacts of Private Standards; Part IV, ITC Techni-
cal Papers 21 (2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=2184314 (referring to ISEAL research which shows that the respondents in-
deed experience difficulties). But see, e.g., GIESEN, supra note 8, at 93-106 (discern-
ing several ways in which private regulation might be binding: public regulation
in which either is referred to private regulation or which entails open norms com-
plemented by private regulation, or an agreement). However, on (international)
CSR issues such public legislation is less frequent. Therefore, before private regu-
lation becomes binding on an enterprise on the international level, it often has a
choice whether it accepts a specific regime.
68 This assessment includes the effects on the final beneficiaries. Cf Cafaggi,
supra note 12, at 32.
69 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 26; Greetje Schouten, Tabling Sustainable
Commodities through Private Governance, Processes of Legitimization in the
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public policy objectives beyond the legal sphere of a national state. The
public legislator might be interested in the effectiveness of private en-
forcement of international private regulation to assess whether addi-
tional public enforcement is required.70
If the assessment reveals that private regulation malfunctions
and does not reach the government objectives, this might stimulate
the promulgation of public legislation.7 For example, the legislator
may want to assess whether certain eco-labels have a real impact on
improving the environment and do not unnecessarily hinder trade.7 If
no measurable impact is assessed and/or trade is unnecessarily hin-
dered, they can examine which type of public regulation should be
promulgated to enhance trade and lessen the environmental impact of
the eco-labeled products. In this respect, it is important to notice that
eco-labels perform best if the legislative environmental standards are
not too high.73 The legislator might consider supporting effective eco-
labels too.74 This could be achieved through tax relief, subsidies, the
Roundtables on Sustainable Palm Oil and Responsible Soy 68 (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Wageningen, Utrecht, The Netherlands 2013). Cf The
United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) Voluntary Sus-
tainability Standards: Today's Landscape and Issues & Initiatives to Reach Public
Policy Objectives, Part 1: Issues, http://unfss.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/unfss-re-
port-issues-ldraft lores.pdf (last visited October 23rd 2013); Part III: Annexes to
the Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 24-7, COM (2009), available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/governance/impact/commission-guidelines/docs/iag_2009_annex en.pdf.
See also UTTING, supra note 57, at 108-09. For them too, it is of importance to
achieve the objectives strived after by governmental organizations in order to min-
imize the risk of public regulation. . See Jodi L. Short, Self-Regulation in the Regu-
latory Void: "Blue Moon" or "Bad Moon"?, 649 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.
22, 24 (2013), available at http://ann.sagepub.com/content/649/1/22.abstract. See
Schouten, supra note 69, at 114-25.
70 Balleisen and Eisner even contend that such assessment is necessary to pre-
vent insufficient regulatory oversight which might result from international pri-
vate regulation. See Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 127.
71 Overmars, supra note 7, at 18. Therefore, Cafaggi and Renda contend that the
public regulator should not leave the assessment of international private regula-
tion to private players. See Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 25; see also Part III:
Annexes to the Impact Assessment Guidelines, supra note 69, at 24.
72 Eco-labels entail, amongst others, words, symbols, and marks indicating com-
pliance with certain environmental or social standards to which compliance has
been certified. See, e.g., Gandara, supra note 25, at 22.
73 Id. at 127, 348. However, in my view, this should not be an incentive to lower
regulatory standards, but to assess whether an eco-label might be able to support
or satisfy governmental objectives.
74 For example, by remedying the effects of companies using frivolous or false en-
vironmental claims and thus jeopardizing the real eco-label market. See, e.g.,
Gandara, supra note 25, at 133-42. However, tax related measures seem unneces-
sary costly. See id. at 158-59. In this respect it is of interest to notice that the
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recognition of certified standards in connection with the assessment of
whether certain sustainability standards are met, and technical assis-
tance or training. 75 The public legislator may eventually even require
proof of effectiveness of international private regulation in order to re-
frain from promulgating public legislation. For example, the European
Commission calls for clear commitments from all concerned stakehold-
ers in the CSR arena, with (i) performance indicators, (ii) a framework
which provides for objective monitoring mechanisms, (iii) performance
review, (iv) the possibility of improving commitments as needed, and
(v) an effective accountability mechanism for dealing with complaints
regarding non-compliance.7 6 If the stakeholders involved are unable to
set effective international private regulation in this arena, it is likely
the European Commission will use legislative instruments.
Eco-labels could also lead to additional pollution, as paying for
an eco-label might alleviate guilt and induce consumers to pollute even
more. 7 7 However, no systematic monitoring of international private
regulation by public regulators exists, not in the least because of the
global nature of international private regulation. Monitoring by na-
tional or regional governmental bodies is not particularly helpful in
such circumstances. Although global scrutiny of international private
regulation by international public organizations is preferable, this
does not prevent regional or national public bodies from an appraisal
of an international private regulatory regime, preferably through pub-
lic regulatory cooperation.7" This appraisal may be connected with the
aforementioned issues, but also with the legitimacy of certain interna-
tional private regulation. The public body might want to assess
whether important stakeholders are able to provide their views on the
provisioned international private regulation or even be a co-regulator.
Furthermore, the large amount of CSR labels causes difficul-
ties in public procurement. 79 This might be a complicating factor, as
the use of eco-labels in public procurement is considered a driver for
European Commission has developed its own, voluntary eco-label. See Environ-
ment, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://www.ecolabel.eu (last visited August 7th
2013).
75 See, e.g., Voluntary Sustainability Standards: Today's Landscape and Issues &
Initiatives to Reach Public Policy Objectives, at 45, UNFSS, http://unfss.files.word-
press.com/2012/05/unfss-report-issues-ldraft-lores.pdf [hereinafter Voluntary
Sustainability Standards]
76 See Communication from the Commission, supra note 54, at 10.
77 Voluntary Sustainability Standards , supra note 75, at 27; Gandara, supra note
25, at 200.
78 Cafaggi, supra note 46, at 25.
79 See generally, Voluntary Sustainability Standards, supra note 75, at 34-38;
Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 6-7. However, they suggest that companies in
general do not experience problems with this. Id. at 17.
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the uptake of these eco-labels, which the government might favor, in
markets.8 0 If a government or an enterprise prescribes a specific CSR
label, an applicant might contend that another label it adheres to per-
forms as well as the label prescribed and also meets the requirements
of the procurator. Governments and enterprises have few tools to as-
sess this contention.8 l However, the size is not necessarily a problem
in the broader context. Different standards may serve a purpose in dif-
ferent fields, issues, regions, or type of companies, such as smal-
lholders and distributors. In these circumstances, they may be
complementary. 2 That said, if certain initiatives entail comparable
objectives in comparable arenas, the effectiveness question arises.
This is also true regarding initiatives in different arenas, as
they might overlap and interfere with the possible ensuing lack of ef-
fectiveness. Furthermore, international private regulation, especially
when intended to create a level playing field between competitors,
might cause market disruption. To a certain extent, this might be use-
ful to support CSR, but clear lines are needed. International private
regulation should therefore effectively meet the CSR policy require-
ments, but should not unnecessarily disrupt markets or hinder sus-
tainable trade.8 3 International private regulation might pose a factual
trade barrier, which may lead to complaints to the WTO or GATT. 4
The more ineffective international private regulation exists, the
greater the risk of unnecessary market disruption or trade hindrance.
Private regulation could have other adverse effects as well. Members
of a certain scheme might stick to suboptimal agreements and focal
points with no incentive to change (lock-in effects).8 5 Furthermore,
covered changes might be induced by the prevalence of some interests
over others, and self-indulgence in the evaluation of private regulatory
bodies might occur, especially when governance arrangements entail
80 Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 11.
81 EU regulation prohibits the prescription of a specific label and prescribes the
use of certain criteria with which the labels advertise to comply. According to EU
regulations the procurer has to determine whether these criteria have been met.
In the Netherlands the 'CO 2 Prestatieladder' is developed to assist business (and
government) in assessing the carbon footprint of a tendering company. See C0 2-
Prestatieladder [C0 2-Performance Lader], SKAO, http://www.skao.nl (last visited
April 20th 2013).
82 Voluntary Sustainability Standards, supra note 75, at 15-17, 35.
83 Cf Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 8, 15, 26, 27.
84 It might be contended that a protectionist non-tariff barrier to trade is imposed.
See UTTING, supra note 57, at 97; Gandara, supra note 25, at 19, 21, 305-336
(description of the Mexican-US Tuna Conflict); Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, Annex 3, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http: / / www.wto.org / englishl
docs ellegal e /17-tbt e.htm (promulgating best practices for standard-setting).
85 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 17.
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self-evaluation. s6 Notwithstanding this, effective private regulation
might favor investments and enhance trade if it is adhered to on a
global level.
NGO's could also benefit from assessing the effectiveness of in-
ternational private regulation. If an NGO assesses whether an enter-
prise has taken adequate measures to prevent environmental damage,
it is relevant whether this enterprise has implemented specific inter-
national private regulation. If it has, the enterprise might advertise its
pretended adequate measures. However, if the private regulation
proves ineffective, the implementation will be a poor indicator of the
adequacy of the measures. The implementation of specific private reg-
ulation does not support the enterprises' claim, which is obviously of
relevance to the NGO. Besides this, NGOs considering setting new in-
ternational private regulation in a certain arena might benefit from
the assessment, whether or not effective private regulation already
exists.
Besides the previous issues, private entities that set interna-
tional private regulation in many instances lack the rule-making expe-
rience public regulators have."v The primary cause of this is the
absence of restrictions on setting private regulation-anyone may be a
rule-maker. This results in too much international private regulation
in certain areas. This can also mean poor quality regulation. Poorly
drafted private regulation causes legal uncertainty and unnecessary
cost.88 For example, the need for proper rule setting and best practices
is noticed by the ISEAL Alliance, which has set the Code of ISEAL
Good Practice. This code codifies best practices for the design and im-
plementation of social and environmental standards initiatives.8 9
Therefore, the effectiveness of international private regulation may
not be taken for granted even less so than the effectiveness of public
86 Id.
87 Cf GIESEN, supra note 8, at 144 n.147-50 (proposing the establishment of direc-
tions on private regulation by governments).
88 See Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in PRODUCTION OF LEGAL
RULES, supra note 10, at 18, 19.
89 Setting Social and Environmental Standards v5, ISEAL ALLIANCE (June 4,
2010), available at http://www.isealalliance.org/online-community/resources/iseal-
standard-setting-code [hereinafter ISEAL Code of Good Practice]. It is applicable
on environmental and social standards for products or related processes and pro-
duction methods (section 3.3). See, e.g., Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 20. Cf
Principals for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community
Practice, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2013), available at https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-agenda/enlnews/principles-better-self-and-co-regulation-and-establish-
ment-community-practice.
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regulation. It is therefore important to assess the effectiveness of in-
ternational private regulation. 90
Finally, the number of actors, norms, and rationales in the still
growing transnational sphere of CSR may cause multiple public and
private regulators to compete for business. 1 In this competition, espe-
cially between private regulatory regimes, assessing the effectiveness
of international private regulation might prove to be a useful tool to
choose certain regimes above others and to dismantle less effective in-
ternational private regulation.
3.2 Different Ways to Assess Effectiveness
As noted in the introduction, the effectiveness of private regu-
lation in the CSR area might be assessed in different ways. It might be
assessed through a legal, but also through an economic, sociological, or
psychological/behavioral avenue.9 2 The legal avenue focuses on the
objectives of the private regulation itself and whether they provide"conflict of law" rules in connection with other private regulation, en-
forcement of private regulation, and conflict resolution. Therefore, this
avenue does not analyze the substantive private norms. Rather, the
avenue provides for "meta-rules" on the formation and enforcement of
such regulation and the resolution of conflicts in connection with these
norms. The economic avenue focuses on the actual impact of private
regulation in terms of economic benefits and growth. It also considers
social, consumer, and environmental detriment, and possible market
disruption or trade hindrance. The sociological approach is connected
with acceptance (legitimacy) of private regulation and focuses on the
90 This is recognized by the joint ISEAL and FAO initiative. SAFA Guidelines:
Sustainability Assessment of Food and Agriculture Systems, FAO (2013), available
at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability-pathways/docs/SAFA
_GuidelinesFinal_122013.pdf. For information on this initiative, see, e.g., Cafaggi
and Renda, supra note 46, at 23-25.
91 Cf Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It
Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. OF INT'L L. 513, 518 (2008). With respect to competition
between private and public regulation, see Anne Meuwese & Patricia Popelier, Le-
gal Implications of Better Regulation: A Special Issue, EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 455,
458 (2011). The competition for members can increase the standards. However,
competition might also lead to watered-down standards. In connection with bio
fuels, see Schouten, supra note 69, at 114-26. However, if several organizations
establish regimes, control might emerge from both cooperation and competition.
See Scott et al., supra note 9, at 15.
92 However, other approaches are proposed as well. See, e.g. Cafaggi & Renda,
supra note 46, at 13 (contending that effectiveness measures ex ante the propor-
tionality between means and ends and ex post the positive or negative impact of
the regulatory measure over the different constituencies including regulated par-
ties and beneficiaries).
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way private regulation is communicated, the way in which it is imple-
mented, whether proper procedures are used to engage relevant stake-
holders, and how the decision making process is shaped. The
psychological or behavioral approach analyzes the effects, if any, of
private regulation on behavior.
In many instances, the more avenues that are fulfilled, the
more likely it is that international private regulation is effective.
Moreover, these avenues are intertwined. 3 Engaging stakeholders in
a regulatory scheme by representation and by organizing accountabil-
ity might enhance acceptance, as well as legitimacy, which are impor-
tant aspects of the sociological approach, but might increase the
transaction and compliance costs that are important from an economic
point of view, and might hinder enforcement, which is an important
aspect of the legal approach. Economic impact assessment tends to
neglect the sociological incentives to comply with a private regulatory
framework and the possibility of effective enforcement. 4
As I previously stated, research has elucidated that "key fac-
tors which led businesses to support the FSC were based on pragmatic
[economic] evaluations related to the possibility of either increased
market access or the protection of market share" rather than "through
normative evaluations relating to participation, transparency and so
on."9 5 Thus, economic effectiveness seems to be a more compelling
driver for implementing international private regulation, than mere
acceptance of this regulation. That said, effectiveness is scarcely as-
sessed taking a legal, as well as an economic, sociological, and psycho-
logical avenue. 96 An example of this is the MSI-evaluation tool for
multi-stakeholder initiatives in the human rights arena, a highly so-
phisticated evaluation tool with over 400 indicators that analyze effec-
tiveness from a human rights perspective using insights from legal
and sociologic disciplines, but not from the economic and psychological
avenues.9 7
93 See id. at 14.
94 Cf Andrea Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World 97 (Apr. 7, 2011)
(Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam) available at http://repub.eur.nl/
pub/22920 (in connection with public regulation).
95 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 91.
96 Cf Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 14. However, from a methodological
perspective it has to be assessed whether insights from other disciplines might be
used in a legal context. Hereinafter I indicate in which instances research ac-
quired from other disciplines may be of importance in a legal context.
97 The MSI Evaluation Tool is developed by MSIntegrity, IHRC, and the Harvard
Law School's Human Rights Clinic. See MSI Evaluation Tool, THE INSTITUTE FOR
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVE INTEGRITY, http://www.msi-integrity.org (last vis-
ited Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter MSI-Evaluation Tool].
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Despite this, all of these disciplines are needed to assess effec-
tiveness of international private regulation. This is supported by the
fact that eco-labels that are part of the ISEAL Alliance-which pro-
vides meta-rules on international private agricultural standards in-
cluding elements of the legal, economic, and sociological approach-
are best represented in the global markets.9" This underlines the im-
portance of scrutinizing international private regulation using the
aforementioned approaches. Related to this issue, effectiveness should
be assessed by independent bodies, as the private initiatives them-
selves might overstate their effectiveness.9 9
Effectiveness assessment, in this sense, should be applied to
private rule-setting (ex ante approach) as well as to the analysis of the
effectiveness of existing international private regulation (ex post ap-
proach). In the rule making process, all avenues are of importance: the
legal with respect to the clarity of the rules and their objectives, con-
flict of laws issues, added value, enforcement, and conflict resolution;
the sociological with respect to foreseeable acceptance of norms and
stakeholder engagement; the macro-economic with respect to possible
consumer detriment or environmental impact, labor issues, market
disruption, and trade hindrance; and the psychological with respect to
behavioral issues in connection with effective behavioral steering. As
to the effectiveness of existing international private regulation, the le-
gal avenue is of importance, especially in connection with enforcement
and conflict resolution, as well as the economic impact assessment.
The sociological avenue operates as a correctional factor in that, if
norms are not accepted by relevant stakeholders, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and positive impacts of a private regulatory framework
may be hampered.
3.3 Different Effectiveness Indicators?
International private regulation is quite frequent in the CSR
arena and it is questionable whether a single methodology might be
established to assess effectiveness. This is because private regulation
differs and covers a lot of topics, fields, functions, and types of enter-
prises and takes different angles, from reporting on, for example, envi-
ronmental and social impact, as well as on topics connected to possible
bribery, to agreements on security, and round tables and involves dif-
ferent stakeholders as well as regions.1 "0 That said, a single methodol-
ogy is preferable and also conceivable.
98 Gandara, supra note 25, at 225, 270.
99 Cf Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 17-18.
10o On the importance of this regional context, see Alvarez & von Hagen, supra
note 67, at 10.
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Although the variation in international private regulation in
the CSR arena may seem tremendous, by and large, it all boils down to
three types. These are (i) government incentivized/established multi-
stakeholder initiatives (OECD guidelines for multinational enter-
prises, Global Compact, EU eco-label), (ii) privately (NGO or business)
established multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g. round tables in food
chains, FSC, and agreements between enterprises on CSR issues), and
(iii) initiatives within an enterprise (corporate governance code). It is
reasonable to assess the effectiveness of multi-stakeholders initiatives
using the same methodology, irrespective of their governmental or pri-
vate roots. It is helpful to compare the effectiveness of these types,
amongst others, to assess whether increased government involvement
contributes to effectiveness. Moreover, the effectiveness of the third
type should be compared with the other types as well, because this
type of private regulation is deemed rather ineffective. This contention
might be proven false if a comparison is made with the other types.
Therefore, a single methodology, using context-independent indicators
and impact assessment, is preferable and should be the starting point
for further research.
As previously discussed, enterprises or an industry, as well as
governmental bodies have an interest in the assessment of the effec-
tiveness of international private regulation. The question arises
whether different effectiveness indicators should be used among gov-
ernments or governmental bodies and enterprises. 10 1 Preferably, the
same indicators and types of assessment would be used. Although gov-
ernmental bodies and enterprises use the outcomes of effectiveness de-
termination for their own purposes, they still may have a common
interest. For example, if a government determines whether or not cer-
tain legislation in the CSR arena will be promulgated or determines
whether enterprises or industries meet certain CSR requirements, it
might be interested in assessing whether existing international pri-
vate regulation achieves its public policy objectives. It might even ask
a certain enterprise or industry to "prove" the effectiveness of the ex-
isting international private regulation. If the indicators differ depend-
ing on the assessment made by the enterprise or industry and the
government, the enterprises have to make different assessments,
which is unnecessarily complicated and costly. Additionally, different
assessments might lead to different outcomes. From this, lengthy dis-
cussions between governments and enterprises or industries should
arise about the effectiveness of international private regulation. Be-
sides this, the question arises which of the types of assessment other
stakeholders, like NGO's, should conduct. This complicates the dual
1o1 Cafaggi and Renda seem to adhere to different indicators. Cafaggi & Renda,
supra note 46, at 25-28.
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effectiveness assessment even further. Obviously, if a methodology for
the assessment of effectiveness could be found which demonstrates ef-
fectiveness from different points of view, the results thereof would be
more viable than the ones generated by two, or even three, different
types of assessments that may be less conclusive or even contradictory.
Therefore, use of the same type of indicators and assessment is
preferable.
3.4 Assessment Intertwined with Assessments of Public Regulation?
Assessment of the effectiveness of international private regula-
tion might benefit from insights derived from impact assessment of
public regulation, as discussed in Section 4. By and large, insights
from the evaluation of public regulation could be helpful in assessing
the effectiveness of international private regulation. This does not,
however, imply that one should stick to the methodology developed for
public regulation. First, several methodologies are developed for the
assessment of public regulation, and many of them are contested.
Thus, finding the most helpful methodology is not easy. But, more im-
portantly, international private regulation only resembles public regu-
lation to a certain extent, depending on the type of international
private regulation at hand.1 °2 Therefore, several effectiveness issues
are specific to international private regulation. For example, the legiti-
macy of this type of regulation cannot be based on the democratic prin-
ciples lying behind public regulation. As such, other ways of legitimacy
have to be found. Conflict of law rules and added value are salient
issues in connection with international private regulation, but are
scarcely used in the effectiveness analysis of public regulation. Addi-
tionally, the economic effects of public regulation are often only ana-
lyzed at the macro level, while international private regulation, as
elaborated herein, is often analyzed at the meso and micro level. That
said, several insights of the methodology proposed for the assessment
of international private regulation are derived from the assessments of
the effectiveness of public regulation.
In the following paragraphs, the different approaches-ex ante
and ex post-are examined. This section begins with the rule-setting
process and later focuses on the effectiveness of existing international
private regulation. These avenues are integrated in the concluding
paragraph. 103
102 For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have a closer
resemblance to public regulation than for example supply chain contracts through
which a CSR policy is implemented. See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), available at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text.
103 International private regulation is deployed in many different areas outside
CSR and the effectiveness thereof may vary along these areas. See, e.g., BARBARA
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4. THE RULE-SETTING PROCESS (Ex ANTE APPROACH)
4.1 Legal Approach
From a legal point of view, the ex ante effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation is primarily connected with its ability to ma-
terialize the objectives this regulation aspires to realize. 10 4 These
objectives may stem from spontaneous private regulation or govern-
ment policy-induced private regulation.10 5 However, unlike public reg-
ulation, it is often hard to assess whether these objectives have been
achieved because it is unclear which specific and assessable objectives
have been set. As to public regulation, this is typically clarified in the
explanatory documents supporting the regulation. International pri-
vate regulation often lacks such explanatory documents. As a result,
the objectives of private regulation remain somewhat unclear. If pri-
vate regulation aims at contributing to a better environment or human
rights compatibility in doing business, it may be difficult to assess
whether these objectives have been achieved. Which environmental
improvement suffices, and to what extent does the human rights situa-
tion need to improve? It is important to clarify the specific and assess-
able objectives international private regulation aims to achieve. 10 6
Unless such objectives have been expressly articulated, it is rather dif-
ficult to assess whether international private regulation is effective in
the sense that it achieves the objectives it aspires to realize.1 0 7 In this
BAARSMA ET AL, ZELF DOEN? INVENTARISATIESTUDIE VAN ZELFREGULERINGSINSTRU-
MENTEN, RAPPORT No. 664 [Do It Yourself? Inventory of the Self-Regulatory In-
struments, Report No. 664] (SEO Econ. Research Apr. 2003), available at http://
www.seo.nl/pagina/article/zelf-doen-inventarisatie-van-de-zelfreguleringinstru-
menten (finding 22 private regulation instruments for many different situations in
the Netherlands and offers regulators factsheets to choose whether private regula-
tion suits their purposes).
104 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 15. As far as the involvement of govern-
ment is concerned, the origin of a legal system in a certain country might also be of
influence on the CSR performance of corporations. See Hao Liang & Luc Ren-
neboog, The Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility (ECGI Finance, Work-
ing Paper No.394, 2013).
105 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 12.
106 Cf ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, §§ 5.1.1, 6.1.1, 6.2.1. Private
regulation should, according to section 6.2.1, create a logical framework entailing
principles, criteria, indicators and verifiers. The indicators should not only indi-
cate what they measure, but also how the indicators are measured and where the
line is drawn between what is acceptable and what is not (verifiers). See also MSI
Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 2. See also Principals for Better Self- and Co-
Regulation and Establishment of a Community Practice, supra note 89, Principal
1.4.
107 See Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 136 (contending that such public
policy goals should entail roughly measurable benchmarks).
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respect, it is important that the private regulation and its supporting
documents are publicized and made transparent. 108 Connected to this,
it is important to create a transparent norm-setting process and main-
tain sufficient autonomy of the private rule-maker.1 ° 9 For instance,
"divergence of interests between the regulators and the regulated"
might lead the members of the rule setting body to prefer less desira-
ble "short-term actions [with no clear long term objectives] that maxi-
mize their likelihood of being re-appointed."1 0
However, this is not always true. If international private regu-
lation is set to achieve specific public policy objectives, it might be pos-
sible to assess whether these exogenous objectives have been
achieved. 1 1 This being the case, the international private regulation
itself does not necessarily have to articulate such specific objectives. A
legal effectiveness criterion, therefore, is whether international pri-
vate regulation expresses specific and assessable objectives, which
may be exogenous public policy objectives, and if so, whether they have
been achieved. In this respect, international private regulation should
be consistent with international public regulation or standards.1 1 2
However, this does not mean it should be consistent with all national
laws, because drawing such international private regulation is virtu-
ally impossible for a variety of reasons, including the fact that those
national laws may be contradictory.1 1
Stemming from this, the private rule-maker has to assess
whether effective private regulation in his area exists that achieves
the public policy objectives his regulatory framework is aiming at and
in what respect it might contribute to the achievement of these objec-
108 Cf. ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, § 5.10 (providing for publica-
tion of the standards and the availability of supporting documents). See also MSI
Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 37. In this respect, the question might arise
whether the private regulation and its supporting document should be publicized
in multiple languages. In my opinion, this is not necessary per se because of
problems of interpretation if the norms are translated in different languages and
the question arises over which is the authentic language. However, translations
might be necessary for proper stakeholder engagement. See id. at 3.
109 Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131, 134-35.
110 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 17.
ill Cf DIMITROPOULOS, supra note 32, at 244.
112 See also Owen E. Herrnstadt, Are International Framework Agreements a Path
to Corporate Social Responsibility, 10 U.PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. (2007) 187, 196-201
(discussing International Framework Agreements on labor standards). Cf Princi-
pals for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community Prac-
tice, supra note 89, Principal 1.5.
113 In case international private regulation is not consistent with certain national
laws, effective alternatives should be implemented regarding such countries. See,
e.g., UTTING, supra note 57, at 86.
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tives. 1 4 If international private regulation exists that effectively
achieves the objectives aimed at by its regulatory framework, it should
refrain from rulemaking, because this would only unnecessary compli-
cate the legal framework in its arena. Beside this, an effective private
regulatory framework entails "conflict of law" rules regarding cases in
which this framework collides with other public or private
regulation. 11 5
After the drafting process, the work is not done. It is important
that the norms are evaluated and, if necessary, reviewed on a regular
basis. This evaluation should make use of past experiences with the
norms, challenges of the norms by members or stakeholders, and
should take into account grievances from stakeholders. 1 6 This process
should be conducted in the same manner as the drafting process.
Furthermore, in the rule-setting process, the rule-makers have
to consider whether any possibilities for enforcement exist and
whether the regulatory regime provides an effective conflict resolution
mechanism. These two elements are elaborated upon in the ex post
approach below.1 1 7
114 See MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 36; cf ISEAL Code of Good Prac-
tice, supra note 89, §§ 5.1.1, 6.1.1, 6.2.1. The public regulator might desire to as-
sess whether certain public policy goals are met as well. See Cafaggi and Renda,
supra note 46, at 29 (proposing a joint assessment by the public and private
regulator).
115 Cf Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 999, 1018 (2004) (discussing the necessity and emergence of a new form of "in-
tersystemic conflict laws"); ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, § 6.5
(dealing with the situation in which international standards have to be adopted to
local standards). Furthermore, section 6.6.1 requires the duty to inform other
standard setting organizations that have developed related or similar interna-
tional standards or a proposal to develop a new standard or revise an existing
standard. It should also encourage the participation of this other standard setting
organization. These 'conflict of law' rules might stem from the private rule-maker,
but also from governments.
116 See, e.g., MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 5, 39-41 (requiring review of
internal governance, overall effectiveness, and awareness of affected population as
well); Principals for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Com-
munity Practice, supra note 89, Principals 2.1 & 2.3; ISEAL Code of Good Practice,
supra note 89, § 5.1.1 (demanding regular-every five year-review and revision
of standards to assess whether they meet their stated objectives). For this it is
important that the rulemaking body is accessible for external parties and or-
ganizes regular meetings with stakeholders (if necessary, on different locations).
See MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 5-6.
117 However, some of the indicators mentioned hereinafter are derived from the
analysis of the means of enforcement, and therefore might be better understood
after reading. See infra Part 4.1.
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Additionally, more precise commands generally result in better
behavior.1 1 Because of this, the degree of precision has to be opti-
mized.11 9 It is important whether the international private regulation
(i) entails clear norms/standards 121 that are interpreted and applied
consistently, (ii) states if exceptions to the general rule exist and, if so,
under which circumstances they apply, (iii) to whom the rules apply
(e.g. only the companies themselves or suppliers and financing entities
too), and (iv) refers to applicable international norms and treaties (e.g.
in the area of human rights or the environment). 121 Further, the speci-
ficity relates to the topics the international private regulation is in-
tended to cover and addresses whether it entails specific rules on all of
these topics, such as international treaties on human rights, the envi-
ronment, or in national regulation. 12 2 In order to achieve specificity,
the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity and legal knowledge
on the part of the regulator is required.1 2 3 Effective international pri-
vate regulation requires sufficient bureaucratic capacity and legal
knowledge of the private rule-maker. If the private rule-maker does
not have this capacity or knowledge, or is not willing to invest in it, he
should refrain from participating.
The foregoing issues are largely addressed by the traditional
criteria applied to public legislation, which might be helpful if a cer-
tain scheme is comparable to public regulation, such as the OECD-
guidelines, but less so to supply chain arrangements.1 24 Among others,
118 See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 19, 20; Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 9;
Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in Production of Le-
gal Rules, supra note 10, at 43; Overmars, supra note 7, at 17 (regarding codes of
conduct); ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, § 6.3.1.
119 See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 19; Luppi & Parisi, supra note 118, at 43, 46-52
(arguing that the frequency of application of a law is a crucial determinant of the
optimal level of specificity).
120 Certain norms and standards might need to be adapted to local conditions. See
Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 21-22.
121 Cf Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 13, 17 (regarding codes of conduct in
the area of CSR on child labor). However, regarding criterion iv., some interna-
tional norms only aim at governments and not at companies. Referral to these
norms might complicate the enforceability of codes of conduct vis-A-vis companies.
Furthermore, referral only to the norms of the home country of a company is less
effective than referral to international norms and preferably, if applicable, also to
norms of host countries. See id. Cf MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 3, 23-
25.
122 Cf Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 14.
123 Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131, 134-35; see Alvarez & von Hagen,
supra note 67, at 17, 18 (discussing sufficient capacity in general). Cf. Principals
for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community Practice,
supra note 89, Principal 2.5.
124 Cf Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 13.
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these criteria include necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity, trans-
parency, accountability, 12' accessibility, and simplicity.126 The SAFA
guidelines translate these criteria in connection with private stan-
dards into relevance, simplicity, cost efficiency, 12 7 goal orientation,
performance orientation, and transparency. 128
The ex ante effectiveness of international private regulation
depends on its ability to reach the goals, whether it entails conflict of
law rules, on its enforceability, and on effective dispute resolution. 12 9
The effectiveness of international private regulation may depend on
the following indicators, which have been derived from the aforemen-
tioned research: 13
0
(i) Whether international private regulation entails specific
and assessable objectives and does not aim at objectives
which are effectively achieved by other public or private
regulation,
(ii) Whether it entails "conflict of law" rules,
(iii) Whether it entails regular evaluation of the regulation
and its functioning (and if necessary) review of the
regulation,
(iv) The existence of an supervisory body to which the parties
to the regulatory regime are accountable (and have to
provide relevant information to this body), the power of
the supervisory body to pass judgment and to impose
sanctions on non-complying parties,1 3 1
(v) The existence of a supervisory body which controls access
to scarce resources,1 3 2
125 This criterion has not been mentioned in the foregoing and will be addressed in
the sociological approach.
126 Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 24.
127 This criterion will be discussed in the economic approach.
128 See, e.g., Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 24.
129 Cf GIESEN, supra note 8, at 106 n.137-141.
130 These indicators are not exhaustive. More detailed research may reveal others.
131 However, Kolk and van Tulder argue that the likelihood of compliance is
higher when company codes of conduct are involved than for example codes of con-
duct set forward by business associations, international organizations or NGOs.
See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 11. This especially stems from the codes
of conduct promulgated by business organizations or international organizations
being less specific and abstaining from the possibility of imposing sanctions.
132 Cf. KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 62; Mirjan Oude Vrielink, Wanneer is Zel-
fregulering een Effectieve Aanvulling op Overheidsregulering?, in RECHT VAN
ONDEROP: ANTWOORDEN UIT DE RECHTSSOCIOLOGIE (Marc Hertogh ed., Wolf Legal
Publishers, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 2011) 70-73; Scott et al., supra note 9, at
7. Beside these indicators the existence of smaller groups with comparable views is
considered to be of importance as well as a high organizational level. This how-
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(vi) Sufficient bureaucratic capacity and (legal) knowledge of
the private rule maker,
(vii) The existence of (a) serious (threat of) contractual en-
forcement or other means of enforcement if necessary
through state legislation and/or (effective) enforcement
by states,
(viii) The specificity of the rules/standards set forward by the
international private regulation,
(ix) Whether the initiative entails an effective complaint and
dispute management mechanism to prevent and deal
with non-compliance, 133 and
(x) The possibility of certification or assessment of compli-
ance by independent third parties whereby reporting re-
quirements in the regulatory framework are helpful.
The aforementioned indicators may be helpful to set effective interna-
tional private regulation.
4.2 Economic Approach
From an economic point of view it is of interest whether inter-
national private regulation potentially contributes to the economic
welfare of (affected) communities and society at large as well as to the
profitability of (multinational) enterprises, This research encompasses
different points of view. The assessment of the potential increase or
decrease in economic welfare differs along the international private
regulation under consideration.1 3 1 It makes a difference whether in-
ever, in my view, refers to the sociological perspective which is going to be dis-
cussed hereinafter. Nonetheless enforcement may be easier to realize in such
circumstances.
133 Regarding CSR compare the communication of the European Commission of
October 25th 2011, COM(2011) 681, supra note 54, at 10. As to CSR in an interna-
tional context non-judicial mechanisms for conflict management seem to be more
effective. Furthermore the prevention of conflicts become more important. Regard-
ing dispute management compare GIESEN, supra note 8, at 138, 139. Furthermore,
the Global Reporting Initiative framework, which is discussed below in the eco-
nomic approach and to which companies may adhere, entails an indicator which
requires companies to state whether they provide a grievance mechanism regard-
ing human rights violations and how many complaints have been received through
this mechanism. From this framework (some) information could be retrieved
whether (effective) grievance mechanisms are in place.
134 From the classical economic approach of Coase and the Chicago School of Law
and Economics this starting point does not have merit. They contend that a mar-
ket is able to reach efficient outcomes through negotiations between well informed
parties without regulation. For this approach see, e.g. Michael Faure, Law and
Economics: Belang Voor het Privaatrecht, 6912 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht en
Notarieel Recht (2011), at 1057. To date the necessity of research of the economic
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ternational private regulation on (i) biodiversity, (ii) prevention of (en-
vironmental) damage to local communities, or (iii) technical
standardization as to sustainability is considered. These three areas
differ as to the stakeholders involved and the relevant economic is-
sues. It is also relevant whether the economic analysis is conducted on
a micro or macro level.
Assessing the existing and future economic welfare of certain
stakeholders calls for a different approach than the one needed for
measuring the potential increase or decrease of the economic welfare
of society at large. The first assessment calls for a "bottom up" ap-
proach assessing the possible increase or decrease of welfare of certain
relevant stakeholders. The second assessment, the 'top down' ap-
proach, necessitates an evaluation of a possible increase or decrease of
welfare at the level of society at large. This second assessment seems
especially necessary if international private regulation might have
more than negligible impact on society at large. If international pri-
vate regulation might only affect certain stakeholders in a certain in-
dustry, and hence the micro level is relevant, the ex ante approach
seems less helpful. It is not easy to assess the impact of future interna-
tional private regulation on a certain stakeholder. Therefore, the micro
level analysis is especially fit for the ex post assessment. The future
economic effects of international private regulation might be analyzed
best through a macro-economic approach.
As the macro level analysis is concerned, insights derived from
a (ex ante) economic analysis of government regulation might be help-
ful to analyze the economic effects of international private regulation.
Economic analysis of government regulation has become quite com-
mon in the last decade. The European Commission, for example, has
established the Better Regulation Framework to analyze (among
others) the economic effects of EU-regulation. 3 5 This framework ad-
vances an Integrated Impact Assessment Model, an ex-ante tool for
improving the quality and coherence of the policy development process
of the European Commission (which entails an integrated approach
effects of rules has been recognized. See id. at 1057, 1058. In this approach private
regulation is an appropriate solution where bargaining, at low cost, can occur be-
tween risk-creators and those affected. See Ogus and Carbonara, supra note 10, at
231.
135 This framework goes back to 2002. See, e.g., Renda, supra note 94, at 46; Al-
berto Alemanno, A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment, 17 EUR. PUB. L. 485
(2011); Claire A. Dunlop, Commentary on MacRae Regulatory Impact Assessment:
a Panacea to Over-regulation?, 14 J. OF RISK RES. 947, 949 (2011); Fabrizio De
Francesco et al., Implementing Regulatory Innovations in Europe: the Case of Im-
pact Assessment, 19 J. OF EuR. PUB. POL'Y 491, 455 (2012) (discussing the legal
implications and the enforceability of this framework (i.e. through courts)).
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covering the economic, social, and environmental dimensions
comprehensively).13 6
The analysis reviews the economic impact of the selected op-
tion, mostly in terms of (i) economic growth and competitiveness, (ii)
changes in compliance costs and implementation costs for public au-
thorities, (iii) impact on the potential for innovation and technological
development, (iv) changes in investment, market shares and trade pat-
terns as well as (v) in- or decreases in consumer prices.13 7 The social
impact includes the impact of the proposal on (a) human capital, (b)
human rights, (c) prospective changes in employment levels or job
quality, (d) changes affecting gender equality, social exclusion and
poverty, (e) impacts on health, safety, consumer rights, social capital,
security, education, training and culture as well as effects on (f) the
income of particular sectors, groups of consumers or workers. 138 The
environmental dimension concerns positive and negative impacts asso-
ciated with the changing status of the environment such as climate
change, air, water and soil pollution, land-use change, bio-diversity
loss and changes in public health.' 3 9 However, the impact assessment
initially focused, as the US and UK do, on business compliance costs
analysis of regulation without preliminary identification of alternative
regulatory options.1 40
As exact economic calculations were considered not to be the
most important contributors to regulatory quality, the framework, be-
came a tool which did not focus on a (sound) economic analysis but
136 See the Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009)92 of the European Com-
mission from 15 januari 2009, http://EUJR-LEX.europa.eu (last visited Jan. 22nd
2014).
137 Renda, supra note 94, at 56. For information on best practices for regulatory
Impact assessment (and how to implement it in the decision making process) see
BUILDING AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
OECD (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/buildingan
institutionalframeworkforregulatoryimpactanalysisriaguidanceforpolicymakers.
htm.138 Renda, supra note 94, at 56 and 57.
139 Id. at 57.
140 Id. at 47, 49-54. It was suggested that a two stage impact assessment should
be conducted, a preliminary one devoted to the analysis of alternative regulatory
options and an extended impact assessment in which the detailed assessment of
the benefits and costs of the preferred regulatory option is made. See id. at 54.
This was implemented in the new impact assessment model of 2002. See id. at 55.
See also CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI ET AL., HOW TO LEARN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE: IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS 39, 40-61 (Center for Euro-
pean Governance, University of Exeter, 2010), available at http://centres.exeter.
ac. uk/ceg/research/ALREG/documents/Lerningfromtheinternationalexperience.
pdf (discussing impact assessment in other countries, including the United
States).
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merely summarized the interests of stakeholders and tried to find a
compromise between political and policy stances advanced by different
stakeholders having an interest in the rules at hand."' The 2002 im-
pact assessment as described above constituted a very complex exer-
cise, which aspired to predict all possible consequences of the
endorsement of new regulation and has been costly, burdensome,
highly discretionary, and time-consuming. 14 2 Research on these ex-
tended impact assessments revealed several methodological shortcom-
ings, entailing unclear descriptions of the problem, obscure ranking of
objectives, a narrow range of policy options, an unbalanced coverage of
different types of impact (economic, social, and environmental) and in-
adequate arrangements for external consultation. 1 43 This resulted in a
phradigm shift from sustainable development to competiveness and
from integrated impact assessment to an economic assessment in
2005, however not being a mere compliance cost assessment.1 4 4 The
guidelines still insist on a multi-criteria assessment by keeping the
three pillars (economic, social, and environmental) separate. 4 ' OECD
reports have pointed at the necessity of linking impact assessment to
an oversight body as a key enabler of the success of regulatory impact
analysis models. 146 Following these reports, the Impact Assessment
board was created within the Secretariat General. 1 47 In 2010, the need
to improve the methodology and soundness of the economic analysis
was felt, as well as the efficient use of resources devoted to impact
assessment and ex post evaluation in the Commission. 14s The assess-
ment of alternatives has become more systematic. 1 4 9
However, the impact assessment is not considered to be very
important because it is an assessment of the European Commission
which rapidly becomes obsolete when the legislation is amended dur-
ing the European co-decision procedure. 15 0 Often the final legislation
only partly reflects the assessment conducted on the original proposal
141 Renda, supra note 94, at 48, 52.
142 See id. at 57.
143 Id. at 69.
144 Id. at 58-60. At this point the dual stage system was abandoned. Id. at 58.
145 Id. at 63.
146 Cf Oliver Fritsch et al., Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and
the UK: Old Questions and New Findings 1 (Ctr. European Policy Studies, Work-
ing Document No. 362, 2012) available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/regulatory-
quality-european-commission-and-uk-old-questions-and-new-findings.
147 Renda, supra note 94, at 64-67. However some feel the need for independent
oversight bodies at EU level. See id. at 66; Fritsch et al., supra note 146, at 1.
148 Renda, supra note 94, at 67.
149 Id. at 78.
150 Renda revealed that the vast majority of impacts assessments relate to non-
binding communications and policy initiatives. See Id. at 72-73.
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of the European Commission. 151 The other EU institutions such as the
European parliament and the Council still abstain from impact assess-
ments. 15 2 Besides this a clear focus lacks, it is unclear whether the
impact assessment should abide by any specific methodology or need
for quantification. 153 Many impact assessment documents do not
adopt a clearly recognizable viewpoint, for example a quantitative
cost-benefit analysis. 5 4 Another disadvantage is the confidential na-
ture of the impact assessments: only the final versions are pub-
lished.1 55 Nonetheless, the Commission managed to improve the
quality of its impact assessments, although a lot seems to depend on
the proposal at stake, bearing in mind that to date no other EU mem-
ber states, excluding the UK, use such an instrument. 156 At the same
time instruments seem to be gradually shifting towards other tools
and in particular towards the Standard Cost Model for the measure-
ment and reduction of administrative burdens as well as fitness checks
covering entire policy domains.1 5 7 The recently developed Impact As-
sessment Guidelines of the European Commission stem from this and
are used by many EU and non EU-countries.1 5 s However, no conclu-
151 Id. at 47.
152 Id. at 80.
153 Id. at 81. Cf Dunlop, supra note 135, at 949; Fritsch et al., supra note 146, at
3.
154 Renda, supra note 94, at 81. However, the cost-benefit analysis has also been
criticized in the recent years because it, just like economics in general, neglects
human behavior. See id. at 102, 112, and 130-135. Nonetheless this approach has
increased success in the US and in other impact assessments. See id., at 140;
RADAELLI ET AL., supra note 140, at 40-61. The critique in Europe might be in-
voked by the impact assessments on non-binding regulation and therefore on a
much broader set of proposals, which may lead to casting doubts on the usefulness
of cost-benefit analysis. The US have adopted a confined, invariable (in terms of
depth and criteria) system to select proposals that should undergo an impact as-
sessment. However, this assessment only covers secondary regulation. See Renda,
supra note 94, at 147-148; RADAELLI ET AL., supra note 140, at 40-61.
155 Fritsch et al., supra note 146, at 1-2; Renda, supra note 94, at 48.
156 Renda, supra note 94, at 48. However, comparable instruments are used in
other EU countries. See, e.g,. RADAELLI ET ALL, supra note 140, at 107-126 and 146-
177.
157 Renda, supra note 94, at 48 and 82. Cf. Dunlop, supra note 135, at 949.
158 Smart Regulation in the European Uninion, COM (2010) 543 final (Aug. 8,
2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2010:0543:FJN:EN:PDF.Cf A "Competitiveness Proofing" Toolkit for Use in Impact
Assessments, SEC (2012) 91 (Jan. 27, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/key-docs/docs/sec_2012_0091_en.pdf. See also Cafaggi and
Renda, supra note 46, at 1.
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sive evidence exists that countries that use the impact assessment
grow faster than countries which do not.159
That said, the Impact Assessment Guidelines of the European
Commission might provide some guidance as to the effects of interna-
tional private regulation. 16' This seems to be taken as a starting point
by ISEAL which launched a code for assessing the impacts of Social
and Environmental Standards. This code in part resembles the impact
analysis of public policy makers.1 6 1 The Standard Cost Model might
also be appropriate and, because it is less sophisticated, it might be
easier to implement. 16 2 This Standard Cost Model is used in other
countries too, like the UK and US, and measures the (reduction of)
administrative burdens.
This Standard Cost Model might provide useful insights on ec-
onomic effects of international private regulation.163 In that respect it
should be noted that international private regulation may lead to a
cost transfer from states to private actors, such as enterprises.1 6 4 Ob-
159 Renda, supra note 94, at 93.
160 The former Impact Assessment tool of the European Commission seems less
adequate, because of its complexity as well as its expensiveness, sometimes incon-
clusive and confidential nature. See id. at 48, 52. Cf Cafaggi and Renda, supra
note 46, at 2.
161 See Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards Systems
vl.O, ISEAL ALLIANCE (Nov. 2010) www.isealalliance.org/online-community/re-
sources/iseal-impacts-code-of-good-practice. See. e.g., Cafaggi and Renda, supra
note 46, at 20-23. Impact assessment is also an indicator in the MSI-evaluation
tool. See MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 37, 38.
162 Cf. Renda, supra note 94, at 48, 82. However, this method is criticized too be-
cause it tends to neglect human behavior. See id. at 102, 112 and 130-35. Beside
this, this method neglects that regulation might generate benefits outside the re-
duction of administrative burdens.
163 However, the question arises whether the cost of compliance with private regu-
lation that entails a code of conduct can be monetized. Compliance with a code of
conduct is often considered to be intertwined with the day-by-day business and the
costs thereof are not measured separately. See, e.g., Oude Vrielink, supra note 132,
at 69.
164 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 30. For example, the GlobalGAP framework (on good
agricultural practice) assumingly imposes disproportionate costs on farmers in de-
veloping countries. See Communication from the Commission on Agricultural
Product Quality Policy, COM (2009) 234 final (May 28, 2009), available at http:ll
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0234:FIN:EN:PDF.
The greater the degree of precision of the norms, the greater will be the costs of
formulating legal commands and applying them in adjudication and of parties in-
terpreting them for purposes of deciding how to conform behavior to such rules.
Therefore the greater the degree of precision, the greater will be the cost transfer.
On the other hand, as has been elaborated before, more precise commands will
generally result in better behavior.
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viously, the process of establishing private regulation is more costly to
industry than government legislation. 16 5 The threat of public regula-
tion (setting new or higher standards than previously adopted by the
public legislator) and relatively small (marginal) cost of private regula-
tion induce business to engage in international private regulatory re-
gimes. 166 Reporting requirements entailed in the private regulatory
frameworks might increase the cost of business as well. This problem
partly might be tackled by a shift in the nature of the norms of a pri-
vate regulatory framework. Instead of focusing on substantive rules
only, a regime might entail rules on the way stakeholders could build a
(long term) relationship amongst each other.167 Private regulation
might have network effects. The costs of participating in an interna-
tional private regulatory framework decrease with the number of par-
ticipants. 168 Such costs are likely to be rather high in the early stages
of the formation of a new regulatory framework. 169 Enforcement of pri-
vate regulation is costly too, although necessary. Without enforce-
ment, free-riding, where participants enjoy the benefits of the
regulatory framework but disobey the rules, is possibly very frequent.
The costs of enforcement might discourage new members to
join the network. 170 From the outset of the regime the (future) costs of
enforcement are borne by the regulatees (or the overarching body). "7 1
However, these costs might be reduced if an overarching body, as re-
ferred to in the foregoing paragraph, exists and if these costs are
shared by many participants. 172 Hence, if a private regulatory frame-
work is set, it is efficient to aim at involving a higher number of par-
ticipants in order to reduce the enforcement costs to be paid by the
165 Cf Overmars, supra note 7, at 20. Furthermore, it is contended that delegation
of public rulemaking power to private regulatory framework can lead to adverse
welfare effects, especially if monopoly power is granted to one regulatory frame-
work. See Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 241, 242.
166 Ogus and Carbonara, supra note 10, at 236. Cf Kolk & van Tulder, supra note
22, at 4.
167 However, a regime might not be confined to the latter rules. This might espe-
cially jeopardize the public interest if the interests of the stakeholders do not coin-
cide with it.
168 Id. at 243. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 224 in connection with eco-labels.
169 Cf Ogus and Carbonara, supra note 10, at 231. Hence, it could be considered
not to promulgate yet another private regulatory framework, but to build on and
improve existing frameworks. Cf. id. at 232.
170 Id. at 232, 237.
171 Id. at 237.
172 Id. at 233, 237 (contending that the information costs for the formulation and
interpretation of the standards are lower and such bodies will emerge if monitor-
ing costs for such a body are low). Compare, in connection with eco-labels,
Gandara, supra note 25, at 112.
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individual participants.1 7 3 In that respect the scope of the private re-
gime is of importance: the more global in scope, the higher the number
of potential participants.1 74 International private regulation has an in-
ternational impact and may lead to a cost transfer from Western devel-
oped economies to southern developing economies.175 This may
contribute to the welfare of (Western) society at large, but might have
adverse effects on developing economies.
That said, the Standard Cost Model might be the predominant
indicator in the ex ante economic avenue which could be applied in
practice, although some other indicators (such as the potential number
of participants in a regulatory regime and other impact assessments
tools) might be relevant as well.1 71
4.3 Sociological Approach
The (ex ante) effectiveness of international private regulation
might be described from a sociological point of view too. 17 7 Important
in this respect is how and when private regulation will be accepted by
a certain group and why. Acceptance within a certain group might en-
hance compliance with regulation and thus might render private regu-
lation (more) effective.
There is however no single answer to the question of how vari-
ous norms crystallize (and thus might produce binding effects upon
actors to whom they are addressed). They may be accepted through a
variety of mechanisms.' The following factors, which relate to the
institutionalization of regulatory norms, might provide some guidance.
173 Although research has revealed that it is very tempting to engage a whole in-
dustry in a private regulatory framework, even if adequate enforcement is imple-
mented. Cf. Ogus and Carbonara, supra note 10, at 237 (contending that the
framework has to provide economic incentives for free riders to participate).
174 Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 10. This might be true for a code of con-
duct within a company if this is spread at a global level through its subsidiaries in
other countries or through supply chains. The size of the company is of importance
in that respect. Cf id. at 21, 22.
175 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 30.
176 However, one should realize that public regulation also might have conse-
quences, for example if highly influential stakeholders manage to make politicians
set rules which (are beneficial to these stakeholders but) have consequences for
the competition on a certain market, which is of course inefficient from an eco-
nomic point of view. It might well be that international private regulation is sus-
ceptible to such influence too, and maybe even more so than government
regulation.
177 See also Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 61-78.
178 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 82; KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 41-44; Jan
Eijsbouts, Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism 17-22 (Maastricht Uni-
versity, Oct. 20 2011) (discussing anti-bribery norms).
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However, these parameters do not establish a very clear distinction
(which might be assessed in an empirical way) between norms which
have been accepted and those which have not. Relevant factors are (i)
the extent to and the way in which a norm has been distributed and is
applied, (ii) the degree of acceptance of a norm, and (iii) the mode of
transmission. 179 In connection with the degree of acceptance of a
norm, the inclusiveness (of the norm setting process) vis-A-vis stake-
holders is of essence. This will be elaborated as a separate issue under
(iv).
Analysis of (i) distribution relates to the extent to and the way
in which a norm is known and applied. Knowledge is not only a prod-
uct of its promulgation. Training and education for those involved in
applying the norm and sometimes information campaigns and notices
also play a role in such knowledge building.'"0 Mass media also plays a
pivotal role in this process. Governments are particularly cognizant of
this dimension of making norms effective.' 81 However, it is of impor-
tance that not only the norm itself, but also the background endorsing
it, as well as the objectives aimed at, are explained in such campaigns.
Purchasers, for example, need to be convinced that the standard not
only enhances efficiency but also achieves the objective it pursues.'8 2
It is even argued that social norms by their nature imply that what
ought to be done is known by the community in which norms oper-
ate.'8 3 Traditional (public) legislation has the disadvantage that it
does not always reach the actors it is meant for.' 8 4 As a result, the
Dutch government has searched for alternative ways, such as in
"Bruikbare rechtsorde" and "Vertrouwen in wetgeving."' s5
Acceptance (ii) of a norm may involve consideration of both the
process through which it emerges, its content, and its likely effects.
Crystallization of norms is therefore heavily reliant upon the instru-
ments which can transmit information which educates actors about
not only the substantive content of rules, but also the objectives which
179 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 78 n.82 (referring to the typology of Morris).
180 Id. at 82. Cf Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 24; RICHARD H. THALER &
CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 54-55, (Yale University Press, 2008). See for example on
International Framework Agreements on labor standards Herrnstadt, supra note
112, at 201, 202. Therefore, the MSI-evaluation tool demands for a continuous
learning program for relevant stakeholders. See MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note
97, at 21, 22, 25-27, 32 and 33.
181 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 84.
182 Compare, on guarantees of product safety, id. at 91-92.
183 Id. at 82.
184 Overmars, supra note 7, at 16.
185 Documents of The Dutch Parliament Second Chamber 2003/04, 29 279, 9;
2008/09, 31 731, 1 and 2, http://www.overheid.nl (last visited Jan 22nd 2014). See
also Overmars, supra note 7, at 17.
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underlie norms, the substantive regulatory process, and methods by
which norms can be complied with.' 8 6 Trust in obedience by other
members and social incentives to comply are needed.' 8 7 The accept-
ance of private regulation might increase if regulation is established
by an industry instead of being promulgated by the government.18 In
this respect a stable group of participants and a slow changing envi-
ronment are helpful.' 8 9 A tradition of and experience with private
rulemaking might enhance acceptance of a new private regulatory re-
gime.' 9 0 Therefore, private regulation may be successfully established
only if the stakeholders are willing to collaborate and to address rele-
vant issues in an industry.1 9 1
Beside this, it is helpful if an industry has a shared vision on
and responsibility towards societal issues.'9 2 In this respect the rele-
vance of norms is deemed to be important for the acceptance
thereof.19 3 In terms of commitment, it is important whether the pri-
vate regulation fits within the strategic choices and dilemmas faced by
the companies and their managers, partly determined by norms that
emerge within markets.'1 4 These norms are classically set through the
interaction of many buyers and sellers.' 5 The success of a standard is
largely determined by its take-up within a particular market through,
for instance, its (voluntary) adoption both in production processes and
186 Jacco Bomhoff & Anne Meuwese, The Meta-regulation of Transnational Pri-
vate Regulation, 38 J. OF L. & Soc'Y. 138, 159; Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 82.
187 Overmars, supra note 7, at 21. For compliance, an independent body might be
helpful. See id.
188 Id.
189 Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 27; Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at
72.
190 Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72. Cf. Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67,
at IX.
191 Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72; Overmars, supra note 7, at 20; Principals
for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community Practice,
supra note 89, Principal 3 (adding that participants have to commit real effort to
success).
192 Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72. See also Overmars, supra note 7, at 20,
26 (arguing for an intermediate organization to assist in this and contends that
such an organization is lacking regarding the Dutch corporate governance code).
193 Standardization for a Competitive and Innovative Europe: A Vision for 2020,
supra note 64, at 9, 19, 21, 29 and 32.
194 See Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72. See also Kolk & van Tulder, supra
note 22, at 20.
195 For example, the rating mechanism of eBay incentivizes compliance and per-
mits sellers who build up strong ratings to sell successfully. See Casey & Scott,
supra note 66, at 81.
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the specification within supply chains.19 Beside this, entities are
more willing to accept norms if they are in their own interest. 197
Acceptance of a norm is intertwined with the legitimacy of
those norms.19 s Linkage to electoral politics is a central mechanism of
legitimating public regulation. 1 9 9 Legitimacy of public regulation is as-
sessed by reference to certain predetermined standards and crite-
ria.2° ° These criteria include assessing whether the regulatory norms
are (i) constitutional (for example fair procedures, due process, consis-
tency, coherence, proportionality, and the existence of oversight from
constitutionally established bodies such as national courts, legisla-
tures, or executives and international organizations) and (ii) demo-
cratic (the extent and effectiveness of participation, transparency,
accountability, and deliberation in the norm-formation process). 20 1
Criteria for assessing legitimacy are also found in (iii) function-
ality and being performance based (degree of expert involvement and
effectiveness and efficiency of the norm in achieving the objectives
which they pursue) and (iv) being value and objectives-based (fair
trade, good agricultural practices, market efficiencies, and sustainable
development).20 2 Obviously, international private regulation does not
meet these requirements of legitimacy in the traditional sense. It
rarely takes the form of formal and informal delegation of rule-making
by public entities. It uses a broad range of regulatory devices that may
be of a rather soft legal nature, such as codes, but also of a hard legal
nature, such as contracts. 20 3 However, private regulation may operate
as a complement to public rules to specify and tailor them to specific
markets.20 4 In this respect (public) legislation lends legitimacy (in the
196 Id. at 81; Overmars, supra note 7, at 19 (on prevention of child labor in the
garment and toys industry). Corporate governance systems in different countries
play a role as to willingness of companies to implement codes of conduct (in the
CSR area) too. See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 8, 9. This might, for exam-
ple, also result in closer relationships between buyers and sellers in a supply
chain. See Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 26, 27.
197 Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72; Schouten, supra note 69, at 71.
198 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 86; Schouten, supra note 69, at 61. Cf. Alvarez
& von Hagen, supra note 67, at IX, 19, and 20. Sometimes this kind of legitimacy
is referred to as authority as an opposite of legitimacy (of governments) in the
legal sense. See, e.g., KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 56.
199 Cf Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 86.
200 Id. at 87. On legitimacy see also KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 45-48.
201 See, e.g. Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 87.
202 id.
203 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 164.
204 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 42, 43. Compare on this (sometimes complicated)
interaction in connection with bio fuels, Schouten, supra note 69, at 106, 107, and
112-125. For example, in countries with weak governance structures or corruption
issues international private regulation might enhance compliance. Cf id. at 139.
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traditional sense) to international private regulation.2 °5 Therefore, cri-
teria (i) and (ii) might be complied with where private regulation con-
solidates in combination with strong public institutions operating with
public regulation.2 °6 It is also possible that private regulation precedes
the creation of public regimes if, in order to bridge regulatory gaps,
private organizations design new markets and new institutions to be
later supplanted by hybrid regimes.2" 7 Furthermore, it is argued a
wide range of activities which might once have been thought of as pri-
vate should be regarded as public in character and therefore amenable
to (future) public-law controls either at the domestic or global level.20 8
This also provides some (future) legitimacy in the traditional sense.
Obviously, legitimacy of international private regulation be-
yond domestic legislation, or in the absence of such domestic regula-
tion, is not derived from state legislation.2 0 9 However, the linkage to
electoral politics is quite distant on a global level if an international
body like the UN is reviewed. Its decision-making process is quite dif-
fuse and solely based on a rather indirect linkage to electoral politics.
Therefore, it is difficult to adopt global regulation/legislation which
has legitimacy in the traditional sense. 2 10 Beside this, international
private regulation is not always comparable with public legislation as
has been elaborated hereinabove. Private regulation might have less
impact than public legislation and on smaller groups, for example, as
it is deployed in supply chains.21
Does this mean that legitimacy is of no importance as interna-
tional private regulation is concerned? Scott, Caffagi, and Senden con-
205 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 42, 47. However, cf. Schouten, supra note 69, at 125,
126, 136, and 137 (contending that public regulation might also water down pri-
vate standards in connection with bio fuels). Furthermore, international private
regulation may contribute to the strengthening of the legitimacy of public regimes
as well. For example national governments make use of transnational corporate
capacity by enrolling airlines in immigration control and banks and (legal) practi-
tioners in monitoring and reporting money laundering. See Cafaggi, supra note 12,
at 41; Scott et al., supra note 9, at 18. Cf. Overmars, supra note 7, at 29.
206 Cf Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 24, 47, and 48; Schouten, supra note 69, at 60,
81.
207 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 24.
208 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 15.
209 However, international private regulation might have some electoral elements
that partly resemble legitimation of public norms. Within private regulation regu-
latees may choose their regulators. For example, consumers may have choices as
to which self-regulatory regime they want to be protected by. See id. at 17.
210 Exempt from global treaties which are binding in all states. However, the
number of treaties meeting this requirement is very limited.
211 In such smaller communities other forms of legitimation are conceivable. Cf.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & MICHAEL D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 411 (Stevens & Sons, London 1985).
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tend a more pluralist conception of constitutionalism which gives
greater recognition to the diversity of institutional structures should
be adopted. 21 2 The alternative forms of legitimacy better reflect the
current social situation in which social media gains importance in the
policy making of multinational enterprises. Hence, other mechanisms
may be considered to bridge the legitimacy-gap as private regulation is
proposed, including drafting proper procedures and potentially judicial
accountability.2 13 Regardless, support for international private regula-
tion from governments might enhance acceptance, although (inhabi-
tants of) non-western countries might consider support from western
countries to be a protectionist measure in some instances.2 1 4
Striving after alternative forms of legitimacy is tempting in
supply chain regulatory regimes such as, for example, those tied to
CSR. In supply chains a purchaser requires adoption of the applicable
standards and engages in monitoring and enforcement either directly
or through contracting third party assurance organizations.2 1 Bilat-
eral contracts within supply chains present significant problems for
the management of legitimacy in terms of both substantive norms/
processes and identifying the level at which such issues are man-
aged.2 1 6 In a worst case scenario, the supplies are likely to coercively
experience the international private regulation adopted in a supply
chain contract. This is especially true if multinational enterprises pre-
scribe the norms vis-A-vis smaller and medium corporations. Interna-
tional human rights and environmental principles might in other (non-
western) countries be suspected as part of alleged protectionist mea-
sures concerning its own national industry. Third party monitoring in-
creases complexity and diffuses the responsibility for legitimacy.
However, third parties may be part of a legitimation strategy not only
regarding suppliers but also in respective of the ultimate consumers.
To the extent that issues of consumer confidence are significant, there
may be strong incentives to make use of third party assurance.2 1 7
It is not unreasonable to assume that the combination of direct
participation of market actors and the inclusion of both NGOs and gov-
ernments has the potential to combine advantages for acceptance as
212 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 2. Cf. Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 43; Pauwelyn et
al., supra note 59, at 511-519; Schouten, supra note 69, at 57 and 109.
213 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 1; Schouten, supra note 69, at 82, 83, 106-110, 128-
132, and 134-137.
214 Compare, on the role of governments, Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at
17 and 18. Compare, in connection with global agri-food chains, Schouten, supra
note 69, at 67, 68.
215 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 93.
216 Id. at 93.
217 Id. at 94.
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compared with inter-governmental regimes.2 1 In fact, government
support might enhance acceptance. 2 19 From the importance of accept-
ance of private international regulation one could infer that an initia-
tive is more effective as the level of acceptance increases and that the
lack of legitimacy of international private regulation in the traditional
sense might be partially compensated for by acceptance (in a sociologi-
cal sense). If regulates and other stakeholders accept the norms, this
acceptance proves at least a slight degree of legitimacy.22 °
As to (iii) the mode of transmission of norms, some modes are
more effective to induce acceptance than others. Supply chain con-
tracts are often used to import norms developed in other contexts
which are less than fully institutionalized. 22 ' The standards set by the
FSC were adopted by major retailers in their supply chain contracts
because of market pressure to show strong environmental perform-
222
ance. 2 2 This is transparent to the parties and has been subject to
well-developed mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement.2 23 In such
circumstances knowledge and acceptance of a norm is part of the pro-
cess of entering into a contract. 2 24 The dimension of socialization and
reinforcement then occurs largely through market processes.2 25
Hence, if a private regulatory regime applies more effective modes of
transmission this indicates more effectiveness from a sociological point
of view.
As to (iv) the inclusiveness of the norm setting process (which
is closely tied to acceptance), it is of importance that the relevant
stakeholders are involved in the production of the rules of the private
regulatory framework. In this respect, rules on stakeholder engage-
ment in public legislation might be helpful. Dutch law provides an in-
teresting example. Section 25 of the Dutch Privacy Act grants the
Dutch Privacy Authority the power to take an administrative decision
on the compatibility with the Privacy Act of a certain code of conduct
218 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 19.
219 Compare, in connection with global agri-food chains, Schouten, supra note 69,
at 67 and 68.
220 Cf HAMPSTEAD AND FREEMAN, supra note 211, at 411.
221 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 85. Cf. Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 72.
222 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 85.
223 This for example takes place through third party certification. See id. at 85.
These mechanisms often encompass a high degree of institutionalization. See id.
224 Id. The more vertically (one entity controls multiple processes along the chian)
and horizontally (fewer entities at each stage) integrated a chain is, the more ef-
fective the transmission appears to be. Compare, in connection with global agri-
food chains Schouten, supra note 69, at 46 and 47.
225 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 86.
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(on privacy) set forth by a certain industry.2 2 6 Section 25 of the Dutch
Privacy Act requires the Privacy Authority to enable relevant stake-
holders to comment on this code of conduct before it reaches its deci-
sion.227 This procedure enhances the acceptance of the code of conduct.
Stakeholders have the opportunity to comment on intended secondary
regulation in the United States. These proceedings might enhance ac-
ceptance as well. If such stakeholder engagement measures are put in
place, this might be effective in terms of acceptance of certain interna-
tional private regulation. 22' By and large, international private regu-
lation is more effective in sociological terms if relevant stakeholders
are involved in the rule making process in such a manner that they
may contribute effectively to the norm setting process.2 2 9
This is shown by a survey carried out by ISEAL in 2007 which
has shown that inclusiveness, participation, and fair representation is
pivotal in connection with the credibility of standards.23 0 Non-inclu-
siveness might induce (not included) stakeholders to (strongly) oppose
226 Which according to section 25 subsection 3 of the Dutch Privacy Act has to
demonstrate its representativeness.
227 In connection with standardization in the EU see Council Regulation 12/1025,
§ 4 subsection 3, 2012 O.J. (L316) (EC) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:316:0012:0033:EN:PDF (requiring a notice
and comment procedure regarding draft standards).
228 However, Scott et al., contend that the legitimacy of monitoring and enforcing
functions is amenable to being addressed not only through participation, but also
through institutionalization both of process and norms for scrutiny. See Scott et
al., supra note 9, at 15.
229 See MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 8-11; Schouten, supra note 69, at
84 and 85. Cf Standardization for a Competitive and Innovative Europe: A Vision
for 2020, supra note 64, at 9, 19, 21, 29, and 32. See also Council Directive 98/34,
1998 O.J. (204) 37 (EC) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:204:0037:0048:EN:PDF.In the report is proposed to
change directive 98/34/EC in line with the provisions of the Service Directive 2006/
123/EC. See the report, at 32. In this respect the report (at 9 and 23) also refers to
the ISO code of ethics (to ensure impartiality) and the WTO Code of Good Practice
for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards. In (technical) stand-
ardization the regulator is supposed to be independent from the industry and its
legitimacy is based on expertise. See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 35. Moreover, inde-
pendency from members of an initiative seems important for this in general. This
poses amongst others limits to funding by members to an initiative and allocation
of resources. See, e.g. MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 6 and 7.
230 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 89. Compare, regarding round table initia-
tives in global agri-food chainsm Schouten, supra note 69, at 36-38. This might be
a specific risk in long supply chains with multiple actors. Cf Alvarez & von Hagen,
supra note 67, at 11.
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international private regulation.2 3 1 Inclusiveness regarding relevant
stakeholders provides insight in the preferences of others, the vari-
eties of perspectives on the problem the regime addresses, and pro-
vides potential for rethinking not only the rules and instruments of the
regime but also its objectives.2 3 2 If only one group of stakeholder(s) is
represented in the governing body, this decreases the acceptance of
such mechanism for others. 233 Therefore, the multi-stakeholder model
seems more effective because it aspires to engage the relevant stake-
holders in the rulemaking process and is therefore able to embody all
interests. 23 4 This might, however, not be true in all circumstances. For
example, market failures associated with the excessive depletion of
natural resources or climate change may be effectively addressed
through action by the same market actors whose conduct caused the
problem.235
As to the way in which relevant stakeholders should be in-
volved, four features of rule-making might be of importance: (i) formal-
ity (how precisely is the rule-making process stipulated in
organization documents, either formal or informal), (ii) decision
calculus (what is the nature of deliberations regarding proposed rules,
either technical or political), (iii) decision rule (how is the decision to
approve a new rule made: majoritarian, supermajoritarian, special
powers, consensus), and (iv) inclusiveness (how open is the rule-mak-
ing process to participation by nonmembers, either self-contained or
participatory).2 3 6
231 See, in connection with global agri-food chains, Schouten, supra note 69, at 43-
45.
232 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 18.
233 Cf UTTING, supra note 57, at 103.
234 Cf. KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 57; Overmars, supra note 7, at 20; Scott et al.,
supra note 9, at 6; Pauwelyn et al., supra note 59, at 521-526; UTTING, supra note
57, at 103. On International Framework Agreements on labor standards see
Herrnstadt, supra note 112, at 187. This is also common in respect of traditional
rule-making.235 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 7; Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 23.
236 KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 145. See also MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97,
at 11-13; section 5.2 of the Iseal Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, which de-
mands for providing public information on the decision-making procedures of stan-
dard setting processes. Section 5.5.1 prescribes that participation in the standards
consultation as a principle should be open to all interested parties and that the
decision making reflects a balance of interests among interested parties. Cf also
MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 37. Section 5.5.3 of the ISEAL code of good
practice prescribes that if decision-making is limited to members the membership
criteria and application procedures shall be transparent and non-discriminatory.
ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, §5.5.3. Section 5.9 aims at consensus
but provides for alternative decision-making procedures if this is not possible. It
prescribes that decision-making procedures should be established and documented
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That said, engaging relevant stakeholders is rather compli-
cated.2 3 7 For example, in the global setting it is troublesome to find the
relevant stakeholders because the relevant community is ambiguous
and contested.2 3 s (Global) administrative procedural requirements
might be included (which might even be assessed by third parties).2 3 9
This is especially true in assessing the relevant stakeholders and en-
gaging them,2 40 assessing the (different) interests of these stakehold-
ers, and providing these stakeholders with adequate information in a
timely fashion and in such a manner that they are able to understand
it. For example, inviting (representatives of) indigenous people from a
country in Latin America to attend a rule setting conference of mul-
tinational corporations at a venue in the United States which is diffi-
cult to reach, and providing them a day in advance with extensive
information through a web portal which they have no access to (be-
cause they do not have Internet access), and in English, a language
they may not understand, is rather ineffective.
Effective stakeholder engagement entails (i) a proper proce-
dure in which the relevant stakeholders are identified and engaged in
the rule setting process (with sufficient resources), preferably through
(with administrative procedures comparable) engagement rules, (ii) an
assessment of their interests, (iii) a procedure in which adequate and
timely information (on the rule setting process and its substantive
norms) is provided in such a manner that the relevant stakeholders
are able to access and understand it, and (iv) sufficient documentation
which make it impossible for one group to dominate or to be dominated in the
decision-making process. Id. § 5.8. Compare, regarding (practical difficulties in)
global agri-food chainsm Schouten, supra note 69, at 64-67 and 85-87, who refers
to a methodology to assess the quality of deliberation (Discourse Quality Index).
237 See, e.g., Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 38; Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at 6;
UTTING, supra note 57, at 62, 63, 103-105. Cf also Scott et al., supra note 9, at 10.
238 Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 20; KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 69. The
Iseal Code of Good Practice provides for an opportunity for interested parties to
comment on the public summary for a proposed standard and its terms of refer-
ence in section 5.2.2. ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, § 5.2.2.
239 Benedict Kingsbury et al., 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16, 17, and 58 (2004-
2005); Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 179. On these procedural requirements
see Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 133 (2004-2005). It might be feasible to start with a
smaller group of stakeholders to build trust and to expand this group afterwards.
See in connection with global agri-food chains. Schouten, supra note 69, at 46.
240 It might be conceivable to introduce threshold criteria in terms of being af-
fected. See Tim Corthaut et al., Operationalizing Accountability of IN-LAW Mecha-
nisms, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 310, 316 (Joost Pauwelyn ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2012).
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of the process and reporting to the stakeholders.2 4 1 NGOs might play a
role in capacity building of local communities especially in non-west-
ern countries.2 4 2 These communities should not feel bound by deci-
sions made by (western) outsiders (only). As to criterion (i) diversity
(in terms of gender and background), for example, has to be safe-
guarded and no relevant stakeholder should be marginalized.2 4 3 Fur-
thermore, if the stakeholders are quite diverse, several selection
processes and different bodies of engagement for different stakehold-
ers might be necessary. Beside this, the degree of participation might
be variable.2 44 There is no need to put too much emphasis on
membership.2 4 5
Several examples show the importance of stakeholder engage-
ment in connection with the effectiveness of international private reg-
ulation. For example the Marine Stewardship Council ("MSC"),
established by the World Wildlife Fund and Unilever in 1996, was ini-
tially criticized due to perceived industry capture and lack of trans-
parency and participation in its standard-setting procedures. The
MSC became a fully independent non-profit organization in 1998 and
undertook a comprehensive governance reform to enhance participa-
241 Cf ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, §§ 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 entail a stakeholder mapping exercise which includes defining
which interest sectors are relevant and why and what means of communications
will best reach them. Furthermore key stakeholders should proactively be ap-
proached and the standard setting body should establish participation goals. Ac-
cording to section 5.5.2 relevant stakeholders are those who have an expertise
relevant to the subject matter of the standard, those who are affected by the stan-
dard and those that could influence the standard. Materially affected stakeholders
should make up a meaningful segment of the participants. Furthermore, section
5.6 prescribes a public consultation phase of 60 days in two rounds (if new stan-
dards are set or existing standards are substantially modified). Section 5.7
prescribes that interested parties shall be provided with meaningful opportunities
to contribute and if a balanced group of stakeholders participate all interested par-
ties should have an equal opportunity to be part of that group. Furthermore, the
standard setting organization should identify parties who will be directly affected
and not adequately represented and proactively seek their contributions (section
5.7.2). If necessary, funding or other means to facilitate participation (especially
for disadvantaged groups directly affected by the standards) should be provided by
the standard setting body (section 5.7.3). Cf Principals for Better Self- and Co-
Regulation and Establishment of a Community Practice, supra note 89, Principals
1.2 & 2.5.
242 UTTING, supra note 57, at 105-07.
243 See, e.g. MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 8-11.
244 Cassese et al., supra note 239, at 17.
245 Imelda Maher, Competition Law and Transnational Private Regulatory Re-
gimes: Marking the Cartel Boundary, 38 J. L. & Soc'Y 119, 135 (2011).
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tion, representation, and transparency.2 4 6 The Forest Stewardship
Council ("FSC") has been one of the most active private regulation re-
gimes in the institutionalization of processes aspiring to increase its
legitimacy relating to responsible forest management,2 7 It institu-
tionalized an elaborate governance structure which is based upon par-
ticipation, democracy, and equality. It established a tripartite
governance structure composed of social, environmental, and economic
chambers which have equal voting rights. In each chamber there are
north and south sub chambers with equal voting rights regardless of
the number of members. In order for a decision to be made there is a
requirement of a two-thirds vote, which necessitates agreement not
only between social, environmental, and economic interests, but also
between northern and southern interests.2 4 8
Concluding this section, one might argue that the more rele-
vant stakeholders are effectively engaged in the rulemaking process,
the more effective an initiative deems to be. From the above, one might
infer, from a sociological perspective, that the effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation is intertwined with:
(i) The degree of knowledge and application,
(ii) Acceptance thereof, which, inter alia, depends on:
a. A stable group of stakeholders,
b. A willingness to collaborate and to address relevant
issues,
c. A shared vision on relevant issues,
d. The degree to which the actions of a governing body, if
any, are aligned with this shared vision,
e. A tradition of and experience with private rulemaking,
f. The way the regulation fits within the strategic choices
and dilemmas faced by the regulatees,
g. The existence of an own interest in the regulation,
h. A slow changing environment,
i. Support from governments,
(iii) The mode of transmission, and
(iv) Inclusiveness vis-A-vis stakeholders and effective stake-
holder engagement.2 49
246 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 90.
247 Id.
248 Id.; Schouten, supra note 69, at 65. Sometimes outside the CSR area, for exam-
ple in GLOBALGAP, a private regulation regime in the sphere of food safety and
quality, processes are initiated to enhance participation in its standards setting by
notice and comment procedures, but the board is still composed of retailer and
producer representatives. See Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 90.
249 This indicator refers to the legitimacy of the process, elaborated in para 2.4
supra, as well.
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The social perspective could be used ex ante to predict whether a
favorable environment exists for a private regulatory framework to be
accepted. Obviously, acceptance itself cannot be assessed ex ante. It is
also relevant to include the most effective ways of communication and
transmission of the framework in the rule setting process and the pro-
mulgation of the framework. The same goes for the inclusiveness of the
rule setting process vis-A-vis relevant stakeholders.
4.4 Behavioral Approach
The psychological approach aspires to assess (ex ante) whether
envisioned international private regulation influences human behav-
ior effectively.25 ° However, legal (either private or public) rules are not
the predominant steering mechanisms which guide an actor's behavior
in many situations. For example, social norms which emanate from
communities govern much human behavior too. 25 1 If a range of (either
private or public) norms is designed to govern an actor's conduct, this
does not automatically mean these norms actually govern that actor's
behavior.25 2 Empirical research has shown that in particular contexts,
both contractual and regulatory, legal rules are not relied upon to
steer the conduct of a social actor, despite the fact these legal rules are
applicable to a specific action of a certain social actor, for instance
through contractual agreements or legislation.2" 3 For example, con-
tracting parties frequently do not rely on the law or lawyers in resolv-
ing disputes over breaches.2 5 4 In such cases, social norms may guide
the specific conduct of the actor.2 5 5 Therefore, it is of importance to
enhance, as much as possible, the crystallization of international pri-
vate regulation in such a manner it actually governs behavior.
Another problem is that research has raised serious questions
about the rationality of many judgments and decisions that people
make.25 6 For example, people tend to overestimate the predictability of
250 In this respect especially, insights derived from cognitive psychology (which
deals with the human decision making process) are relevant and those derived
from social psychology (the interaction between people and the way this influences
decision making) are less relevant. The psychological approach is also concerned
with the issue whether decision-making may as well be influenced by other
(proper) measures than regulation.
251 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 79.
252 Id. at 81.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 86.
255 Id. at 82.
256 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 7.
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past events (the "hindsight bias"). 25 7 Furthermore, people tend to go
along with the status quo or default option. 25 s Therefore, if public offi-
cials think that one policy produces better outcomes, they can influ-
ence the outcome by choosing it as a default.2 59 Following the default
option might stem from a choice/information overload. Research sug-
gests that past a certain point, if provided with more choice and infor-
mation, humans either walk away from markets, choose the default
option, or choose randomly. 260 For example, in connection with eco-
labels, consumers might attempt to simplify rather (complex) environ-
mental information and aggregate other people's opinions.2 61 They
might expect eco-labeled foods to taste better because the environmen-
tal benefit is not observable.2 6 2 Furthermore, a consumer tends to ac-
cept information which is in line with previous knowledge.2 63
Consumers might also overestimate the environmental improvement
of an eco-labeled product or consider brands or companies which en-
gage in eco-labels as entirely green.2 6 4 Even their expectations about
a product's (environmental) quality makes a product better or worse. If
their impression is positive, negative information will be ignored.2 6 5
A higher price enhances the credibility of the product too.2 6 6
Because eco-labels are oriented towards providing (certain) environ-
mental information, consumers might tend to overestimate the effects
of these environmental problems in favor of less exposed environmen-
tal problems.2 67 Beside this, a problem has to be individualized or sep-
arated into smaller manageable parts: if it becomes too broad, such as
climate change, an individual contribution is rather small. Therefore,
257 Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1, 24 (2007-2008); Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive
Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 Judicature 44, 47 (2002-2003).
258 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 8, 34.
259 Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE
1338 (2003); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 8, 86. For example, countries
in which people have to object to providing organs have a higher rate of donors
compared to countries in which people have to consent.
260 Renda, supra note 94, at 110. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 190 -192. This
might explain the popularity of websites which assist people in making choices (for
example in the area of (health-care) insurance, consumer goods and financial
products).
261 Gandara, supra note 25, at 129, 193-94.
262 Id. at 129.
263 See id. at 194.
264 Id. at 129, 162, and 205. Obviously, this conclusion is false. If a company ad-
heres to a carbon reduction label it does not necessarily follow that the company
performs well in other areas such as water and waste management. See id. at 207.
265 Gandara, supra note 25, at 130-31.
266 Id. at 132.
267 Id. at 181.
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people are likely to neglect it emotionally.2 6 s If an informational deficit
results in neglecting the information altogether, international private
regulation might not function. For example, eco-labels are informa-
tional tools aiming at nudging consumers to buy environmentally
friendly products. Hence, neglecting the information provided by them
(as well as distrusting such information or being unaware of it) ren-
ders them ineffective.2 6 9 Eco-labels should preserve a good reputation
and avoid negative emotions (of consumers) in order to attract atten-
tion.2 10 In this respect competition between (too many) eco-labels
might result in confusion, especially if false eco-labels or frivolous en-
vironmental claims exist as well.2 7 1
Additionally, losing something makes people twice as misera-
ble as gaining the same thing makes them happy. We, therefore, are
loss averse.2 7 2 Thus the personal severity, the perceived severity of
negative consequence or outcome which could result from assuming no
behavioral action and the salience of a certain topic to an individual,
influences decision making.27 3 Beside this, inconsistency between atti-
tudes (preferences, beliefs, or norms) may result in an uncomfortable
state (cognitive dissonance) which an individual tries to resolve. 4
Eco-labels might assist in this because they enable an individual to
change his behavior (through buying an eco-labeled product) and align
it with his moral (environmental) preferences.2 75
From the above, it becomes clear that individuals exhibit
bounded rationality, which means that their mental resources are lim-
ited and depart from the expected utility theory. People make choices
sometimes which are not in their long-term (financial) interest or are
even harmful to them.2 76 These biases might also lead to shifting focus
towards measurable and immediate benefits, rather than long-term
social welfare. 27 7 Therefore, in designing private regulation, one
268 Id. at 183.
269 Id. at 200-02.
270 Gandara, supra note 25, at 203. In this respect they should also review their
supply chain. The eco friendlier it is (if made public), the better their reputation.
See id. at 208-09.
271 Id. at 205, 206, 209, 268 and 269.
272 Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, supra
note 257, at 46-47; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 33; Sanne B. Pape,
Warnings and Product Liability (Ph.D. Thesis Rotterdam (The Netherlands 2011),
173.
273 Pape, supra note 272, at 104.
274 Gandara, supra note 25, at 198.
275 Id. at 199.
276 See, e.g. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 8 and 34; Renda, supra note
94, at 112.
277 Cafaggi and Renda, supra note 46, at 17.
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should take into account that human decision making is not impecca-
ble.2  One could toy with designing regulation which entails no
choice. However, sometimes the most equitable system is where a
choice is required.2 7 9 Many (more or less) open norms contain an ele-
ment of choice.
But, as discussed above, this may not be a good idea or it might
not even be feasible with highly complex choices. 2 ' Good private regu-
lation also helps people to select options that will make them better
off, by providing information for example.28 1 One way of doing this is
to make the information about various options more comprehensi-
ble.2 8 2 As choices become more numerous and/or vary on more dimen-
sions, people are more likely to adopt simplifying strategies.28 3 Then
the choice architecture has to provide structure.28 4 It should provide
feedback too. 28 5 Incentives might be used, but it is important to put
the right incentives on the right people and make them notice the in-
centive.28 6 Many people will take whatever option requires the least
effort or the path of least resistance.28 7 Therefore, a rule is required
that determines what happens to the decision maker if he does
nothing.28 8
The question arises whether these insights also pertain to deci-
sion making by companies, for example on market regulation or envi-
ronmental protection.28 9 Obviously, individuals within a company
might be hampered by the biases described above, for example if inter-
national private regulation prescribes a risk assessment. In making
such an assessment, this individual within the company might be
hampered by the hindsight bias or the fact that humans tend to be risk
278 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 87.
279 Id. at 86.
280 Id. at 87.
281 Cf Renda, supra note 94, at 158 and 159; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180,
at 92.
282 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 92.
283 Id. at 95.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 90. See, e.g., on feedback with eBay, which provides a judgment system
of sellers Vincent Buskens, Between Hobbes' Leviathan and Smith's Invisible
Hand 29-34 (Inaugural lecture Rotterdam, Eleven, Den Haag (The Netherlands)
2011).
286 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 97-98.
287 Id. at 83.
288 Renda, supra note 94, at 158; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 83. How-
ever, choosing a default option might in itself pose (for example ethical) questions
and might raise legitimacy issues. Notwithstanding this, the private regulator has
to consider what happens if no choice is made.
289 Renda, supra note 94, at 160.
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averse. 2 90 However, this conclusion does not answer the question
whether the organizational design of a company influences decision
making. A shift of perspective is necessary in order to answer that
question. The focus shifts from individual decision making to group
behavior.2 9 1
Research has revealed that organizational design of enter-
prises does indeed influence group behavior. Different types of organi-
zations make different types of decisions and errors. A variety of
different organizational structures may be classified into hierarchies
and polyarchies for the purposes of modeling, taking a decision-mak-
ing rule as a criterion. Under the hierarchy, a project to be passed
should first be accepted by one level of managers and after their posi-
tive evaluation it should get an approval of the other level of manag-
ers. So it requires the approval of all the managers. In contrast, a
polyarchy allows a project to be passed if it is accepted by at least one
manager. A polyarchy accepts a larger number of projects because
managers can accept them independently from each other. Assuming
that different projects are divided into good and bad ones, Sah and
Stiglitz showed that hierarchies and polyarchies are prone to different
kinds of errors. Hierarchies reject good projects more often than poly-
archies, while polyarchies accept more bad projects than hierar-
chies.2 92 Alternatively, a model may be based on the comparison of
different organizational structures, similar to the structures used in
the models of Franckx and De Vries2 9 3 or Besanko, Regibeau, and
Rockett.29 4 Their models are used to analyze the product-based organi-
zational structure and the functional one in relation to accident
prevention.
This approach may, however, be useful to analyze decision
making incentivized by international private regulation too. Private
international regulation should fit to market conditions in a certain
290 Despite this risk might be missed as well. See, for a clear example, Balleisen &
Eisner, supra note 62, at 128.
291 In this respect especially, insights derived from social psychology (the interac-
tion between people and the way this influences decision making) are important,
whereas cognitive psychology, which has been discussed hereinabove, is concerned
with individual decision making.
292 Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Human Fallibility and Economic Or-
ganization, 75 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proceedings), 293 (1985); Tim Wu, Intel-
lectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV., 108
(2006).
293 Laurent Franckx & Frans P. de Vries, Environmental Liability and Organiza-
tional Structure 1 (Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers (Series)
04-01 2004).
294 David Besanko et al., A Multi-Task Principal- Agent Approach to Organiza-
tional Form, 53(4) J. Indust. Econ., 437 (2005).
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industry or country. The way the majority of enterprises are organ-
ized, for example, may influence the market conditions. The product-
based organizational structure implies that a division of an organiza-
tion into departments is made along the lines of the products manufac-
tured. Thus, the first department is responsible for all functions
related to the product A, the second department of the product B, and
so on. By contrast, the functional organizational structure is based on
a type of activity. The typical activities include production, marketing,
research and development, human resources, and internal audit. This
division principle encourages the managers of the product-based struc-
ture to practice a complex approach to their broad tasks and assumes
more autonomy at a department level, whereas the functional struc-
ture makes the managers rather narrow professionals in their specific
functional field and more centralized guiding is provided across differ-
ent product lines. Therefore, effective international private regulation
has to take into account the (prevailing) organizational model of the
regulated organizations.
In designing international private regulation, the aforemen-
tioned insights should be taken into account.2 9 5 From an ex ante psy-
chological perspective, international private regulation has the best
chance to be effective if:
(i) It takes into account that human decision making is not
flawless and expects failures,
(ii) Structures complex choices, amongst others by:
a. Restricting the number of choices,
b. Providing information which assists people in making
proper decisions, and
c. Demanding transparency as to the consequences of a
choice,
(iii) Entails a default option which is beneficial to the majority
of regulatees,
(iv) If business is involved, takes into account the organiza-
tional model of the regulatees,
(v) It enhances crystallization so as to govern behavior.
Instead of promulgating new private regulation, policymakers might
consider establishing nudges that direct people in the desired direc-
tion. A nudge is a choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly chang-
ing their economic incentives. Regulation might not be the right in-
strument to change behavior, for example because it is necessarily not
tailor made, because of the distance between a regulator and an indi-
295 Thaler and Sunstein promulgate that the aforementioned features can easily
be enlisted by private and public nudgers. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note
180, at 71.
318 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:2
vidual and because the help of intermediaries (for example companies)
is necessary to influence behavior. In such circumstances a nudge
might be more effective, provided that this intervention is easy and
cheap to avoid. 296 Especially rare, difficult choices with delayed effects
are good candidates for nudges according to Thaler and Sunstein, for
example in situations lacking direct feedback or where feedback did
not work.2 9 7
The psychological avenue might thus provide an ex ante tool to
assess the effectiveness of international private regulation, next to the
legal, economic and sociological avenues.
5. COMPARING EFFECTIVENESS OF ExISTING INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE
REGULATION (Ex POST APPROACH)
5.1 Legal Approach
After discussing the ex ante indicators which are helpful in the
rule setting process, I will turn to the effectiveness of existing interna-
tional private regulation. In this respect, the legal and economic ave-
nues are especially important, combined with a more limited role for
the sociological avenue. From a legal point of view, the effectiveness of
existing international private regulation is, amongst others, ques-
tioned because it is deemed to be less enforceable than public regula-
tion. This is supposedly caused by the lack of public instruments to
enforce private regulation. Furthermore, as elucidated above, other in-
dicators are important to assess the effectiveness of existing interna-
tional private regulation, such as an effective conflict resolution
mechanism.
However, research has not confirmed the assumption that pri-
vate enforcement is less effective in the Netherlands. Research has
been conducted in connection with effectiveness of private and public
enforcement regarding regulation on consumer protection against un-
fair trade practices (the sections 6:193a-j of the Dutch Civil Code).29
For example, misleading product information is considered an unfair
trade practice (section 6:193c subsection 1 under b and section 6:193d
subsection 3 Dutch Civil Code).29 9 These rules in the Dutch Civil Code
are enforced by public instruments, such as fines. This public enforce-
ment was evaluated in 2007 and 2008, but the evaluation did not con-
firm public enforcement being more effective than private
296 Id. at 6.
297 Id. at 75.
298 See, e.g., Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] art. 6:193b-j (Neth.) (listing
various different practices considered misleading by the Dutch government),
available at http://dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle6633.htm#secO633a
299 Id.
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enforcement. 30 0 That said, enforcement by states is deemed to be nec-
essary if violations of norms have a low probability of detection. Then
more severe public sanctions are needed in order to compensate for
this low probability. Furthermore, a public entity may have an infor-
mational advantage over private supervisors. However, this does not
mean that enforcement should be a prerogative of states. The capacity
to steer transnational actors may arguably be even greater for inter-
governmental actors than it is for national governments.3 0 1 This is
mainly caused by the fact that no global overarching (public) supervi-
sor (with instruments to enforce) exists. Therefore, alternative mecha-
nisms to enforce international private regulation have to be
considered.
According to Casey and Scott, "[a]nalysis of enforcement of a
private norm is concerned with the rewards and punishment associ-
ated with following the norm, the mechanisms and extent of enforce-
ment, the source of authority, and the degree of internalization."30 2
Research has not demonstrated the frequent use of enforcement
processes connected to international private regulation involving the
stringent application of regulatory rules. Casey and Scott also point
out that "a wide range of approaches, often involving education and
advice to those found in breach, are utilized ahead of more stringent
approaches-warnings, civil or criminal penalties, and license revoca-
tions."3 0 3 Studies have even been conducted combining the empirical
evidence of the practice of escalating sanctions with game-theory argu-
ments as to how and when such escalation should occur.304 The appli-
cation of the enforcement pyramid is intended to ensure that
regulatees who are fundamentally oriented towards legal compliance
receive appropriate advice to enable them to achieve this objective. 0 5
On the other hand, the credible threat of escalation encourages
the subjects who only comply when this is consistent with financial
incentives to comply at the lowest level of the pyramid, because non-
compliance would be more costly. 30 6 When social norms are persist-
ently breached there is the potential for an escalating set of sanctions
300 See E.L.M. Mout-Vos, Het duale stelsel van handhaving van de Wet handhav-
ing consumentenbescherming (Whc), een tussenstand, Tijdschrift voor Consu-
mentenrecht en handelspraktijken 258, 265 (2010). However, the author contends
public enforcement cannot be missed in order to impose punitive sanctions.
301 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 8.
302 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 83.
303 Id. at 83.
304 Id.
305 Nevertheless, imposing sanctions is not necessary in many instances. Business
disputes are often settled without the use of judicial enforcement mechanisms.
306 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 83. Nonetheless, especially regarding punitive
sanctions, public legislation is deemed to be essential. A need for such enforcement
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against the deviant, (starting with social sanctions such as negative
gossip), and which eventually may reach a formal legal claim.3 ° 7 Social
norms likely underpin the operation of parties to a private regulatory
regime, however, often because of the possibility or threat of reinforce-
ment through market sanctions and/or the possibility of legal sanc-
tions for significant or harmful deviation from such norms. 30 8 If the
threat of effective enforcement exists, it may not be necessary to make
use of the whole pyramid. Beside this, it must be noted that enforce-
ment is not only tied to sanctions and the accompanying costs, but also
to other means, such as providing information on the regime and
education.
International private regulation is often associated with a high
sense of freedom to opt in or out of a certain sphere. 30 9 Parties who
wish to join the regulatory bodies participating in the regime are free
to do so. Therefore, private enforcement is considered less effective.
However, this is not necessarily so. Once entities have implemented a
private regulatory regime, they are legally bound by it and violation of
the rules might subject them to legal sanctions imposed by an over-
arching body or arising from contractual provisions.3 10 The more se-
vere the threat of possible sanctions, the more effective the private
regime is. 3 11
Furthermore, incentives may exist to participate. Participation
in a private regime and compliance with its standards might be a con-
dition for access to this or other regimes which provide market oppor-
tunities for the regulated entities. Some standards are even de facto
compulsory for market actors, whether promulgated by individual ac-
tors (for example Microsoft or ICANN3 1 2 ) or by standardization bodies
(like ISO).3 1 The foregoing standards promulgated by individual ac-
mechanisms may exist if the possibilities for the detection of violations of the pri-
vate regime are limited.
307 Id. at 84.
308 Id.; Overmars, supra note 7, at 17. But cf. Hernstadt, supra note 112, at
202-07 (on International Framework Agreements for labor standards).
309 Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131; Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at
168.
310 See, e.g., GIESEN, supra note 8, at 93-106, who discerns three grounds for the
binding nature of private regulatory regimes. These are national legislation,
agreement, and open norms in national legislation. See, e.g., MSI-evaluation tool,
supra note 97, at 33-36 (on sanctions by an overarching body).
311 Cf Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 10-11. They contend that codes
promulgated by business associations perform weakly in the CSR area amongst
others in this respect.
312 KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 52.
313 But cf Maher, supra note 245, at 135. However, this raises the question
whether such a regime violates public regulation on competition. If companies cre-
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tors, either individual companies or overarching bodies, both provide
access to scarce resources. This enhances the possibilities of setting
314Anteexmforth private regimes and enforcing these regimes. Another exam
ple is connected with the IFC guidelines. If a company does not comply
with these standards, it is much more difficult to raise capital. 15
The enforceability of international private regulation is con-
nected with its specificity, which has been elucidated above. More pre-
cise commands will generally result in better behavior.3 16 Market
incentives may exist to develop and follow standards, too, while the
market punishes those who do not follow them.3 1 7 Pressure to comply
with private norms may be exerted by consumers, NGOs, investors, or
stock markets.31 8 Incentives might also exist within a company. For
example, a company listed on a stock exchange might increase the bo-
nuses of its board members if it raises its position in the sustainability
index. That said, it is important that an overarching body exists which
has the power to inform the public about the implementation of and
ate a level playing field amongst each other in order to enhance CSR-compliance,
one might favor such a regime because it contributes to social welfare, unlike most
actions which restrict competition. Unfortunately, to date European competition
law does not seem to provide an exemption for such regimes. If such an exemption
is deemed feasible, public supervision might be desirable to assess whether these
regimes restrict competition in a proportional manner. Reference could be made to
section 25 of the Dutch Data Protection Law, which creates the power of the Dutch
Data Protection Agency to decide whether codes of conduct on data protection
meet the requirements set forth by the Data Protection Law. Competition authori-
ties might be attributed a comparable power to assess whether private regulation
on CSR does not restrict competition unnecessarily. Compare in this respect the
proposed section 2 of the policy of the Dutch Department of Economic Affairs
which provides for guidelines to the Competition Authority as to which cases an
exemption to section 6 subsection 3 of the Dutch Competition Act (which prohibits
acts which hamper competition) should be granted in connection with sustainable
business.
314 But cf KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 62; Vrielink, supra note 132, at 70-73; Scott
et al., supra note 9, at 7.
315 See KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 63 (showing outside the CSR area on the ac-
counting standards of the ISAB).
316 See Kaplow, supra note 88, at 19-20. Cf. Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at
9; Luppi & Parisi, supra note 118, at 43; Overmars, supra note 7, at 17 (regarding
codes of conduct); UTTING, supra note 57, at 82; ISEAL Code of Good Practice,
supra note 89, at § 6.3.1.
317 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 7.
318 Id. at 10; Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 21; KOPPELL, supra note 29, at
61; UTTING, supra note 57, at 90, 111-12. Koppell gives some examples of NGOs
being quite successful in such private enforcement.
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compliance with the transnational private regulation by its
members. 1 9
Sometimes private regulation addresses reputational issues 320
because of the ease of access to information on the internet or in news-
papers, for example, on the violation of CSR standards or codes of con-
duct.32 1 This seems necessary in such cases because the problem of
enforcing CSR standards appears to function so that unless strong
pressure is exercised by consumers, some significantly sized retailers
might not have sufficient incentives to monitor and enforce viola-
tions.322 Without being pressured, companies with weak records might
gravitate toward undemanding programs to enhance their reputation
without changing their practices. This might drive companies seeking
to make credible efforts out of these non-demanding regimes. On the
other hand, demanding (and, consequently, more effective) initiatives
tend to attract companies with stronger performance records, but
might not be implemented by weaker companies. 2 3 In some sectors,
this problem is partially solved by NGOs, which find ways to address
these problems, regarding human rights or the environment, for
example. 3 24
If market incentives drive compliance, the norms of a private
regime often are reflected in contractual arrangements and reinforced
through participation in markets.3 2 5 Contractual arrangements might
319 See, e.g., MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 20- 21.
320 But cf. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131-33; Ogus & Carbonara, supra
note 10, at 244-45; Scott et al., supra note 9, at 7. Reputational damage raises the
cost of non-compliance with the private regulatory framework. Ogus & Carbonara,
supra note 10, at 244-45. In the Netherlands, naming and shaming is considered
to be one of the possibilities regarding repeated or severe violations of the corpo-
rate governance code. See Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs to The
Second Chamber (Jan. 30, 2012) at 5.
321 But cf Liesbeth F.H. Enneking, Foreign Direct Liability and Beyond 398-401,
439 (Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht, Eleven Publ. 2012) (elaborating on the possibility of
codes of conduct becoming trade practice too).
322 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 38.
323 Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 132-33.
324 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 8.
325 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 83. For example the Equator-principles, which
have been adopted by the Equator-principles Financial Institutions, are relied
upon in project financing and advisory activities (if the total project capital costs
exceed US$ 10 million). These principles, among others, require the use of the
social screening criteria and environmental, health, and safety guidelines of the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and prescribe a risk assessment by the
borrower, a grievance mechanism as well as independent monitoring and report-
ing. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, Principals 1, 2, 6, and 9, June 2013, http://www.
equator-principles.comresources/equator-principlesIll.pdf. The principles also
entail an annual reporting requirement of the financing entity regarding the im-
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even be used to enforce international private regulation without the
existence of market incentives. Nonetheless, many enterprises comply
with CSR standards voluntarily and do not need such incentives. This
is important because the more enterprises accept this regulation and
comply voluntarily, the less enforcement is necessary. Conflict, and
thus the need for enforcement, is most likely when (i) the distribution
of interests among the stakeholders to be governed is heterogene-
ous,326 (ii) a governing body does not have coercive tools at its disposal,
and (iii) a governing body lacks control over a valuable resource.3 2 7
Furthermore, certification or monitoring by a third party is a
common tool to assess whether entities act in compliance with a cer-
tain international standard.3 2 s Certification is partly connected to re-
porting requirements. It generally entails (i) establishment of
standards, (ii) certification assessment for compliance with the stan-
dards, (iii) a certification seal or label, (iv) accreditation of the certifier
by the certification body, and (v) compliance monitoring.3 2 9 If a private
regulatory regime entails reporting requirements, it is easier for third
parties to determine whether regulatees comply with this regulatory
framework.3 3 °
plementing process and its experiences. Id. at Principal 10. In such instances, the
crystallization of social norms within particular professional or commercial group-
ings is often involved. A shared responsibility towards societal issues is needed.
For this, an intermediate organization may be necessary, which the IFC regards
as its Sustainability Framework. See generally, Overmars, supra note 7, at 20.
Next to this, smaller groups of companies and a high organizational rate seem to
be beneficial. However, in my view, the latter requirements are more closely con-
nected with acceptance from a sociological point of view, which I elaborate later on
in this contribution. Nonetheless, if these requirements are met, enforcement of a
private regime might improve.
326 But cf. Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 234.
327 KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 62.
328 But cf Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 136; Ogus & Carbonara, supra
note 10, at 245; Gandara, supra note 25, at 152. Cf. Schouten, supra note 69, at
41-43 (in connection with standards in global agri-food chains).
329 See, Gandara, supra note 25, at 51-52 (in connection with eco-labels). See, e.g.,
DIMITROPOULOS, supra note 32, at 224 (on certification in general). Dimitropoulos
contends international certificates should be recognized throughout the world and
national governments should supervise the certification process. Id. at 237, 241,
and 246.
330 But cf. United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), Today's
Landscape and Issues & Initiatives to Reach Public Policy Objectives, at 52-54,
available at http://unfss.org/documentation/general-documentation (in connection
with traceability of products through a supply chain in order to assess conformity
with a standard) [hereafter UNFSS Landscape Report].
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Certification seems a very useful instrument to enforce compli-
ance with standards.3 3 1 It is frequently used in connection with eco-
labels. 3 2 Eco-labels have different appearances, such as: words, logos,
and brand names. They are used for communicating certain environ-
mental and social claims. These claims may be used only if those envi-
ronmental or social standards have been complied with, and
compliance with them has been certified.3 33 However, the effectiveness
of certification may be a little disappointing in practice. In many coun-
tries, severe competition exists between certification bodies, thus put-
ting pressure on the reliability of the certification process. 3 34
Furthermore, the certification bodies fund their own supervising au-
thority in the certification process, therefore it is not as independent
as it could be.335 Beside this, certification is costly, and procedural as-
pects (such as, the review of documentation) might prevail over assess-
ing actual improvement of quality in an organization or changes in
331 See extensively on advantages and disadvantages in connection with certifica-
tion regarding environmental and social aspects Resolv, Toward Sustainability,
The Roles and Limitations of Certification, available at www.resolv.org/site-as-
sessment/files/2012/06/Report-Only.pdf. It might become even more effective if
certification is used to prove that requirements set by public regulation are met.
But cf. Schouten, supra note 69, at 116-17 (in connection with bio fuels). Certifica-
tion might also be incorporated in supply chains contracts or might be connected to
them. See Cafaggi, supra note 10, at 1561, 1566, 1580, 1601-11. The indicators
used in certification might even be more detailed and specific than the ones used
by courts to assess compliance with public regulation. See id. at 1607.
332 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 22. Some of these labels not only include envi-
ronmental issues but social matters as well. Certification (in connection with eco-
labels) provides the proof consumers need about a product/service's environmental
attributes. This is necessary because eco-labels are credence goods which do not
reflect the product's physical or other identifiable characteristics. Id. at 260-61.
333 Many eco-labels have an overarching body (being the "owner" of the eco-label
in which stakeholders might be represented) as well as authorized or subordinated
certification bodies. See, e.g., Gandara, supra note 25, at 25. Eco-labels by and
large are (or should be) certification marks and have three purposes (i) to achieve
operational improvements in social and environmental arenas, (ii) to provide cred-
ible assurance around sustainability to consumers and (iii) to increase the demand
by modifying purchasing decisions and behavior by communicating sustainability
performance to consumers at the point of purchase. Id. at 26, 61, 106-12.
334 See, e.g., Dimitropoulos, supra note 32, at 224 (on certification). He contends
international certificates should be recognized throughout the world. Id. at 237,
246. He also contends that national governments should supervise the certifica-
tion process. Id. 241; see Gandara, supra note 25, at 224 (in connection with eco
labels).
335 See Council Regulation 765/08, 2008 O.J. (L 218/30) (EC), available at http://
eur-lex.europa.euLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:218:0030:0047:EN:
PDF (concerning norms for these supervising authorities in the EU).
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environmental impact.3 3 6 Furthermore, employees of certifying bodies
might lack sufficient knowledge, and certification criteria might be un-
specified or unclear. 3 7 Research has revealed that certification works
best if buyers are willing to pay for quality, better environment or so-
cial performance, and certification bodies compete with each other
amongst others by referring to the quality of their assessments. 3 s
Other forms of third party monitoring are conceivable too.339
To be effective, this monitoring should preferably be carried out by
skilled and independent third parties.3 40 Such monitoring should also
connect with accountability of enterprises which have adopted certain
international private regulation to an overarching body.3 41 Accounta-
bility in general may be defined as "a relationship between an actor
and a forum (i) in which the actor has an obligation (ii) to explain and
justify (iii) his or her conduct (iv), the forum can pose questions (v) and
pass judgment (vi) and the actor may face consequences (vii). '34 2 The
forum can be an individual (ex. minister, journalist) or an agency (par-
336 But cf UTTING, supra note 57, at 93 (concerning the cost of certification). It
should be noted that certification is not provided for in connection with the ISO-
standard on CSR, the ISO 26000 standard. See Schouten, supra note 69, at 132-33
(concerning the effectiveness of certification in connection with global agri-food
standards).
337 Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 25-26.
338 Cf Timothy D. Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial
Food 28-29 (Harvard University Press 2013).
339 Kolk and van Tulder discern between second party (e.g. trade associations)
and third party (external professionals paid by the company) assessment. They
argue that second party assessment is less effective than third party assessment.
See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 10. In my opinion, this is not necessarily
the case depending on the way these assessments are designed. See Herrnstadt,
supra note 112, at 202-04 (concerning internal and external monitoring of Inter-
national Framework Agreements on labor standards). Apart from this type of
monitoring, monitoring of the transnational regime itself (by an independent
evaluator) is conceivable. See MSI Evaluation Tool, supra note 97.
340 See MSI Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 15-18. However, retrieving the
relevant information is tempting, for example, because business might not want to
share certain information. See, e.g., UTTING, supra note 57, at 63. Effectiveness of
international private regulation therefore might gain relevance if it entails trans-
parency obligations. See, e.g., MSI Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 19-20.
341 Cf Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131, 137 (contending such body
should be a public entity with vigorous enforcement programs).
342 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 181. In connection with international pri-
vate regulation, see Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 142; Curtin & Senden,
supra note 11, at 185. Balleisen and Eisner contend that the level of accountability
should equal the level of accountability public regulation imposes. See Balleisen &
Eisner, supra note 62, at 145-46. See generally, Mark Bovens, Analysing and As-
sessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Framework, 13 Eur. L. J. 447 (2007)
(concerning accountability).
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liament, court, audit office and NGO).34 3 Regarding international pri-
vate regulation, the identification of the accountability relationship is
difficult because of the many actors and different backgrounds and in-
terests. 4 4 This problem is especially salient in the transnational con-
text with regulatory regimes of a diffuse, hybrid public-private nature
which include many different (public and private), often-organization-
ally-disconnected, actors at various moments in time. 45 Another ex-
ample is a supply chain contract.3 46 Furthermore, the question might
be to whom an actor should be accountable: a government, an over-
arching private body, or another type of NGO.3 4 7 Many effective pri-
vate regulatory regimes therefore have multiple accountability
relationships.348 However, sometimes actors focus their accountability
on one set of stakeholders at the expense of others.3 49 Consequently, a
need exists for balanced accountability, not only towards the powerful
stakeholders.3 °
If independent third parties are involved in assessing compli-
ance (and preferably impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance), this
indicates more effectiveness vis-A-vis private regulatory regimes which
lack such third party assessment.3 5 1 In this respect, it is important
that the third parties are allowed to share information about the ac-
tors with the (overarching) body to which the actors are accountable in
order to pass judgment on the behavior of the actors.
343 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 182. (discussing that the relationship be-
tween the actor and the forum does not necessarily need to have a principal-agent
character).
344 Id.; cf. Corthaut et al., supra note 240, at 314.
345 Cf. Corthaut et al., supra note 240, at 313-22.
346 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 182; UTTING, supra note 57, at 83. In con-
nection with traceability of products through a supply chain in order to assess
conformity, see UNFSS Landscape Report, supra note 330, at 52-54; Alvarez &
von Hagen, supra note 67, at 11-12.
347 Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 137; Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at
183.
348 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 183. This type of accountability is not
deemed effective by Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 137. Furthermore, obli-
gations to account are not comparable to political accountability, but they exist in
private regulatory regimes, sometimes however only of a voluntary or moral na-
ture. See Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 184.
349 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 187.
350 Id.
351 Cf ISEAL Code of Good Practice, supra note 89, at §6.2.2; Principals for Better
Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community Practice, supra note
89, Principal 3.2; Cf also Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 131; Kolk & van
Tulder, supra note 22, at 10; Herrnstadt, supra note 112, at 202-04; UrrING, supra
note 57, at 82-88.
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Public intervention might change the regime from voluntary to
compulsory.3 5 2 Public intervention is, amongst others, deemed to be
necessary to address the free-rider issue. Free-riders benefit from in-
ternational private regulation without adopting or implementing it.
One of the ways in which they might benefit is the enforcement of in-
ternational private regulation in a certain market against entities
which have adopted this regulation but violate it.3 53 Because of the
existence of the international private regulation which is enforced
(publicly), consumers, for example, might (erroneously) trust all mar-
ket participants to have adopted this regulation.
Public intervention has many faces. International private regu-
lation could be adopted as international "soft law" initially, but
redeployed by international organizations and implemented through
"hard law" at the continental (e.g., EU) or state level, through contract,
tort and/or company law.3 5 4 If the private regulation is implemented
through contract and/or tort law, domestic courts recognize privately
produced standards as part of customary public or private interna-
tional law.35 5 Contractual mechanisms for example are deployed in
supply chains (possibly through purchase or license-agreements) or in
financial arrangements in which a purchaser or financial entity re-
quires adoption of the applicable standards and engages in monitoring
and enforcement either directly or through contracting third party as-
surance organizations.3 56 Furthermore, legislation on unfair trade
352 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 22. On the necessity of public intervention, see Alva-
rez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 16-17. Cf DIMITROPOULOS, supra note 32, at
227, 229-32 (contending that international policy objectives might be realized
through national recognition of certificates). Public intervention might also take
more 'soft' modes as support for private regulation e.g. through incentivizing com-
panies to engage in it. This might enhance effectiveness as well. See Lily Hsueh &
Aseem Prakash, Incentivizing Self-Regulation: Federal vs. State-Level Voluntary
Programs in US Climate Change Policies, 6 Reg. & Governance 445, 445 (2012),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01140.x/
full.
353 Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 231.
354 Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 168. In connection with foreign direct lia-
bility see generally Enneking, supra note 321, at 439, 474, 506-12, 519-21, 560; Cf
Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 85; See also the example of the ISAB in Europe.
In the Netherlands, Article 2:8 of the Civil Code, which deals with good faith and
fair dealing in company law, is applied to incorporate the corporate governance
code into norms which are enforceable through national courts. See Pauwelyn et
al., supra note 59, at 509.
355 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 22; Enneking, supra note 321, at 439, 474, 506-12,
519-21,560.
356 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 93. On initiatives in supply chains, see, e.g.,
IDH SUSTAINABLE TRADE INITIATIVE, http://www.idhsustainabletrade.com (last
visitied Feb. 23, 2014); and on labor standards, see ETHIcAL TRADING INITIATIVE
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practices or unsupported claims may play a role in this. For example,
if a company advertises a certain product referring to an eco-label
while it in fact does not meet the requirements of that label, this could
be considered an unfair trade practice.3 5 7 The US, UK, New Zealand,
and Australia have endorsed public guidelines on environmental
claims, enforced by the public trade or environmental authorities. 5 If
an environmental claim is made based on an eco-label, the public au-
thority might ask for sufficient documentary evidence to support this
claim.35 9 In specific cases, legislation on misrepresentation might also
be of use to redress false environmental claims made by eco-labels.3 6 °
Other forms of public supervision are conceivable as well." 1 Addition-
ally, legislation might impose a due diligence obligation on a supply
chain.36 2
However, contractual enforcement through national courts is
often costly. Litigation in national courts might depend on the willing-
ness of domestic citizens to take action, courts to recognize such ac-
(ETI), http://www.ethicaltrade.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). On International
Framework Agreements on labor standards, see Herrnstadt, supra note 112, at
194-96. On supply chain initiatives and their problems, see generally Cafaggi &
Renda, supra note 46, at 18-20. However, if an overarching entity exists, member-
ship with it might also be determined as a contractual relationship, although of a
different nature than investment, lending, or supply chain contracts. See Cafaggi,
supra note 10, at 1564. In case of investments (or lending agreements), third party
rating agencies are engaged by investors to assess whether these privately set
rules are implemented and adhered to by entities invested in (or lenders). These
rating agencies make this assessment irrespective of the public or private nature
of the regulation. Furthermore, there are contractual remedies in these supply
chain contracts, which are by and large aimed at enhancing compliance (or ulti-
mately possibly termination) in connection with CSR issues instead of damages
and in which reputational sanctions might perform a role. Id. at 1614-15, 1617.
357 See, e.g., BW § 6:193g (Neth.) (based on the European unfair trade practices
directive, which considers such an advertisement to be an unfair trade practice).
358 Gandara, supra note 25, at 215-16. The guidelines resemble the ISO 14021
standard on environmental claims. See id. at 214-15. Absolute or wide range
claims such as 'environmentally friendly' or '100% recyclable' are considered to be
deceptive per se. Id. at 216.
359 Id. at 216-338. However, Gandara contends that the current regulation is in-
sufficient to deter greenwashing. Id. at 343; 348.
360 Id. at 226.
361 For example, the Dutch Financial Markets Authority supervises whether the
annual reports of companies listed at the Dutch stock exchange entail the main
elements of CSR issues that are relevant to the company. See Dutch Corporate
Governance Code, Principle II. 1.2.d, available at http://commissiecorporategovern-
ance.nlldownload/?id=606.
362 See, e.g., Council Regulation 995/2010, Laying Down the Obligations of Opera-
tors Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market, art. 4, 2010 O.J.
(L295) 23, 27 (aiming for the global prevention of illegal deforestation).
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tions and governments to set a framework which enables such
actions. 3 Because of the international nature of litigation in national
courts tied to international private regulation, these trials might re-
sult in time-consuming and costly proceedings in many different juris-
dictions, bringing about the risk of multiple (and even contradicting)
decisions. Furthermore, the question may be raised whether national
courts are equipped to deal with difficult international matters in the
CSR arena.364 Enforcement is rather complicated too in such circum-
stances. Coordination among national courts enforcing the same re-
gime is required in order to avoid too much differentiation.3 6 5 This
could be established by applying a duty of loyal cooperation which ex-
ists in the domain of public institutions, but such a system is obviously
difficult to enforce.366
Other forms of public intervention exist as well, including both
governmental and non-state actors, and also multi-level actors, i.e.,
national, European, and international levels. 367 In these systems, en-
gagement of stakeholders in the promulgation of self-regulatory codes
is encouraged, and member states of the EU are required to penalize
businesses' abuse of self-regulatory codes through legislation. 368
National corporate law regimes embody some of the CSR re-
quirements. 369 Oversight and enforcement is, however, left to the com-
panies themselves.370 Ethical committees, independent from the
management, have been put in place and shareholders can also help
steer companies towards compliance with key corporate governance
norms. The increasing importance of private regulation has promoted
important changes in the corporate governance structure of multina-
tional enterprises to promote responsiveness towards stakeholders af-
fected by the activity of the corporation 1.3 7  Also, governments have
increasingly sought to assert at least limited enforcement capacity
over companies' compliance with privately promulgated corporate gov-
ernance norms. Such rules might however give rise to a "tick the box"
mentality. Some enterprises tend to follow the rules in a rather formal
363 See, e.g., Enneking, supra note 321, at 487, 490-504, 510, 574, 595. On eco-
labels, see Gandara, supra note 25, at 300.
364 Enneking, supra note 321, at 620, 642 (proposing future solutions).
365 Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 49.
366 Id.
367 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 8.
368 Enneking, supra note 321, at 455-59; Scott et al., supra note 9, at 8-9. See,
e.g., Council Regulation 2005/29, Unfair Trade Practices Direction, art. 6(2)(b),
2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:EN:PDF.
369 Scott et al., supra note 9, at 9.
370 Id. at 10.
371 Id.
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way instead of internalizing them. Furthermore, it could be beneficial
for individual suppliers to make use of the increase of trust in the in-
dustry but not comply with underwriting the code.37 2 Beside this, a
code of conduct may create a false impression with consumers that the
government monitors the industry and enforces the code.3 7
Another hybrid system is connected to trademark law. Espe-
cially in some Anglo-American countries, like the UK and Australia,
certification marks might be registered. For example, some eco-labels
have been registered as such.3 7 4 The proprietor of a certification mark
is an overarching, standard-setting body.3 7 5 The mark has to be
granted to every applicant who meets the standards of the eco-label
and is certified. 7 6 The proprietor is not allowed to use the mark for its
own goods or services and an environmental supervisory governmental
body assesses whether the implemented standards contribute to envi-
ronmental improvements (unlike collective marks and geographical in-
dications).3 7 7 If a company advertises a product referring to such an
eco-label while it is not granted permission to use the certification
mark, all usual means to redress the infringement of a trademark
might be invoked by the proprietor of the certification mark. The same
applies if a company is granted the use of the certification mark but
fails to meet its standards or is no longer certified, while the permis-
sion to use the mark may then be revoked.
The aforementioned hybrid regimes typically comprise both
hard and soft law instruments where a public dimension to corporate
activities is recognized.3 7 Conventional private law devices have been
transformed to perform regulatory functions at the global level.37 9
This model has been extended in ways which are promising for hybrid
governance regimes to recognize the potential for third party enforce-
ment. Businesses, trade associations, and NGOs become involved in
enforcing by using powers delegated by legislative bodies or rights as-
signed to them under contracts.38 0 This is limited, however, because
businesses tend to adopt standards voluntarily, and they are in a
sense judged by the market in terms of their compliance. Nevertheless,
many regimes recognize the importance of checking for compliance,
372 Overmars, supra note 7, at 18.
373 Id.
374 Gandara, supra note 25, at 230.
375 See, e.g., id. at 82.
376 See, e.g., id. at 253.
377 Id. at 82.
378 See Scott et al., supra note 9, at 292.
379 Id. at 10.
380 Id. at 11.
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and it is not unusual to find contractual requirements that businesses
engage third parties to certify compliance. 38 1
However, if governments are engaged in enforcement of inter-
national private regulation because of the existence of hybrid systems,
this does not necessarily indicate greater effectiveness of private regu-
lation. For example, because of elections, government officials might
have a short-term perspective instead of a long-term vision required
for effective sustainable solutions. Furthermore, corruption might
hamper effective enforcement by a government.
Beside these issues of a more practical nature, if both private
and public sanctions might be imposed at the same time, the accumu-
lation of sanctions becomes an issue.3 2 It is questionable whether
both these ways of enforcement may be used at the same time. It
stands to reason that they could reinforce each other, but this may not
be desirable in all circumstances. Unlike public sanctions which are
imposed at the same time, where public bodies are often legally bound
to coordinate their actions and accumulation is governed by law, coor-
dination between private and public enforcement is more troubling,
not only because the supervising public and private bodies may not be
aware of the actions taken by the other body, but also because legal
barriers to the exchange of information might exist.
Another aspect of effectiveness is an effective complaint mech-
anism and effective resolution of disputes if they arise. 3 11 If disputes
cannot be solved effectively, adequate enforcement is difficult, if not
impossible.38 4 Moreover, defective conflict resolution might result in
unnecessary cost.38 5 Effective dispute resolution is not confined to ju-
dicial mechanisms, such as litigation in national courts or arbitration,
381 Id. at 12. More conventional bilateral monitoring and enforcement may also
apply, but this is usually carried out on a national or sub-national level.
382 See also GIESEN, supra note 8, at 141.
383 This is true for the international private regime itself as well as for its mem-
bers. The private regime should require them to have their own grievance mecha-
nism. Cf MSI-Evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 27-31; ISEAL Code of Good
Practice, supra note 89, §4.4 (regarding the standard setting process itself); Princi-
pals for Better Self- and Co-Regulation and Establishment of a Community Prac-
tice, supra note 89, Principle 2.4.
384 See, e.g., UTTING, supra note 57, at 113-15. It is important to notice that the
aforementioned certification marks may only be registered if they have a dispute
settlement procedure regarding the certification of the goods and/or services. See
Gandara, supra note 25, at 248; see also Herrnstadt, supra note 112, at 204-07
(concerning International Framework Agreements on labor standards);
385 Cf Rachel Davis & Daniel M. Franks, The Cost of Conflict with Local Commu-
nities in the Extractive Industry, Shift, First International Seminar on Social Re-
sponsibility in Mining, 1, 2 (2011), available at http://shiftproject.org/sites/
default/files /Davis%20& %2OFranksCosts%20ofo2OConflictSRM.pdf
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on the contrary. A growing interest in non-judicial conflict manage-
ment mechanisms exists in the CSR arena. In other areas, govern-
ments are engaged in improving their conflict resolution mechanisms
by making use of non-judicial mechanisms too. As to conflict resolution
in the human rights arena, Ruggie emphasized the need to improve
the patchwork of current non-judicial mechanisms in the third pillar of
his framework.3" 6 He and others have speculated that litigation might
be rather ineffective because applicable (legal) norms are unclear, be-
cause of jurisdictional issues, and because it might encompass parallel
litigation in many jurisdictions.3" 7 Litigation in many national courts
has adverse effects: it is slow, costly, not always predictable, and it
might cause legal uncertainty. Apart from jurisdictional issues, it
might entail litigation and enforcement in several countries, the diffi-
cult process of assessing applicable norms (if possible at all) and diffi-
culties in gathering sufficient evidence. Furthermore, enforcement of
awards or settlements stemming from litigation is difficult.
Human rights may not be the only area where litigation in na-
tional courts is unproductive: this might also be true in other CSR ar-
eas such as in connection with the environment. Different
environmental challenges exist in different countries: public rules dif-
fer, different stakeholders are involved in different industries, and no
global public supervisor exists. Hence, enterprises might have to be
geared towards non-judicial dispute resolution and prevention mecha-
nisms to resolve CSR issues, for example regarding the compliance
with international private regulation in this arena, instead of instigat-
ing or engaging in (parallel) litigation in several jurisdictions. Of im-
portance in this respect is to assist enterprises, (representatives of)
local communities, NGO's, and other international bodies, like the
World Bank, to find their way through the existing non-judicial mech-
anisms. Currently many stakeholders experience difficulty in finding
the proper and effective mechanisms. However, the necessity of non-
judicial mechanisms does not unravel the effectiveness thereof. Beside
this, in some instances the need for judicial mechanisms still is felt, for
386 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect
and Remedy' Framework, at 24, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John
Ruggie), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-
31_AEV.pdf [hereinafter Protect, Respect, and Remedy].
387 David Kovick & Caroline Rees, International Support for Effective Dispute Res-
olution Between Companies and Their Stakeholders: Assessing Needs, Interests,
and Models 3-4 (Corp. Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 63,
2011), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbgCSRI/publications/work-
ingpaper 63_rees%20kovickjune%202011.pdf.
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example to enforce governmental regulation (either entailing open
norms or of another nature) which entails or refers to private regula-
tion in the CSR arena, if some stakeholders are not willing to engage
in non-judicial mechanisms and in connection with gross human right
violations. However, by and large such judicial mechanisms cannot be
implemented in international private regulation as they are, apart
from arbitration, 38 8 government prerogatives.
As to the effectiveness of judicial mechanisms, the notion of ef-
fective remedy is a well-known and reasonably developed concept in
connection with international human rights law, which is included in
many regional and international human rights treaties (such as art.
2(3) ICCPR3 s 9 and art. 13 ECHR3 90 ). This might apply more generally
in the CSR arena. Broadly speaking, it entails access to an impartial
decision-maker or mechanism with the power to hear and investigate
complaints and, where appropriate, to provide reparation. In this re-
spect, it is important to distinguish between the procedural aspects
involving "access to justice" (which refers to the effectiveness of the
remedial mechanisms in place and whether victims have both the op-
portunity and ability to access them), and the substantive "repara-
tion," which means the type or quantum of relief afforded.
Other aspects of the right to a remedy have evolved out of in-
ternational humanitarian law requirements regarding, for instance,
the recording and passing on of information about the wounded, sick,
and the dead. In addition, human rights cases concerning amongst
other things enforced disappearances have stressed the importance of
the victim's right to information about the violation, particularly
where the claimant is not the direct victim but another affected indi-
vidual closely linked to them, for example, a member of their family.3 9 1
Similar views have been expressed by a number of global and regional
human rights treaty bodies. With respect to the United Nations treaty
38s And other possibilities for third (non-government related) parties to pass judg-
ment. An arbitral clause might be entailed (included/implemented by) in a model
or supply chain agreement. Therefore, judicial mechanisms might be set forth by
international private regulation in such circumstances.
389 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
390 European Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/ConventionENG.pdf
391 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Addendum Promotion of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including
the Right to Development, at 29, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13/Add.1 (May 15, 2009) (by
John Ruggie) [hereinafter Addendum to the Ruggie Framework].
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bodies, some common strands can be identified in their approach to
State obligations to provide access to remedy for human rights abuses,
whether committed by public or private actors.3 9 2 They have empha-
sized the importance of both procedural elements: (i) conducting
prompt, thorough, and fair investigations, (ii) providing access to
prompt, effective, and independent remedial mechanisms, established
through judicial, administrative, legislative, and other appropriate
means. 393 Furthermore, outcome-oriented elements are deemed to be
important such as (iii) imposing appropriate sanctions, including
criminalizing conduct and pursuing prosecutions where abuses
amount to international crimes, (iv) providing a range of forms of ap-
propriate reparation, such as compensation, restitution, rehabilita-
tion, and changes in relevant laws.39 4 The concept of effective remedy
has been strongly influenced by the law of state responsibility and, as
a general rule, follows its emphasis on compensatory justice, which
means putting the victim back in (or as close to) the position it would
have been in but for the violation.3 9' Thus, appropriate reparation in
each case will turn on the right at issue and nature of the violation.
The obvious question is whether this concept of effective rem-
edy might be transposed wholesale to non-judicial grievance mecha-
nisms (either related to human rights violations or to other CSR
disputes) without further consideration. A number of considerations
suggest not. Judicial mechanisms within any jurisdiction will offer
similar processes, or at least processes that are highly aligned with
each other. With regard to human rights violations, they are intended
to provide reparation for victims insofar as the human rights in ques-
tion are reflected in applicable law; to create a level of deterrence to
others who may commit similar violations; and-at least in the case of
criminal proceedings-to provide wider justice and protections for soci-
ety. This reflects the broader role of judicial mechanisms in ensuring
the rule of law.
Non-judicial mechanisms can vary widely in their location,
form, and process, including:3 6
392 Id. at 2.
393 Id. at 2-3.
394 Id. at 3.
395 Id. at 2.
396 See, e.g., Caroline Rees & David Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in
the Business and Human Rights Arena (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative,
Harvard University, January 2008).
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(i) Mechanisms at the company or project-level to which im-
pacted individuals and groups (for example, workers, com-
munities, etc.) can bring complaints;3 97
(ii) Mechanisms linked to industry and multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives (for example, the Fair Labor Association, Ethical
Trading Initiative, Social Accountability International, In-
ternational Council of Toy Industries, Voluntary Princi-
ples on Security and Human Rights, Global Framework
Agreements);
(iii) National mechanisms based in government (for example,
National Contact Points of OECD Member States, con-
sumer complaints bodies);
(iv) National mechanisms that are state-supported but inde-
pendent of government (for example, ombudsman offices,
labor dispute resolution offices, national human rights in-
stitutions); and
(v) Regional and international mechanisms (for example, ILO-
based mechanisms, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
(CAO) of the World Bank Group).
As this reflects, although some non-judicial grievance mecha-
nisms lack any state involvement, the state or a state agency adminis-
ter and others-to the extent they are effective-contribute to the
implementation of the state duty to protect against human rights
abuses. In addition, some non-judicial mechanisms, both state-based
and non-state-based, entail investigatory and quasi-adjudicative
processes that involve reaching findings or conclusions and recommen-
dations. These mechanisms come closer to resembling judicial mecha-
nisms through this quasi-adjudicative function, than do those
mechanisms that are premised primarily on seeking dialogue-based
solutions.3 9 s
This suggests that some of the criteria or definitions for effec-
tive remedy in relation to judicial mechanisms may be applicable in
the case of non-judicial mechanisms. Others would clearly not be, such
as criminal punishment or sanctions. Moreover, the necessity of en-
forcement of the outcomes of judicial mechanisms does not exist in con-
nection with all non-judicial grievance mechanisms and enforceability
is sometimes not even strived after. Furthermore, some state-based
non-judicial mechanisms are voluntary in the sense that stakeholders
397 For an extensive analysis of these mechanisms, see Emma Wilson & Emma
Blackmore, Dispute or Dialogue? Community Perspectives on Company-led Griev-
ance Mechanisms (2013), available at http://pubs.iied.org/1652911ED.html.
398 However, it should be noted that some of the mechanisms might perform both
functions, i.e. dialogue based and quasi-adjudicative (e.g. the CAO/World Bank
ombudsman and the NCPs).
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cannot be forced to take use or take part in the mechanism or to be
bound by its outcomes without their consent, unlike judicial mecha-
nisms which by their nature might provide redress against the will of
a perpetrator.3 99
As to the effectiveness of non-judicial mechanisms, we might
consider two approaches: the effectiveness of the mechanisms them-
selves (or their procedure) or the effectiveness of their outcomes. As to
the effectiveness of non-judicial mechanisms themselves (and their
procedure), extensive research has been conducted.40 0 Guiding princi-
ple 31 of the Ruggie framework deals with this topic and states:
In order to ensure their effectiveness, both State-based
and non-State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms
should be:
(a) Legitimate: enabling trust from the stake-
holder groups for whose use they are intended and being
accountable for the fair conduct of grievance processes;
(b) Accessible: being known to all stakeholder
groups for whose use they are intended and providing
adequate assistance for those who may face particular
barriers to access;
(c) Predictable: providing a clear and known pro-
cedure with an indicative time frame for each stage and
clarity on the types of process and outcome available and
means of monitoring implementation;
(d) Equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved
parties have reasonable access to sources of information,
advice and expertise necessary to engage in a grievance
process on fair, informed and respectful terms;
(e) Transparent: keeping parties to a grievance
informed about its progress and providing sufficient in-
formation about the mechanism's performance to build
confidence in its effectiveness and meet any public inter-
est at stake;
399 However, some non-judicial mechanisms also resemble judicial mechanisms,
like those of national human rights institutions, or mechanisms relevant to some
industries that are run by parts of government and might provide redress which
resembles judicial mechanisms.
400 See generally Caroline Rees, Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human
Rights (Corp. Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 4, 2008); Caro-
line Rees, Access to Remedies for Corporate Human Rights Impacts: Improving
Non-Judicial Mechanisms (Corp. Social Responsibility Initiative, Report No. 32,
2008); and Martijn Scheltema, Does CSR Need More (Effective) Private Regulation
in the Future?, in The Law of the Future and the Future of Law II 389 (Sam
Muller et al. eds., 2012).
20141 ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION 337
(f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes
and remedies accord with internationally recognized
human rights;
(g) A source of continuous learning: drawing on
relevant measures to identify lessons for improving the
mechanism and preventing future grievances and
harms;
Operational-level mechanisms should also be:
(h) Based on engagement and dialogue: consult-
ing the stakeholder groups for whose use they are in-
tended on their design and performance and focusing on
dialogue as the means to address and resolve
grievances. °1
The commentary to this principle elucidates that a grievance mecha-
nism can only serve its purpose if the people it is intended to serve
know about it, trust it, and are able to use it. The aforementioned cri-
teria provide a benchmark for designing, revising, or assessing a non-
judicial grievance mechanism to help ensure that it is effective in prac-
tice. Poorly designed or implemented grievance mechanisms can risk
compounding a sense of grievance among affected stakeholders by
heightening their sense of disempowerment and disrespect by the pro-
cess. This is also true regarding other non-judicial mechanisms in the
CSR arena. If these requirements are met, some proof of effectiveness
of the mechanism itself is provided. However, assessing whether these
requirements have been met is complex. For example, should the re-
quirement of transparency entail the publication of documents relied
upon in the non-judicial process? Obviously, these documents should
be made available to the parties in the non-judicial process, but not
necessarily to other stakeholders. Furthermore, effectiveness of non-
judicial dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms is connected
with ongoing dispute resolution if new complaints or disputes arise.40 2
As to the effectiveness of the outcome of non-judicial mecha-
nisms, the question that arises is whether it is possible to determine
overarching, common elements of effectiveness of non-judicial mecha-
nisms or only for certain types of mechanisms. In this respect, one
should bear in mind that a large variety of different possible remedy
outcomes of non-judicial mechanisms are conceivable. The outcomes
might, for example, range from a final statement of an NCP, to
strengthening of the human rights policy and due diligence process of
a company, continuous dialogue between a company and a local com-
401 Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 386, at 26.
402 This ongoing dispute resolution might entail judicial mechanisms like
arbitration.
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munity, a Stop Order from the government, improvements in care and
income generating projects to support alternative livelihood, monetary
redress, and a general memorandum of understanding.4 0 3 Non-judicial
remedial outcomes need to have certain features in order to qualify as
effective. Therefore, it becomes necessary to describe what these fea-
tures are, including whether they are necessarily objective (for exam-
ple alignment with national law), necessarily subjective (for example
based on the perspective of those impacted), or may be a mixture of
both. In my opinion, elements or indicators of effectiveness are:
(i) The consistency of an outcome with national and interna-
tional human rights laws and regulations,
(ii) The rights-compatibility of an outcome (see Guiding prin-
ciple 31(f)),
(iii) Whether an outcome falls within a certain predefined
range of options (such as compensation, restitution, guar-
antees of non-repetition and providing relevant
information),
(iv) Whether business and/or local communities (and/or their
representatives) involved in a case perceive a certain out-
come or set of outcomes as effective,
(v) Whether states classify certain outcomes as effective or
support them as outcomes of a non-judicial grievance
mechanism,
(vi) Whether companies increase their efforts to respect
human rights because of the existence of such
mechanisms,
(vii) Whether the outcome of a certain mechanism restores a
particular individual to the enjoyment of their human
rights,
(viii) Whether the outcome of a certain mechanism improves
the human rights, environmental or social situation and
whether it helps prevent or reduce future grievances and
harms,
(ix) Whether the outcomes of a certain mechanism are imple-
mented in practice and are enforceable (the enforcement
of the outcome of non-judicial mechanisms might be real-
ized through state mechanisms (for example through en-
forcing an agreement which has resulted from a non-
403 For an extensive case analysis of company based non-judicial mechanisms, see
WILSON & BLACKMORE, supra note 397.
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judicial mechanism)4 ° 4 or through arbitration after an
agreement has been reached (if agreed upon)4 0 5), and
(x) Whether the outcome of a certain mechanism is aligned
with the (possible) outcomes of other non-judicial and ju-
dicial mechanisms which stakeholders are engaged in
and/or can contribute to effective remedy in combination
with the outcomes of other processes.
This list of elements that might define the effectiveness of outcomes
reflects a mix of objective and subjective considerations. Arguably, the
more of them that are fulfilled, the more likely it is that the remedial
outcome will be generally deemed to be effective.
The foregoing has shown that the ex post effectiveness of inter-
national private regulation amongst others, such as the indicators
mentioned in para 3.1, depends on its enforceability and on effective
dispute resolution.40 6 Effectiveness of international private regulation
may depend on the following indicators, which have been derived from
the abovementioned research:4 0 7
(i) Whether international private regulation entails specific
and assessable objectives (and if so, whether they have
been achieved) and does not aim at objectives which are
effectively achieved by other public or private regulation,
(ii) Whether it entails 'conflict of law' rules,
(iii) The regular evaluation of the regulation and its function-
ing (and if necessary) review of the regulation,
(iv) The existence of a supervisory body to which the parties
to the regulatory regime are accountable (and have to
provide relevant information to this body), the power of
404 For example, the Mediation Directive has been promulgated in the European
Union. See Directive 2008/52/EU, 2008 O.J. (L 136/3) (EC), available at http://Eur-
Lex.europa.eu. This directive is applicable to cross border conflicts (as mentioned
in section 2), in which at least one party (in human rights related conflicts, this is
by and large a company) has its seat in the EU. Section 6 subsection 1 is especially
of importance. It imposes a duty on EU-member states to render agreements re-
sulting from mediation/facilitation enforceable if parties consent to this and so
long as/provided that the result is not contradictory to national law.
405 Because of Article V of the New York Convention (which many developing
countries also have adopted), the enforcement of arbitral awards is easier than
foreign judgments in member states because that article prevents member states
from imposing other barriers on enforcement than those adopted for national arbi-
tral awards. United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
N.Y., May 20 - June 10, 1958, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 7, 1959).
406 Cf GIESEN, supra note 8, at 106, 137-41.
407 These indicators are not exhaustive. More detailed research may reveal others.
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the supervisory body to pass judgment and to impose
sanctions on non-complying parties,4 ° s
(v) The existence of a supervisory body which controls access
to scarce resources,40 9
(vi) The existence of a serious threat of contractual enforce-
ment or other means of enforcement or endorsement of
the private regulation if necessary through state legisla-
tion and/or (effective) enforcement by states,4 10
(vii) The specificity of the rules/standards set forward by the
international private regulation,
(viii) The existence of an effective complaint and dispute man-
agement mechanism to prevent and deal with non-
compliance,4 11
(ix) The possibility of certification or assessment of compli-
ance by independent third parties whereby reporting re-
quirements in the regulatory framework are helpful, and
susceptibility of a certain business to negative (social)
media attention and active NGOs or other organizations
408 However, Kolk and van Tulder argue that the likelihood of compliance is
higher where company codes of conduct are involved than those set forward by
business associations, international organizations, or NGOs. See, Kolk & van
Tulder, supra note 22, at 11. This especially stems from the fact that codes of con-
duct promulgated by business organizations or international organizations are
less specific and abstain from the possibility of imposing sanctions.
409 Cf Scott et al., supra note 9, at 7. Beside these indicators, the existence of
smaller groups with comparable views is considered to be of importance as well as
a high organizational level. This however, in my view, refers to the sociological
perspective which is going to be discussed hereinafter. Nonetheless, enforcement
may be easier to realize in such circumstances.
410 However, public enforcement as a fall back option in connection with certifica-
tion is only effective if certain requirements are met. See Paul Verbruggen, Gorri-
las in the Closet? Public and Private Actors in the Enforcement of Transnational
Private Regulation, 7 Reg. & Governance 512, 514-15 (2013), available at http:/!
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego. 12026/abstract.
411 As to CSR in an international context, non-judicial mechanisms for conflict
management seem to be more effective. Furthermore, the prevention of conflicts
becomes more important. Cf GIESEN, supra note 8, at 138-39 (regarding dispute
management). Furthermore, the Global Reporting Initiative framework, which is
discussed below in the economic approach and to which companies may adhere,
entails an indicator which requires companies to state whether they provide a
grievance mechanism regarding human rights violations and how many com-
plaints have been received through this mechanism. From this framework, some
information could be retrieved as to whether effective grievance mechanisms are
in place.
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monitoring this business if at least a moderate chance of
detection exists.4 1 2
These are the predominant indicators. However, in the ex post ap-
proach the clarity of the rules and a "conflict of laws" provision as well
as the answer to the question whether the international private regu-
lation is able to reach its objectives might be of importance.
5.2 Economic Approach (Impact Assessment)
From an economic point of view, it is of interest to learn
whether existing international private regulation contributes to the
economic welfare of affected communities, and society at large as well
as to the profitability of multinational enterprises.4 13 This economic
assessment is also referred to as impact assessment. This research en-
compasses different points of view. The assessment of the increase or
decrease in economic welfare differs along the international private
regulation under consideration.4 14 It makes a difference whether in-
ternational private regulation on (i) biodiversity, (ii) prevention of (en-
vironmental) damage to local communities, or (iii) technical
standardization regarding environmental issues is considered. These
three areas differ as to the stakeholders involved and the relevant eco-
nomic issues. Furthermore it is, as explained above, relevant whether
the economic analysis is on a macro or micro level.
On the macro level one may, for example, consider the eco-
nomic effects of international private regulation on economic growth.
This kind of research regards private standard setting or standardiza-
tion in France, the UK and Germany.4 15 However, international pri-
412 For example, with many (single issue) eco-labels, this chance of detection of
non-compliance is deemed low. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 37. Conversely,
companies with strong brands seem more susceptible to negative media attention.
413 See Faure, supra note 134, at 1056-64.
414 From the classical economic approach of Coase and the Chicago School of Law
and Economics this starting point does not have merit. They contend that a mar-
ket is able to reach efficient outcomes through negotiations between well informed
parties without regulation. See Faure, supra note 134, at 1057. To date, the neces-
sity of research of the economic effects of rules has been recognized. See id. at
1057-58. In this approach, private regulation is an appropriate solution where
bargaining, at low cost, can occur between risk-creators and those affected. See
Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 231.
415 Elizabeth Gasiorowski-Denis, Standards: Economic and Social Impact, ISO
Focus, June 2010, at 17, available at http://digital.iso.org/Olive/ODE/ISO-Focus-
Plus-Org/?href=ISOFP/2010/06/01. However, the main source of growth in France
is technological improvement. See id. at 18. On the U.K. and Germany, see Stand-
ardization for a Competitive and Innovative Europe: A Vision for 2020, supra note
64, at 29.
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vate regulation might not be beneficial to consumers.4 1 6 If the quality
imposed by an overarching body exceeds consumers' preferences, con-
sumers bear the excessive cost.4 17 However, externalities might legiti-
mize an increase in price paid by consumers. 1 S For example, an
increase in the price of products with an eco-label arguably attracts
more producers (who comply with the certified standards and presum-
ably makes consumers who favor the environment more willing to buy
such products) and thus might benefit the environment.4 1 9
Other types of consumer detriment are conceivable as well. Pri-
vately set standards might, particularly if the standard setting indus-
try has bargaining power, induce more lenient public regulation,
which, if adopted, might have external consequences for consumers.4 2 °
Furthermore, if sanctions are publicly imposed on a regulatee, this
might lead consumers to update their beliefs on the behavior of all
regulatees, reducing the perceived quality of the goods provided by
them (especially if credence goods are involved), which might induce
the group of regulatees (or the overarching body) to refrain from pun-
ishment.4 21 This might be detrimental to consumers as well.
Therefore, it is important to assess consumer detriment be-
cause private regulation tends to optimize the benefits of the regu-
latees, but to lose track of the consumer detriment (and other external
consequences) resulting from it. However, to date, no one has
researched the (detrimental) effects of international private regulation
on consumers. Notwithstanding this, insights may derive from re-
search instigated by the European Commission on consumer detri-
ment arising from (intended) European legislation.4 2 2 The main
indicators for measuring consumer detriment (relevant in connection
with international private regulation) are: (i) market power indicators,
416 Cf Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 233-34.
417 Id. at 234, 242.
418 But cf id.
419 Gandara, supra note 25, at 25, 112-33. See also UNFSS Landscape Report,
supra note 330, at 30-33 (Concerning the relation between price increase and envi-
ronmental benefits). Price-premiums might vary over time. See Alvarez & von Ha-
gen, supra note 67, at 11.
420 Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 235-36.
421 Id. at 238 (contending that an effective overarching body might counter this
problem).
422 EUROPE ECONOMICS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE OF CONSUMER DETRIMENT AND
THE MOST APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGIES TO ESTIMATE IT 351 (July 2007), http://ec.
europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/study consumer detriment.pdf [hereinafter
Consumer Detriment]
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(ii) information deficit indicators,4 2 3 and (iii) consumer complaint
indicators.4 2 4
Market power indicators (i) are likely to be sensitive to the defi-
nition of the market to which they are applied.4 25 Carrying out a ro-
bust market definition exercise can be a resource-intensive and time-
consuming process.42 6 In competition cases, where market definition is
an important first stage of analysis, substantial resources are some-
times devoted to this issue.4 2 7 If available, such indicators may point
at consumer detriment.
As to information deficit indicators (ii), the occurrence of cer-
tain market conditions may result in consumer detriment. These mar-
ket conditions are: (a) high search costs, (b) "focal" competition, (c)
bundled goods or after-markets, (d) complex products, (e) infrequent
purchases, (f) credence goods, and (g) commission payments to salespe-
ople.4 2 This information deficit for example exists in connection with
423 For example, in the area of CSR, the European Commission has found mis-
leading marketing related to the environmental impacts of products (so-called
'green-washing') in the context of the report on the application of the Unfair Com-
mercial Practices Directive foreseen for 2012, and considers the need for possible
specific measures on this issue. See Communication from the Commission on a
Renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility of October 25,
2011, supra note 54, at 9.
424 See Consumer Detriment, supra note 422, at 568. However the research
reveals that measuring consumer detriment is very complicated and may involve
many different techniques such as consumer surveys, mystery shopping, com-
plaints with adjustments, various market models, evidence from awards in court
cases. See id. at 223. However, none of the individual methods can be applied suffi-
ciently widely to be useful as a simple generic tool to assess the impact of policy on
consumers because all methods can only deal with certain specific sources of detri-
ment and/or are only applicable under certain limited conditions. Id. at 225-26. It
is furthermore difficult to assess consumer detriment because differences between
countries exits in terms of pricing, market power, information problems, and trade
barriers. See id. at 231-34. Beside these issues there are practical problems. For
example, should wholesale or retail prices be compared; should these prices in-
clude taxes, and if prices differ between customer groups within a country, which
customer group should be considered? See id. at 234-35. Furthermore some indica-
tors should be accorded greater weight than others, depending on: (a) the priority
placed on the type of problem market which the indicator is designed to identify;
(b) the extent to which the indicator reliably identifies a particular type of problem
market; (c) the extent to which the available data is a good proxy for what the
indicator is meant to measure. The study presents results using an illustrative
weighting scheme. See id. at 301-02, 307. See id. at 385, 387 (describing the possi-
ble impact of certain directive measures using these factors).
425 Consumer Detriment, supra note 422, at 351.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 See also, Gandara, supra note 25, at 64-77.
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environmental information. Eco-labels play a role in bridging this gap
and lower the cost of information gathering.42 9 However, eco-labels by
and large use pricing to distinguish themselves from other products.
This might have adverse effects because the consumers might perceive
a higher price as a sign of higher (environmental) quality and overall
prices might be higher in a market with an eco-label segment.4 3 ° Sepa-
rating and clarifying the nature of the increase in price might counter
this problem. 1
As to the consumer complaint indicators (iii), consumer
surveys may assess consumer detriment.4 3 2 For example, this method
is used in the INRA/Deloitte methodology for measuring consumer sat-
isfaction.4 3 The core questionnaire consists of seven different "blocks"
of questions. 4 Another survey has been carried out by Taylor Nelson
Sofres (TNS) and involved a sample of 2,220 UK adults.4 35 The ques-
tionnaire consisted of 45 questions, of which 31 relate to consumer ex-
periences involving some kind of detriment, and 14 relate to
demographic factors.4 3 6 The 31 questions relating to detriment divide
into different sub-headings.4 37
Both of these surveys in essence are posing comparable ques-
tions, but it is hard to infer economic detriment from the aggregate
answers if one looks beyond the level of an individual consumer. How-
ever, if the aggregate answers show a low consumer satisfaction, this
may serve as an indication of consumer detriment.13 ' Therefore, anal-
429 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 73-77, 121, 128-33, 337.
430 Id. at 116, 124.
431 Id. at 118.
432 See Consumer Detriment, supra note 422, at 240-41.
433 Id. at 241.
434 Id. It covered the following variables:(a) overall satisfaction,(b) evaluation of
quality, (c) evaluation of price, (d) image perception, (e) market and personal fac-
tors, (f) consumer commitment, and (g) complaint behavior.
435 Id. at 245.
436 Id.
437 Id. at 245-46. These were : (a) have you had a problem with goods or services
in the last 12 months, (b) what products or services gave rise to problems, (c) how
many problems in each category of goods and services, (d) when did it/they start,
(e) who has to deal with the problem(s), (f) who is/was affected, (g) what type of
problem was it (e.g. safety, unreliability, late delivery), (h) how long did the prob-
lem take to be resolved (or how long has it been going on if unresolved), (i) how
much money was involved in the initial purchase, (j) what action did you take to
deal with the problem, (k) how much time and money did you spent to resolve the
problem (or how much so far), (1) actions taken by the supplier, (m) interviewee's
criticisms of the supplier, (n) compensation received or expected, and (o) inter-
viewee's propensity to complain.
438 However, the problem is that a small number of consumers reported very large
financial losses. Therefore, one should increase the statistical robustness of esti-
2014] ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION 345
ysis of consumer complaint data provides significant value. In particu-
lar, where sufficiently detailed data is available, it can provide
indications of:
(a) the sectors where consumers are experiencing detriment,
(b) the nature of that detriment,
(c) how detriment breaks down between different methods of
purchase, and
(d) the potential scope for financial detriment associated with
different complaints (based on the value of the
transaction).4 3 9
Indicators (i)-(iii)(market power, information deficit and con-
sumer complaint) may assess whether international private regulation
is detrimental to consumers, provided they are a stakeholder in con-
nection with certain international private regulation. If private inter-
national regulation, for example, causes a shift in market power to the
consumers' detriment, private regulation may be less efficient. Infor-
mation deficit is an important issue regarding international private
regulation too, but in a slightly different way. Often consumers are not
directly involved in the rule-making process and it is even harder for
them to assess which rules apply and whether others comply with the
rules than for the governing body or other stakeholders. This may be
economically detrimental to consumers. Hence, as elaborated before,
transparency (also to consumers) is important. Consumer complaints
may also indicate consumer detriment caused by international private
regulation. However, not all of these indicators are fit to assess the
detriment to consumers.
Quantifying detriment seems possible regarding adversarial
market power, because this may, for example, cause an increase in
pricing. Also, information deficits may cause consumers to pay too
high a price for certain products/services, buy products/services they
do not need, or suffer loss because of unclear products/services. How-
ever, as to consumer complaints, not all of the factors mentioned above
mates of financial detriment. In order to do this, the survey needs to pick up more
cases of large financial detriment and verify that the data is correct when respon-
dents report very high figures for financial costs. Achieving statistically robust
results could by established by: (a) Increasing the overall sample size used in the
survey, as suggested by the OFT (but a large enough sample would be prohibi-
tively expensive); (b) splitting the sample, and asking (for instance) half of the
respondents about the most recent problem and half about the worst problem; (c)
using filter questions inserted into an Omnibus survey to build up a database of
consumers who have experienced problems which gave rise to large financial costs,
and then including them within a separate full-scale quantitative survey; and (d)
side-stepping the problem by focusing on other types of data or analysis. See id. at
272-76.
439 Id. at 408-09.
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under (iii) are available. From the Taylor Nelson Sofres survey, the
abovementioned factors (k), (1), and (n) may be used. The factors de-
rived from the IRNA/Deloitte research are hard to quantify and thus
less suited for the purpose of quantification. Therefore detriment to
consumers may be defined as:
dC = nM,I,C
Whereby the abbreviations mean:
- dC: aggregate detriment to consumers
- iT: is depending on
- M: aggregate consumer detriment caused by market power
created by international private regulation
- I: aggregate consumer detriment caused by informational
deficits created by international private regulation
- C: aggregate consumer detriment caused by unsolved com-
plaints caused by international private regulation
Furthermore, international private regulation might have a detrimen-
tal impact on competitiveness, innovation, trade, or markets. 4 40 For
example, contracts between competitors on CSR in order to create a
level playing field or eco-labels might disrupt competition.4 4 1 For ex-
ample, if certification in connection with eco-labeling brings about
high costs, 442 small companies might not have the means to engage in
such eco-labels or remain certified, although this might be profitable to
other (larger) companies.4 4 3
Moreover, international private regulation, especially if it is
adopted in supply chains, might put undue pressure on smaller and
medium suppliers vis-A-vis multinational enterprises imposing this
440 See WTO, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, annex 3, http: / / www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbt-e.htm (entailing the best practices for
standard setting in order to counter trade barriers) (last visited Mar. 17 2014).
This annex amongst others entails the obligation to consult WTO-members on
draft standards. See also UNFSS Landscape Report, supra note 330, part 1, at 18-
25 (connecting with sustainability standards and trade barriers). Cf ISEAL Code
of Good Practice, supra note 89, §§ 6.1.2, 6.3.1-6.3.2; European Commission, An-
nexes to the Impact Assessment Guidelines of the European Commission of 2009, 24
(Jan/ 15, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission-guidelines/
docs/iag_2009 annex en.pdf. See also, The Communication of the European Com-
mission on the applicability of section 101 TFEU on horizontal agreements O.J.
2011 C 11/55-64, http://www.Eur-Lex.europa.eu (dealing with agreements be-
tween competitors in the EU).
441 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 92-96, 105-06.
442 It by and large does. See id. at 164, 268.
443 Id. at 120. See generally, UTTING, supra note 57, at 98; UNFSS Landscape Re-
port, supra note 330, at 27-28; Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 12, 14, 22-
23.
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regulation and turning it into a competitive advantage for larger com-
panies. 4  Furthermore, because of the informational failures regard-
ing the environmental attributes of a certain product, free-riders
might reap benefits of the environmental market created by eco-labels
without incurring any of the costs by using terms with no clear mean-
ing like "all natural" or "eco-friendly."4 4 5 This results in unfair compe-
tition between free-riders and the companies investing in certified eco-
labels and might jeopardize eco-labels because they lose their advan-
tage on the environmental market.4 4 6 International private regulation
might also exclude or complicate access to a certain market.4 4 7 For ex-
ample, certain standards might favor producers in developed countries
because they use production methods which are close to or compliant
with these standards, whereas these methods are less common in de-
veloping countries.44 s Innovation might be hampered if certain inter-
national private regulation (for example in supply chains or in an eco-
label) demands the application of certain (non-innovative) techniques,
which some consider beneficial to the environment.4 4 9
Besides economic effects on stakeholders, such as consumers
and companies, one should also take into account the economic conse-
quences of international private regulation to the public interest, such
as the environment or labor conditions. Certain international private
regulation may prove beneficial to its stakeholders, for example busi-
nesses and consumers, but may have adverse effects on the environ-
ment or workers. 450 Environmental damage as well as bad labor
conditions obviously should be prevented as much as possible. In addi-
444 UTTING, supra note 57, at 107.
445 Gandara, supra note 25, at 133-42, 269, 271-74. (referring to this phenomena
as 'greenwashing'.) Other types of greenwashing exist, for example using false la-
bels; making claims of environmental performance, which has been proscribed by
law; and false environmental claims. Whether greenwashing takes place might
depend on the type of purchasers in the supply chain and whether alignment with
other initiatives is established. See Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 23-25.
446 See, e.g., UNFSS Landscape Report, supra note 330, at 30-33, (on different
types of price premiums which do not always increase profit depending on the po-
sition of the entity in e.g. a supply chain).
447 See, e.g., Gandara, supra note 25, at 159.
448 See Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 13-14.
449 This might also disrupt competition. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 105.
450 See Renda, supra note 94, at 132 (providing some indicators to assess such
detriment). These however do not consider improvement of the environment also
for future generations and portions of the territory that are not regularly inhab-
ited, and therefore are not considered to be good indicators. See id. at 132-33.
More useful is the cheapest cost provider model, which requires four discrete
steps: (i) identifying the possible actors who can influence the outcome (polluters,
pollutees or the government), (ii) identifying alternative ways in which the out-
come can be altered, (iii) assessing the minimum costs of the various methods fig-
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tion, governments might have to make costs to monitor the industry at
an arms' length.4 5 1 Therefore the damage to the public interest or to
labor conditions has to be assessed too.
However, the public interest might also benefit from interna-
tional private regulation. It may benefit because a standard contrib-
utes to sustainability. For example, eco-labels might benefit the
environment. However, the actual impact of private standards, such as
entailed in eco-labels, on the environment is not easy to assess.4 5 2 Dif-
ferent, intertwined factors generally cause environmental problems.4 5 3
To assess the effectiveness of a standard, we must assess these factors.
Furthermore, if private standards and other policy instruments com-
pete, it might be difficult to assess the influence of each individual la-
bel or instrument.4 54 It is contended that the quality of the standards
or criteria (of the eco-label) and its credibility might function as a
proxy indicator of actual (beneficial) environmental impact.4 5 5 Impor-
tant aspects are whether (i) the environmental issue has not been ad-
dressed more efficiently through government regulation (in which case
the standards are superfluous), (ii) they address more than a single
environmental issue (because single issue labels tend to lose sight of
other environmental detriment generated by a product), (iii) they use a
lifecycle analysis of a product instead of the impact of the production
only, (iv) they are performance based (as opposed to process based be-
cause changes to the processes (of the producer) do not necessarily
generate an improved environmental performance), (v) the standards
are raised regularly (so that they meet the newest environmental re-
quirements and insights), (vi) they entail specific standards for specific
ured out and (iv) identifying the least cost method and the actor connected to it,
who is the cheapest cost avoider. See id. at 151.
451 Overmars, supra note 7, at 22. However, some economic models (e.g. the stan-
dard cost model) assume 100% compliance. In such models, the cost of enforcement
is not considered. See, e.g., Renda, supra note 94, at 132.
452 Therefore, the actual impact on the environment of an eco-label is hardly ever
assessed. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 266-67. Cf. UNFSS Landscape Report,
supra note 330, at 27.
453 Id. at 28.
454 See id. Eco-labeling entities might not be interested in this type of research,
unless coerced to conduct it, because if the research elucidates no actual impact,
potential users might not invest in this label. See id. at 28, 45. However, eco-labels
should assess the actual impact. Id. at 28.
455 Id. at 32. The quality of eco-labels is addressed by the ISO-14020 Environmen-
tal labels and declarations - General Principles and ISO-14021 and ISO-14025
standards too. See, e.g., id. at 16. However, few eco-labels actually meet these
standards. See id.
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industries, products or environmental issues, and (vii) whether they
are regularly certified.4" 6
Furthermore, a pro-environmental community has to exist in
order for eco-labels to perform and the producers need to have pos-
sibilities to increase prices and make their environmental performance
public (by showing that their environmental performance is higher
than prescribed by law).4" 7 By and large, this possibility does not exist
if the eco-label is endorsed by the public regulator because the regula-
tory nature of it tends to monopolize the market.4 58 Therefore, inter-
national private regulations are needed in this respect. However, if the
impact of a private standard, such as an eco-label, remains unclear
and poses high cost to an industry and consumers, the question is
whether the unclear contribution to the public good outweighs the cost
of participation by an industry and the detriment to consumers. 45 9 In
many instances the answer to this question seems rhetorical. How-
ever, even if an eco-label is successful in the aforementioned sense, an
over-demand might result in eco-labels emerging on the market with
lower standards and being less advantageous to the environment.4 60
Furthermore, if too many eco-labels exist the (necessarily higher).6 1
prices are not sustainable.4 6 2
The advantage to the public interest might comprise the pre-
vention of legislation, flexibility, and diminished enforcement effort
too. 46 3 Furthermore, independent supervisory bodies might decrease
the use of the government funded judicial systems.4 6 4 Beside this, the
industry might have specific knowledge not available to the govern-
456 Id. at 15-16 (identifying different kinds of voluntary sustainability standards).
However, regarding issue (vii) verification instead of certification (especially in
business to business environment) is deemed effective too. See id. at 51.
457 Gandara, supra note 25, at 160. However, the focus on making the environ-
mental performance public might hamper useful pro-environmental behavior. See
id. at 170.
458 Id. at 223. In this respect, the eco-label developed by the European Commis-
sion might be disadvantageous. See THE EU ECOLABEL, http://www.ecolabel.eu
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014); see, e.g., UNFSS Landscape Report, supra note 330, at
32 (providing a legal and economic analysis and showing that the increase of price
is not always useful, and other informational tools are necessary).
459 Cf Gasiorowski-Denis, supra note 411, at 33 (analyzing this point in connec-
tion with ISO-standards).
460 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 125 (discussing the FSC and sustainable wood).
461 Id. at 127-28 (pointing out that eco-labels work best if the environmental legis-
lative standards are not too high).
462 See, e.g., id. at 126.
463 Overmars, supra note 7, at 18.
464 Id. at 21.
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ment, and might be able to set standards at lower cost than the gov-
ernment. Private regulation thus benefits to the public good.
From the above, it could be inferred that several indicators might be
applied to measure the ex post economic effects of international pri-
vate regulation at a macro level. Obviously such a measurement is not
without hurdles, as has been illustrated hereinabove, and especially if
the international private regulation at stake more or less resembles
public regulation in terms of the number of regulatees and the content
of the rules. The following indicators, mentioned above, might be used
to make such an assessment:
- (i) the Standard Cost Model for the measurement and reduc-
tion of (administrative) burdens of international private reg-
ulation to regulatees...
- (ii) changes in the growth of gross domestic product caused by
international private regulation;
- (iii) consumer benefit or detriment;
- (iv) competitiveness and trade;
- (v) impact on the potential for innovation and technological
development;
- (iv) improvement of labor conditions and social welfare;
- (iv) benefit or detriment to the public interest.
That said, it should be noted that international private regulation
might not have effects on all these indicators. One should only assess
these indicators on which the regulation might have an impact. For
example, regulation on equal pay among men and women is more
likely to have gender effects rather than impact on climate change and
the environment.4 66
However, this kind of macro-economic research is rather costly
and the outcome is to a certain extent speculative because of the exten-
sive use of assumptions.46 '7 Beside this, international private regula-
tion often does not resemble public regulation at all.4 6 The nature of
private regulation might be rather different from public regulation in
terms of the number of regulatees and the content of the rules.46 '9 This
is true regarding, for example, codes of conduct, international private
regulation entailing principles, and regulation through contractual
provisions in supply chains. A macro analysis seems less fit regarding
such international private regulation. Furthermore, this research at a
465 This model has been elaborated in the ex-ante economic avenue. See supra
note 176 and accompanying text.
466 See, e.g., Fritsch et al., supra note 146, at 4.
467 See UNFSS Landscape Report, supra note 330, at 19.
468 See, e.g., id. at 16.
469 See, e.g., id.
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macro level does not provide any grip on the economic effects/benefits
of international private regulation on/for individual companies.
To make a proper assessment of these effects a "bottom up"
(micro-economic) approach is required. This approach is partially re-
flected by the policy of the European Commission on CSR, which calls
for maximizing the shared value for the owners/shareholders of an en-
terprise as well as for its other stakeholders and society at large.4 70 As
enterprises are concerned, research has elucidated that private regula-
tion such as standardization may contribute to the profitability of en-
terprises. The same is true in connection with sustainable
entrepreneurship. 47 ' An increase of profitability (for example result-
ing from an increase of market access) is an important indicator to
assess the economic effects of international private regulation, as the
willingness of industry to establish and/or adhere to private regulation
is increased (or even driven) by expected benefit.4 72
However, although continuity and profitability are important
(long term) aims, business is increasingly inclined to live up to its re-
sponsibility in the CSR field-also if governments are unable to set
(national or international) standards-by including other interests (of
external stakeholders) into their (CSR) policy and by reporting on
those non-financial topics. 4 73 Furthermore, customers and investors
(as well as society4 74 ) increasingly require a (sound) CSR policy.
Therefore, the dissemination of international private CSR regulation
is not only driven by an increase in profits caused by this type of regu-
lation, but also entails a delicate process of (enhanced) assured non-
financial reporting and of meeting the (CSR) requirements of custom-
ers, investors, and society at large.
As to the micro-economic effects of international private regu-
lation, research has been conducted on the economic effects of stand-
470 Communication from the Commission, supra note 54, at 6.
471 See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Culture of Sus-
tainability on Organizational Processes and Performance 21 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 12-035, 2013), available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-035.
pdf; see also Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 5, avaliable at http://www.waterhealth.com/sites/de-
fault/files/HarvardBuinessReviewSharedValue.pdf (advertising the concept of"shared value"). Furthermore, this is beneficial to investors too because the return
on investment increases as well. See, e.g., id. at 9.
472 Overmars, supra note 7, at 20; cf Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 11;
Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 91; Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 244.
473 Cf Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 10, at 244. Part of this non-financial report-
ing is liaising with external stakeholders. Id.
474 Such demands might be expressed through legislation, but also through other
means, such as social media, the Internet, or civic voice organizations (e.g. NGO's).
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ardization.4 7 5 Standardization is used in the CSR arena too, for
example with environmental issues.4 7 6 However, this research entails
technical standards only and not relevant (management) standards in
the CSR arena. Therefore, the usage of this method to assess the eco-
nomic impact of standardization or, more generally, of international
private regulation in the CSR arena, is not axiomatic.4 7 7 Technical
processes within a company are quite distinct and have less external
impact as such. In this respect, standardization has to be discerned
from CSR.4 7 s
A company CSR policy (based on private regulation) might be
profitable to the company, but might have external consequences for
consumers, local communities, or the environment. 4 79 Besides this, the
process from extracting raw materials to the delivery of a certain prod-
uct to a consumer might take rather long.4"' This process regularly
involves a (long) chain of activities of several enterprises. 48 1 Further-
more, the implementation of certain international private CSR regula-
tions throughout the mentioned supply chain is time consuming, and
the economic effects thereof are less clear.48 2 This assessment is fur-
ther complicated because the profit of an enterprise depends on many
factors, especially in the long run.48 3 Besides this, negative media, be-
cause of violations of international private CSR regulation, might be
more threatening to a company's profit than non-compliance with in-
ternational technical standards.48 4 However, this depends on the in-
dustry.48 5 The producer of consumer goods might envisage more
severe consequences of negative media attention than a company in
the arms industry and might profit more because of positive media if it
complies with private CSR regulation.48 6 For the company in the arms
475 See Gasiorowski-Denis, supra note 411, at 11.
476 See INT'L S ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION ser. 14000 (2013) (providing standardi-
zation on environmental issues); see also INT'L S ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION ser.
26000 (2010) (providing standardization on CSR as a whole).
477 Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility As Global Public Law: Third
Party Rankings As Regulation by Information, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 145, 160
(2010).
478 See id. at 155.
479 See id. at 158; see, e.g., ADINDA P. INSYIRANI ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERNAL EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION 9, 10 (2013), available
at http://www.caal-inteduorg.com/ibsm2/proceedings/FP04-AdindaPutri-Insy-
irani-The Impact-of CorporateSocial.pdf.
480 Metcalf, supra note 477, at 161.
481 See id.
482 See id.
483 See id. at 160.
484 See id. at 169.
485 See id.
486 See id.
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industry the expected benefit from compliance with international pri-
vate regulation in the CSR arena might be lower.4" 7 Furthermore, the
abandonment of child labor, for example, turns on whether the indus-
try in general is child-labor dependent and whether products are sold
to consumers and not in a business-to-business market.4"' If both re-
quirements are met, negative media attention is deemed to have ad-
verse effects on a certain company.
Therefore, economic effects of international private CSR regu-
lation on the micro level are not measured easily and depend on the
specifics of a certain industry.48 9 However, as has been mentioned
before, research has shown that CSR might be profitable to companies,
consumers, and local communities as well as to the environment. 4 90
For example, a certified eco-label might lower the cost of reputation-
building for a company in the environmental arena because the eco-
label might be well known in the market and might be connected to
environmental improvement by consumers.4 9 1 The eco-label supports
the environmental claim and the (environmental) reputation of the
company in such instances. It might even permeate to the other (non-
labeled) products of such a company.4 9 2
How then to find a method to assess the economic effects of
international private CSR regulation on the micro level? Many meth-
ods exist to measure the economic effects of CSR on companies.4 9 3 The
487 See id.
488 Cf Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 7.
489 See id. at 160.
490 See, e.g., Eccles et al., supra note 471, at 4; Porter & Kramer, supra note 471,
at 9; Gandara, supra note 25, at 159-60. However, Gandara notices that a correla-
tion between sustainability and financial performance has been found, but no
causal relation. See id. at 151.
491 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 88. However, she also addresses the downside
because the aforementioned cost reduction is the highest for companies with a
rather poor environmental performance. Id. at 90. Furthermore, companies with a
good environmental performance might incur high cost because of the certification
process and might receive marginal benefits. See id. at 92.
492 Cf id. at 100.
493 It is not possible to review all methods in this contribution. Indicators to mea-
sure detriment to local communities by analyzing complaints (e.g. about illness,
increased mortality as well as damage to economic and environmental assets) are
provided by Renda. Renda, supra note 94, at 132. However, these indicators are
not considered to be adequate measurement tools. Id. The human development
indicator might also provide for some insight in the economic advantages of inter-
national private regulation to other stakeholders (for example, local communities).
However, it is contended an increase of wealth may not constitute a social im-
provement unless it furthers some other goal such as utility and therefore is not a
useful indicator. Id. at 104. Furthermore, an aid in the environmental area might
be SimaPro software, which uses many of these methods to assess the effects of
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Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) might play a role in this.49 4 Another
useful instrument for the agricultural sector might be the joint ISEAL
and FAO initiative Sustainability Assessment of Food and Agriculture
systems (SAFA guidelines).4 9' GRI provides organizational reporting
company activities on the environment, climate and health. See SIMAPRo 7, http:/!
www.pre-sustainability.com/download/Webdemo/SimaPro 7_Introduction.htm.
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014): see also About the Consortium, THE SUSTAINABILITY
CONSORTIUM, http://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/what-we-do/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014) (developing the Sustainability Measurement and Reporting System
(SMRS), a global platform which enables research on the effects of company activi-
ties on climate, raw materials, health, water use, and the environment at an in-
dustry level); Earthster 2: Semantic Web-based Life Cycle Assessment,
EPIMORPHICs LTD., http://www.epimorphics.com/web/Earthster (developing
software that assesses the impact of company activities at an industry level); see,
e.g., http://www.sustainabilityconsortium.orgopen-io/use-the-model/.
494 See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.orgPages/de-
fault.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also Alberto Fonseca, Barriers to
Strengthening the Global Reporting Initiative Framework: Exploring the percep-
tions of consultants, practitioners and researchers 3-4 (n.d.), available at http:/!
www.csin-rcid.ca/downloads/csin-conf albertofonseca.pdf (discussing the history
of the initiative). This type of reporting is required by some certifiable manage-
ment systems by the Dutch 'MVO prestatieladder' (at application level 5 in which
GRI reporting application level B+ is required). See MVO PRESTATIELADDER (CSR
PERFORMANCE), http://www.mvoprestatieladder.nl (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
However, although the GRI seems an open inclusive organization aiming at public
policy goals, its performance in this respect is questioned. FONSECA, supra note
494, at 5. Some consider the nature of the indicators rather formalistic and giving
rise to a 'box-ticking' mentality as well as difficult to apply (e.g. the human rights
indicators). Id. A survey amongst stakeholders on the performance of GRI has re-
vealed a lack of integrated indicators, no obligation for external assurance, a lack
of guidance on stakeholder engagement and limited participation as well as a lack
of real inclusiveness because of the focus on internal organizational performance
and losing sight of the physical space surrounding specific facilities or industrial
plants. See id. at 5-7; cf. Cafagg & Renda, supra note 46, at 18. However, some
contend the GRI has succeeded in operationalizing accountability as a virtue. See
Curtin & Senden, supra note 11, at 178. Besides the GRI, a new organization has
been established, the International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC), which
aims at creating an internationally accepted reporting framework enabling compa-
nies to combine financial and non-financial reporting. See INTEGRATED REPORTING,
http://www.theiirc.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
495 FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.
fao.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see, e.g., Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 46, at
23-25. See also About Us, TRUE PRICE FOUNDATION, http://www.trueprice.org (last
visited Oct. 30, 2013) (aiming to establish a methodology to make external social
and environmental impact transparent at the price-level of individual products).
This might be an interesting tool to assess impact of an initiative which is imple-
mented by a company on the price-level (in terms of improvement of environmen-
tal and social impact).
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guidance. Its framework enables all companies and organizations to
measure and report their sustainability performance.4 9 6 The SAFA
guidelines entail a comparable (and comprehensive) framework in the
agricultural area. The following research on the GRI therefore mutatis
mutandis applies to the SAFA guidelines. A sustainability report is an
organizational report that gives information about economic, environ-
mental, social, and governance performance.4 9 7 Sustainability report-
ing is a form of non-financial reporting. It is also an intrinsic element
of integrated reporting, a recent development that combines the analy-
sis of financial and non-financial performance. Sustainability report-
ing involves the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being
accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organizational
performance towards the goal of sustainable development.4 98 In order
to produce a regular sustainability report, companies should set up a
program of data collection, communication, and responses.
A sustainability report should provide a balanced and reasona-
ble representation of the sustainability performance of the reporting
organization, including both positive and negative contributions. The
GRI provides that companies, amongst others, provide performance in-
dicators that elicit comparable information on the economic, environ-
mental, and social performance of this company.49 9 Furthermore, the
496 See ISEAL ALLIANCE, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF SOCL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS SYSTEMS vX.0, at 8 (2010), available at http://www.isealalliance.org/
online-community/resources/iseal-impacts-code-of-good-practice (providing ele-
ments the assessment should entail); see, e.g., THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT (HRCA) QUICK CHECK 4, availa-
ble at https://hrca2.humanrightsbusiness.orgdocs/file/HRCA%20Quick%2OCheck-
English.pdf (providing indcators regarding human rights); Shift, From Audit to
Innovation: Advancing Human Rights in Global Supply Chains 9 (2013), available
at http://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/From%2OAudit%20to%2OInnovation-
Advancing%20Human%20Rights%20in%20Global%20Supply%2OChains-0.pdf
(assessing human rights impact in supply chains); see also Cafaggi & Renda, supra
note 46, at 20-23. Third party rating agencies assess human rights performance of
entities on behalf of investors too, but unfortunately their analysis is not public.
See, e.g., About Us, VIGEO, http://www.vigeo.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2013); Sus-
TAINALYTICS, http://www.sustainalytics.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). Some pub-
lic indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index entail human rights
indicators as well; however, to date only 6% of the indicators are related to them.
See ROBECOSAM, CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT 33 (2013), available at
http://www.robecosam.conmimages/sample-questionnaire.pdf (providing a corpo-
rate sustainability questionnaire).
497 See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 494, at 9.
498 See id. at 17.499 To date the most advanced performance indicators are entailed in the G4 re-
porting framework. G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, GLOBAL REPORTING
INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/g4/Pages/default.aspx (last
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sustainability report has to focus on the organization's key impacts on
sustainability and effects on stakeholders, including rights as defined
by national laws and relevant internationally agreed standards.5 0 0 In
order to meet the GRI requirements, the reporting organization should
identify (i) on which topics it has significant economic, environmental,
and social impact,5 °1 (ii) its stakeholders10 2 and explain in the report
how it has responded to their reasonable expectations and interests,
and (iii) should put the performance information in the context of the
limits and demands placed on environmental or social resources at the
sectorial, local, regional, or global level.5 °3 For example, this could
mean that in addition to reporting on trends in eco-efficiency, an or-
ganization might also present its absolute pollution loading in relation
to the capacity of the regional ecosystem to absorb the pollutant in a
sustainable manner. Furthermore, (iv) coverage of the material topics
and indicators and definition of the report boundary should be suffi-
cient to reflect significant economic, environmental, and social im-
pacts50 4 (for example along the supply chain50 5 ) and enable
stakeholders to assess the reporting company's performance in the re-
porting period.5 ° 6 Reported information should be presented in a man-
ner that enables stakeholders to analyze changes in the performance
of the company over time, and could support analysis relative to other
companies. 50 7 A company should include total numbers (absolute data
such as tons of waste) as well as ratios (normalized data such as waste
per unit of production) to enable analytical comparisons."' 8 GRI has
different application levels . 0 9
visited Mar. 12, 2014); see also GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, REPORTING PRINCI-
PLES AND STANDARD DISCLOSURES 1 (2013).
500 See id. at 17.
501 See id.
502 Which refers to entities or individuals significantly affected by the activities of
the company. Examples of stakeholder groups are civil society, customers, employ-
ees (and other workers, and their trade unions), local communities, shareholders,




505 However, this is only if the company has control over the entity in the supply
chain or has significant influence on this entity. In the first circumstance, the com-
pany has to provide performance indicators and in the latter it has to disclose the
management approach of the entity in the supply chain. See id. at 20.
506 See id.
507 See id.
508 See id. at 50.
509 These are A, B and C to which a "+" might be added if external assurance is
utilized. See id. at 11, 15. Level A is the most elaborate level of reporting and
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Because the GRI reporting, especially if the highest (A) appli-
cation level is implemented, enables stakeholders to analyze changes
in the performance of a company over time and could support analysis
relative to other companies, it might be a helpful tool to assess the
economic impact of the implementation of private regulation in the
area of CSR. If a company uses the GRI reporting tool, one could as-
sess its economic, environmental, and social performance indicators
before and after the implementation of certain private regulation in
the CSR arena. Because the sustainability reports are made public,
stakeholders and researchers are able to make this assessment too.5 10
From this analysis, it could be inferred that private regulation
in the CSR arena seems to be effective in an economic sense if (i) the
profits of the reporting company increase (in the long run) after imple-
menting the private regulation, 1 1 which could be inferred from the
common financial reporting, and (ii) the external (environmental and
societal) consequences of the company's operations do not increase (or
ideally decrease), which could be inferred from the non-financial per-
formance indicators.5 1 2 However, an increase or decrease of profit
might have many causes, especially if measured over a longer period of
time.5 1 3 Therefore, increase or decrease of profit might not be attribu-
table to the implementation of certain private CSR regulation. 51 4 So,
the financial statements should be scrutinized to assess whether other
factors could have caused changes in profit. As far as possible, these
other factors should be left out of the analysis. However, these other
factors, such as an increase in production, might also cause an in-
crease in environmental and social consequences. Such an increase
might only be left out of the analysis if the increase is consistent with
the implemented private CSR initiative. A further complication is that
many companies do not adhere to a single private CSR initiative but
implement more initiatives. Therefore, it might be difficult to assess
which increase of profit could be attributed to the implementation of a
certain CSR initiative. This hurdle might be overcome by assessing at
which time certain private CSR initiatives are implemented. If these
initiatives are not implemented at the same time, one could commence
measuring an increase in profits and the change of external conse-
quences after implementation of a first initiative but before the imple-
entails all indicators of the GRI on economic, environmental, and social impact of a
company.
510 See, e.g., id. at 16.
511 Fully implementing private CSR regulation might be rather time consuming
and therefore the moment of measuring profits before and after implementation
might be quite remote. See Gandara, supra note 25, at 151.
512 See id. at 5.
513 See Gandara, supra note 25, at 151.
514 Id.
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mentation of a second. In this regard it is of importance that GRI
requires companies to indicate to which initiatives they adhere in their
non-financial report.5 15 Furthermore, it is conceivable that private
CSR initiatives concern different topics, for example water usage and
sustainable fishery. In such cases it might be possible to attribute part
of the increase of profit and a change in environmental and social con-
sequences to a certain initiative.
Put in a formula: private CSR regulation is efficient (on a micro level)
if:
PAccsr - PBccsr > 0 and
AEC + ASC = 0
In which formula:
- PAccsr is the company's profit after implementation of a cer-
tain private CSR initiative,
- PBccsr is the company's profit before implementation,
- AEC is the change of environmental consequences of the com-
pany's operations, and
- ASC is the change of social consequences of the company's
operations. 6
An objection to this way of measuring efficiency through the
GRI reporting might be that the figures and statements are provided
by the company. Therefore, they might be considered to be less trust-
worthy, especially by external stakeholders. However, regarding the
financial statement, this distrust seems only partially justified be-
515 See id. at 5.
516 EC and SC are assumed to be quantifiable in this formula. However, it should
be noted that these consequences cannot be monetized regarding all aspects. In
the GRI-reports these consequences are considered to be of a non-financial nature.
See REPORTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 499, at 5 n.1. For example, the impact on
human rights in a certain local community or on diversity is not easy to measure
in a figure. In such instances, the non-financial report stating the changes in this
respect have to be considered without attributing a figure to these changes. Obvi-
ously, this may cause problems if the environmental and social consequences are
not aligned. For example, if the figures regarding environmental impact show a
positive effect and the (non-figurative) social statements a negative, the question
arises whether the overall effect (EC + SC) is positive. Furthermore, it might be
hard to assess whether the human rights situation has improved if the number of
human rights issues has decreased but the severity of the remaining issues has
increased. Unfortunately, the answer to these questions cannot be given in a truly
objective way, but only more subjectively through assessing which effect seems to
be predominant (for example by engaging with the affected community). However,
this is still better than refraining from any assessment at all, especially if reports
from other companies adhering to certain private regulation are available too.
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cause external assurance (by an accountant) is required in most coun-
tries.5 7 As to the non-financial statements this distrust might be
understandable, but in this regard GRI also provides for external as-
surance. 5 11 Obviously, if external assurance is applied, the credibility
of the reports increases. 5 19 Furthermore, one might assess the effi-
ciency of certain private CSR regulation by using financial and non-
financial GRI reports from multiple companies.5 2 ° If efficiency in the
abovementioned sense could be inferred from several GRI-reports, this
strengthens the assumption of efficiency of a particular initiative (this
entails an assessment at the meso level).52 1 Considering the reports of
multiple companies also could assist in assessing the efficiency of pri-
vate CSR initiatives if a certain company has implemented several ini-
tiatives at the same time or close to each other. If one compares the
reports of multiple companies which, but for one, have implemented
different initiatives and assesses efficiency in the abovementioned
sense with all these companies, this raises the assumption that the
initiative they all have implemented is efficient.
Therefore GRI-reports are helpful to assess the efficiency of
private CSR regulation on a micro-economic level, especially if compa-
nies have adopted the A+ (the highest externally assured) application
level. If so, they have to report on all environmental and social per-
formance indicators with external assurance of this report. From these
reports, the efficiency of private CSR regulation can be inferred best in
the way described above.
However, not many companies have adopted the GRI A(+) ap-
plication level.5 22 Because companies which have adopted the GRI B
or C application level do not have to report on all environmental and
social performance indicators, assessing the efficiency of private CSR
regulation is more complex, although these reports might still provide
some guidance using the indicators which are reported on. Further-
more, GRI-reporting seems to be adopted by companies which have an
interest in sustainability.5 28 Therefore, assessing the effects of not im-
plementing private CSR regulation by using GRI-reports is less feasi-
ble because the companies which have not implemented private CSR
517 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Transparency Regulation in Financial Markets - Moving
into the Surveillance Age?, 2 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 305, 306 (2011).518 If external assurance is utilized the company adds a "+" to the application level
of GRI. See id. at 11, 15; see also Gandara, supra note 25, at 151.519 See, e.g., Gandara, supra note 25, at 151.
520 See, e.g., id.
521 See, e.g., id.
522 Only 20% of the GRI-based reports published in 2008 declared an A+ level.
These reports mainly stem from large transnational corporations based in OECD
countries. See FONSECA, supra note 494, at 13.
523 See FONSECA, supra note 494, at 1
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regulation are not very likely to use the GRI-reporting tool. Thus the
assessment of efficiency is mainly undertaken by using reports from
companies which implemented private regulation.524 This might be
compensated for, and this method might also be of use, if no GRI-re-
ports are available of companies which have implemented a particular
private CSR initiative, by using other assessment tools for example on
environmental impact in connection with scrutinizing publicized fi-
nancial data. 25 However, the current assessment tools do not require
companies to make the results of their assessments public. Therefore,
these assessments are not fit for external research on the efficiency of
private CSR initiatives. In order to enable and improve future re-
search on the effectiveness of international private CSR regulation,
the implementation of GRI-reporting (preferably at the A(+) applica-
tion level) or comparable reporting requirements should be pro-
moted.5 26 An even better solution would be to adopt a GRI or
comparable reporting requirement in future international private CSR
regulation (or elsewhere). 5 27 Thus, the requirement of GRI-reporting
(or comparable kinds of reporting) becomes an indicator of effective-
524 See Regulating for a More Sustainable Future: New Norwegian CSR Regula-
tion Entered Into Force, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (last visited Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/Regu-
lating-for-a-more-sustainable-furure-New-Norwegian-CSR-regulations-entered-
into-force/ (showing how these companies might be intrinsically motivated to make
a success of international private CSR regulation, which might cause an increase
in profit although the regulation itself is rather ineffective. However, the more
companies which have implemented particular private CSR regulation report an
increase in profit after implementation, the more likely it becomes that this is (at
least partly) attributable to the private regulation. Furthermore, this increase of
profit after implementation provides at least an indication of efficiency as opposed
to refraining from this assessment at all).
525 See, e.g., THE CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cdproject.net (last vis-
ited April 29, 2013); THE SUSTAINABILITY MEASUREMENT & REPORTING SYSTEM,
SMRShttp://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/open-io/use-the-model (last visited
April 29, 2013).
526 Cf Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 62, at 136, 142; see, e.g., OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguide-
linesformultinationalenterprises.htm, (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). Furthermore,
the SEC requires companies listed at the New York stock exchange to report on
sustainability issues such as climate change. See, e.g., New SEC Guidelines May
Cause an Outbreak of Sustainability Reporting, CA. SUSTAINABILITY ALLIANCE,
http://sustainca.orgblog/climate/sec-guidelines-sustainability-reporting (last vis-
ited Nov. 27, 2013).
527 Cf MSI-evaluation Tool, supra note 97, at 19-20; and Kolk & van Tulder,
supra note 22, at 10 (arguing that the extent to which a code of conduct entails
quantitative standards should be adopted as an effectiveness indicator).
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ness of future international private CSR regulation itself because it
enables better research on its efficiency.
However, the economic approach by itself is not a reliable indi-
cator that emanates ex post effectiveness of international private regu-
lation. Unlike what classical economic theory assumed, human
decision-making is not solely based on economic appraisal of a situa-
tion, but also on other assessments and is biased.5 2 For example, net-
work effects, herd behavior, and bandwagon effects are typical cases in
which the interdependence between individuals and their dynamic in-
teraction makes it impossible to follow a single mathematical aggrega-
tion of individual preferences as in the Pareto efficiency (connected to
the macro level approach), in which an aggregate increase of wealth
agreed upon by all members of society is predominant.5 2 9 As biases
emerge, effective international private regulation ought to operate di-
rectly on them and attempt to assist people either to reduce or to elimi-
nate them, but this aspect of effectiveness is not covered by the
economic avenue.5 3 ° Besides this, acceptance of particular interna-
tional private regulation by stakeholders is important. Economic effi-
ciency, for example, tends to neglect the division of wealth caused by
international private regulation, 3 1 which is an important factor in the
acceptance thereof. The welfare of an individual most often depends on
that individual's relative, rather than absolute, well-being. 32 An indi-
vidual earning C50,000 in a company where everybody receives the
same amount might be happier than an individual who earns C60,000
in a company in which everyone else earns C 80,000.53 3 If the per cap-
ita income of a local community increases by $5 as a result of the im-
plementation of private CSR regulation, it makes a difference whether
this community is located in Nigeria or Canada. Such and other distri-
butional issues, which relate to returns on income and the assessment
of how much an increase of wealth contributes to the utility for an
528 See, e.g., Renda, supra note 94, at 110-11.
529 Id. at 117-18, 126. The same is true regarding the Kaldor-Hicks principle, al-
beit in this principle the possibility that someone is left worse-off after an efficient
policy change is explicitly contemplated. This principle is an important feature of
the US impact assessment on major legislation issued by agencies. See id. at
127-28. Therefore, the aggregate increase of wealth agreed upon by all members
of society has lost its predominant position in current law and economics. See, e.g.,
Faure, supra note 134, at 1061.
530 Christine Jolls, Behavioural Law and Economics, in Behavioral economics and
its application 34-35 (Diamond et al. eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2007).
531 Cf Renda, supra note 94, at 122.
532 Id. at 118.
533 Id. at 125.
362 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:2
individual (the same increase in wealth has different utility for a poor
or a rich individual), 3 4 are neglected in classical economics. 535
As discussed above, the economic avenue as a whole is espe-
cially fit to measure ex post effects of international private regula-
tion.136 Only the macro-economic approach is helpful in assessing the
economic efficiency of international private regulation ex ante. How-
ever, it emanated from the foregoing that a single economic approach
does not suffice to assess the ex post effectiveness of international pri-
vate regulation. Other disciplines are needed to correct the shortcom-
ings of the economic avenue.5 37 As to the distributional shortcomings
of the economic approach, the acceptance of international private regu-
lation is important. The sociological approach covers this avenue. 38
That said, the economic avenue ought to be one of the main factors in
the ex post assessment of the effectiveness of international private reg-
ulation, next to the legal approach, in spite of these shortcomings.
5.3 Sociological Approach
The sociological approach might be important too in the ex post
approach to assessing the effectiveness of existing international pri-
vate regulation. The better international private regulation is actually
accepted, the greater the incentives are to comply with it. This might
reduce the costs of enforcement and dispute resolution. Alternatively,
if acceptance is rather poor, this might be a contra-indicator.
However, the degree of acceptance is not easily measured. It
might, for example, take some time before the implementation of a cer-
tain private regulatory regime brings about perceptible effects. Fur-
thermore, private regulation is often intertwined with government
534 In technical terms: a diminishing marginal utility of income. See, e.g., Richard
A. Easterlin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income 2004, http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=539262 (last visited March 20th 2013).535 Renda, supra note 94, at 122 (giving the example of a poor and a rich cousin
who have to divide an inheritance on the condition that they agree on how to di-
vide the sum).
536 See Faure, supra note 134, at 1061. (showing that it is possible to assess the
economic effects of a particular desirable division of wealth, and that the economic
approach also might assist the ex ante appraisal of international private
regulation).
537 Therefore, the importance of human behavior is recognized in current law and
economics. See, e.g., Faure, supra note 134, at 1061-62; cf. Jonathan Klick, The
Empirical Revolution in Law and Economics 23 (Inaugural lecture Rotterdam)
(Eleven Publ. 2011).
538 This approach is, as has been discussed hereinabove, of importance to alterna-
tive forms of legitimacy of international private regulation as well. Beside this,
insights might be derived from social psychology and political science which also
research acceptance of norms.
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regulation, and it is therefore rather complicated to isolate the effects
of a private regulatory regime.5 39 Beside this, acceptance may vary be-
tween the different actors subject to the regime. Acceptance then
might be assessed by conducting surveys with relevant stakeholders.
It should be noted this approach is ex post; ex ante research of this
kind is not conceivable. However, this requires research which is often
rather time consuming and costly. Acceptance preferably should be as-
sessed without the necessity of extensive surveys. An indicator of ac-
ceptance at the company level might be the commitment of the
management of a company as well as financial commitment of that
company to a certain initiative. 54 0 The higher the management and
financial commitment of the company is, the higher the degree of as-
sumed acceptance. Obviously, the fact that a company has imple-
mented a certain ISO-standard indicates acceptance thereof.
Furthermore, it seems, for example, clear which company has commit-
ted itself to the Global Compact (in the CSR area), because of the list of
adhering companies. However, this might not be a very reliable indica-
tor. A company could adhere to the Global Compact, but the implemen-
tation of the principles might be scant. In such instances, the existence
of an effective enforcement framework as well as extensive referral to
it in social or other media might be indicators of acceptance.
Some examples might illustrate the importance of actual ac-
ceptance of international private regulation. The acceptance/legiti-
macy of ISO standards was traditionally assessed by reference to the
degree of expertise and the extent to which ISO standards rationalized
technical standards. 4 ' The ISO, however, expanded its scope from
technical standards to a social responsibility standard with ISO
26000.542 Expertise and rationalization were insufficient to legitimate
the new standard. The ISO recognized that, given the potential users
of such a standard, it had to adapt its standard-setting procedure to
open it up to wider stakeholders such as NGOs and consumer groups.
In order to do this, ISO set up six specific stakeholder categories and
created new procedural rules so that it represented all stakeholder
views.5 4 3 By doing so, it faced new types of stakeholders who had dif-
539 Oude Vrielink, supra note 132, at 69.
540 See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 22, at 10.
541 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 92. This however is not an informal process of
rule-making, the ISO has created a set of procedures for the creation of standards.
See KOPPELL, supra note 29, at 148.
542 ISO 26000 - Social Responsibility, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://
www.iso.orgliso/iso26000 (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
543 Casey & Scott, supra note 66, at 92. (Such a multi-stakeholder model was also
applied when drafting the model mining development agreement, supra note 13, a
model agreement drafted for the extracting industry, which model, inter alia, con-
tains provisions on CSR (provisions 22-27 including an obligation to adopt a com-
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ferent legitimacy demands from those previously dealt with. 4 4 In par-
ticular, NGO and consumer stakeholder groups created a legitimacy
dilemma when they demanded that the standard-setting process be
more transparent and opened to the media. 4 5 However, industry
stakeholder groups successfully contested this demand for increased
transparency.5 4 6
The acceptance and legitimacy of the Dutch corporate govern-
ance code, principle II.1.2.d, which obliges companies listed at the
Dutch stock exchange to state the main elements of CSR issues that
are relevant to the company,5 4 7 is also questioned. It is purported that
the identity of the stakeholders is unclear. Furthermore, no industry
organization established this code. Instead, different stakeholders of
different disciplines, backgrounds, and interests established the code.
A clear picture of the organization is absent, and, stemming from this,
it remains unclear whether all stakeholders feel adequately repre-
sented.5 4 ' Furthermore it is questionable whether all the information
and expertise gathered was needed to solve the societal problem and to
support the measures implemented. 549 Despite these objections, sec-
tion 2:8 of the Dutch Civil Code, which deals with good faith and fair
dealing in company law, converts the corporate governance code into
norms which are enforceable through national courts.
The social perspective may be used to assess whether a certain
initiative is effective ex post. One might assess actual acceptance of
international private regulation. Obviously acceptance might differ
among different groups of stakeholders. Therefore, the level of accept-
ance has to be assessed within all groups of stakeholders. To assess
actual acceptance, the same indicators which have been found in para.
3.3 might be helpful. The ex post sociological approach bridges some
pitfalls of the economic approach. Effectiveness of international pri-
vate regulation in a sociological sense might infer that distributional
issues (the "fair" division of wealth), return on income, and some as-
pects of individual happiness, have been covered.55 0 If not, this regula-
tion obviously has a high probability of not being effective in a
sociological sense. Using the sociological approach to bridge these pit-
pany based grievance mechanism) and requires the operator to conduct a
feasibility study and assess the environmental and social impact of its operations




547 See Corporate Governance Code, MONITORING COMMISSIE, http:/commissiecor-
porategovernance.nl/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
548 Overmars, supra note 7, at 25.
549 Id. at 25.
550 Cf Renda, supra note 94, at 139.
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falls of the economic approach is, in my opinion, preferable to trying to
adjust economic models, which by their nature have difficulties in
dealing with concepts of fairness and distributional issues.5 5 1 Further-
more, acceptance might bridge the lack of legitimacy, in the traditional
sense, of existing international private regulation, at least in part.
6. INTEGRATED APPROACH
Four avenues have been explored to assess the effectiveness of
international private regulation. All of them provide useful insights,
either for the rule-setting process (ex ante approach) or assessment of
existing international private regulation (ex post assessment) or for
both. However, none of them are sufficient by themselves to make an
overarching effectiveness assessment. All approaches have their quali-
ties, but also their pitfalls. Research has also revealed that trust in
certain standards results from all these approaches.5 5 2 Therefore, an
integrated (ex ante and ex post) approach is needed to enhance the
scientific value of this type of effectiveness research and to bridge the
gaps left by the separate approaches. In this contribution, the focus
has been on international private regulation in the CSR arena. Hence,
the models mentioned hereinafter refer to the effectiveness of interna-
tional private regulation in that arena.
6.1 Ex Ante Approach
The ex ante approach could, as has been elucidated above, ben-
efit from the legal, macro-economic, sociological, and psychological per-
spectives to assist private rule makers in instigating effective
international private regulation. Therefore, the effectiveness assess-
ment will be more useful and based on actual future impact as more
perspectives are taken into consideration.
The relative value of the legal, sociological, and psychological!
behavioral avenues as such is equal. One should attempt to meet as
many indicators as possible derived from these three perspectives.
These indicators require a yes/no (0/1) answer regarding some indica-
551 Cf id. at 141-43.
552 Alvarez and von Hagen refer to a survey of business, government and NGOs
commissioned by ISEAL in 2010, The ISEAL 100: A survey of thought leader
views on sustainability standards 2010. ISEAL Alliance, London, 2011, in which
respondents mentioned four main elements that create trust in a standard: credi-
ble verification processes, including accreditation and third-party certification
(55%); a standard document being science-based, comprehensive, and practical
(38%); a credible multi-stakeholder standard-setting process that has the support
of all relevant stakeholders (NGOs, local communities/smallholders/producers, en-
terprises) (35%); a transparent governance model (32%) and an ability to show
impacts (11%). See Alvarez & von Hagen, supra note 67, at 20.
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tors and a more elaborate answer to others. As some of the avenues
have more indicators than others and a possibility of higher scores, the
highest possible score on a certain avenue might be higher than on
others. This does not necessarily mean that an avenue with a lesser
possible highest score is less important, but, in comparison to other
initiatives, the overall score is a useful tool to compare effectiveness.
Furthermore, the expected impact on a macro level (if applicable)
should be assessed in order to strive toward macro-economic efficiency
in the design process of international private regulation. This expected
impact should be assessed in actual figures. International private reg-
ulation is more effective compared to other private regulation if it
shows a higher total score on the legal, sociological, and psychological
perspectives and a positive future economic impact is expected. It is
less effective if positive future economic impact is expected but a lower
score on the other three avenues is recorded. It is least effective if neg-
ative economic impact (economic avenue) is expected and a lower score
on the other three avenues is recorded. The ex ante effectiveness
model is as follows:
Effectiveness indicators (ex ante) Yes (1)-
No(0) 5 53
Legal approach
Articulate specific and assessable objectives -3
Existing (public or private) regulation does not reach 0-6555
these objectives (if all objectives are met refrain from
new regulation)
553 Unless indicated otherwise.
554 0: no specific and assessable objectives, 1: specific objectives only, 2: specific
objectives and criteria/indicators to assess whether these objectives have been
met, 3: as 2 but with verifiers to make this assessment.
555 0: verifiers indicate that other regulation meets all the objectives, 1: indicators/
criteria indicate that other regulation meets all the objectives, 2: it is not possible
to assess whether other regulation meets the objectives, 3: verifiers indicate that
other regulation meets part of the objectives, 4: indicators/criteria indicate that
other regulation meets part of the objectives, 5: indicators/criteria indicate that no
other regulation exists which meets the objectives, 6: verifiers indicate that no
other regulation exists which meets the objectives,
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Articulate 'conflict of law' rules 0-6556
Regular evaluation of the regulation and its functioning 0-6557
and (if necessary) review of the regulation
Enforcement
The existence of an supervisory body to 0-3558
which parties are accountable and the
power of supervisory body to pass
judgment and impose sanctions
A supervisory body which controls
access to scarce resources
(A) serious (threat of) contractual 0-3 5 5 9
enforcement or other means of
enforcement or endorsement if
necessary through state legislation
and/or (effective) enforcement by states
556 0: no such rules, 1: only general explanation which rules prevail and why, 2:
rules exist which explain which specific standard/rule prevails in connection with
public or private regulation and in which circumstances for less than 50% of the
standards/rules, 3: rules exist which explain which specific standard/rule prevails
in connection with public or private regulation and in which circumstances for
more than 50% of the standards/rules, 4: rules exist which explain which specific
standard/rule prevails in connection with public and private regulation and in
which circumstances for less than 50% of the standards/rules, 5: rules exist which
explain which specific standard/rule prevails in connection with public and private
regulation and in which circumstances for more than 50% of the standards/rules,
6: rules exist which explain which specific standard/rule prevails in connection
with public and private regulation and in which circumstances for more than 50%
of the standards/rules and other relevant bodies which set international private
regulation are informed if rules are set or reviewed.
557 0: no evaluation and review, 1: irregular evaluation not involving stakeholders
or past grievances and without review, 2: regular evaluation (at least every 5
years) not involving stakeholders or past grievances and without review, 3:
irregular evaluation involving stakeholders and past grievances without review, 4:
regular evaluation (at least every 5 years) involving stakeholders and past
grievances without review, 5: irregular evaluation and review involving
stakeholders and past grievances, 6: regular evaluation and review (at least every
5 years) involving stakeholders and past grievances.
558 0: no supervisory body, 1: supervisory body exists, but no accountability
(possibility to pass judgment) and no sanctions, 2: supervisory body exists and
accountability but no sanctions, 3: supervisory body exists, accountability and
possibility of imposing sanctions (such as expelling members).
559 0: no possibility to enforce, 1: only private enforcement (e.g. through (blocking)
entrance to a market, shareholders, media attention etc.), 2: (contractual or other)
enforcement through state legislation in some states, 3: (contractual or other)
enforcement through state legislation and/or treaties on a global level (e.g.
trademarks).
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Specific rules/standards 0-9560
Sufficient bureaucratic capacity
Sufficient (legal) knowledge of the
private rule maker
An effective complaint and dispute 0-9561
management mechanism
Certification or assessment of 0-6562
compliance by third parties supported
by a reporting requirement
Sociological approach
I The degree of knowledge and application of regulation 0-2563
560 0: principles only, 1: the norms meets none of the criteria for specificity ((i)
entails a clear norm/standard which is interpreted and applied consistently, (ii)
states if exceptions to the general rule exist and, if so, under which circumstances
they apply, (iii) to whom the rules apply (e.g. only the companies themselves or
suppliers and financing entities too), (iv) refers to applicable (international) norms
and treaties (e.g. in the area of human rights or environment)), 2: as one but less
than 50% of the norms meet one criterion, 3: as one but less than 50% of the norms
meet two criteria, 4: as one but less than 50% of the norms meet three criteria, 5:
as one but less than 50% of the norms meet all criteria, 6: as one but more than
50% of the norms meet one criterion, 7: as one but more than 50% of the norms
meet two criteria, 8: as one but more than 50% of the norms meet three criteria, 9:
as one but more than 50% of the norms meet all criteria.
561 0: dispute management mechanism meets none of the criteria of Guiding
Principle 31 of the Ruggie framework en entails no evaluation of outcomes, 1:
dispute management mechanism meets at least one of the criteria of Guiding
Principle 31, 2: dispute management mechanism meets at least two of the criteria
of Guiding Principle 31 (etc.), 9: dispute management mechanism meets all
criteria of Guiding Principle 31 and entails an evaluation of the outcomes of the
mechanism.
562 0: no certification or assessment by third parties, 1: entails assessment by
independent third parties, 2: entails certification for less than 50% of the
operations of members, 3: entails certification for more than 50% of the operations
of members, 4: entails assessment by independent third parties and a reporting
requirement (which either obliges the regulatee to make the results of the
assessment by the third party public or allows the third party to share the
information retrieved with the overarching body the regulate is accountable to), 5:
entails certification for less than 50% of the operations of members and a reporting
requirement (which either obliges the regulatee to make the results of the
assessment by the third party public or allows the third party to share the
information retrieved with the overarching body the regulate is accountable to), 6:
entails certification for more than 50% of the operations of members and a
reporting requirement.
563 0: no training and education on norms and no explanation on background and
objectives, 1: explanation on background and objectives but no training and
education on norms, 2: explanation on background and objectives and training and
education on norms.
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Acceptance [has to be assessed
per (group of) stakeholder(s)]






Shared vision on 0-2565
relevant issues
The degree to which 0-2566


















Effective mode of transmission 0-357 0
Inclusiveness vis-h-vis stakeholders and effective 0-7571
stakeholder engagement
564 0: no willingness to collaborate, 1: minority of stakeholders wants to
collaborate, 2: majority of stakeholders wants to collaborate.
565 0: no shared vision, 1: minority of stakeholders has a shared vision, 2: majority
of stakeholders has a shared vision.
566 0: actions are not aligned, 1: minority of actions is aligned, 2: majority of
actions is aligned.
567 0: does not fit, 1: only fits within the strategic choices of a minority of the
regulatees, 2: fits within the strategic choices of the majority of the regulatees.
568 0: no own interest, 1: only in the own interest of a minority of the stakeholders,
2: in the own interest of the majority of the stakeholders.
569 0: no support, 1: support from (western) government(s), 2: global support from
governments.
570 0: no transmission through market mechanisms or contracts, 1: transmission
through market mechanisms, 2: transmission through contracts, 3: transmission
through market mechanisms and contracts.
571 0: no stakeholder engagement, 1: one of four criteria ((i) a proper procedure in
which the relevant stakeholders are identified and engaged in the rule setting
process, preferably through (with administrative procedures comparable)
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Psychological approach
Takes into account that human decision making is not 0-2572
flawless and expects failures







engagement rules, (ii) an assessment of their interests, (iii) a procedure in which
adequate and timely information (on the rule setting process and its substantive
norms) is provided in such a manner that the relevant stakeholders are able to
access and understand it and (iv) sufficient documentation of the process and
reporting to the stakeholders) on stakeholder engagement is met, 2: two of four
criteria are met (etc.), 4: all criteria are met, 5: all criteria are met and affected
stakeholders make up a meaningful segment of the participants, 6: all criteria are
met, affected stakeholders make up a meaningful segment of the participants and
necessary funding is provided for stakeholder engagement; 7: all criteria are met,
affected stakeholders make up a meaningful segment of the participants,
necessary funding is provided for stakeholder engagement and diversity of
stakeholders (e.g. geographical spread, gender, constituency) is maintained.
572 0: no account of behavioral effects, 1: takes into account the behavioral effects
on regulatees, 2: takes into account the behavioral effects on all stakeholders.
573 0: no restriction, 1: less than 50% of the norms that entail an element of choice
restrict the choices of regulatees, 2: more than 50% of the norms that entail an
element of choice restrict the choices of regulatees, 3: less than 50% of the norms
that entail an element of choice restrict the choices of regulatees and takes into
account the choices to be made by other stakeholders which originate from the
regulation, 4: more than 50% of the norms that entail an element of choice restrict
the choices of regulatees and takes into account the choices to be made by other
stakeholders which originate from the regulation.
574 0: no information, 1: less than 50% of the norms that entail an element of
choice provide information to the regulatees, 2: more than 50% of the norms that
entail an element of choice provide information to the regulatees, 3: less than 50%
of the norms that entail an element of choice provide information to the regulatees
and provide information to other stakeholders on choices which originate from the
regulation, 4: more than 50% of the norms that entail an element of choice provide
information to the regulatees and provide information to other stakeholders on
choices which originate from the regulation.
575 0: no transparency, 1: less than 50% of the norms that entail an element of
choice provide transparency on the consequences of a choice to the regulatees, 2:
more than 50% of the norms that entail an element of choice provide transparency
on the consequences of a choice to the regulatees, 3: less than 50% of the norms
that entail an element of choice provide transparency on the consequences of a
choice to the regulatees and provide transparency on the consequences of a choice
to other stakeholders on choices which originate from the regulation, 4: more than
50% of the norms that entail an element of choice provide transparency on the
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transparency as to
the consequences of a
choice
Entails a default option which is beneficial to the 0-2576
majority of regulatees
If business is involved, takes into account the 0-2577
organizational model of the regulatees
Enhances crystallization as to govern behavior 0-2578
Total score
Macro-economic approach (figures of expected impact)(if effects occur at the
macro level)
(Administrative) burdens by international private
regulation according to the Standard Cost Model
Changes in the growth of gross domestic product
caused by international private regulation
Additional consumer detriment
Impact on competitiveness and trade
Impact on the potential for innovation and
technological development
Impact on labor conditions and social welfare
Additional detriment to the public interest
6.2 Ex Post Approach
The ex post approach might especially benefit from the legal
and economic avenues. In addition, the sociological avenue might
bridge some of the gaps that the economic avenue leaves. The lower
the sociological score, the higher the non-acceptance of international
private regulation and thus the risk of less effectiveness thereof. In
such circumstances, positive impact has to be scrutinized because, for
example, distributive effects might have been neglected. Hence, the
more these perspectives are taken into account, the more significant
the effectiveness assessment will be.
consequences of a choice to the regulatees and provide transparency on the
consequences of a choice to other stakeholders on choices which originate from the
regulation.
576 0: no default option, 1: less than 50% of the norms that entail an element of
choice provide a default option, 2: more than 50% of the norms that entail an
element of choice provide a default option.
577 0: does not take the organizational model into account, 1: takes into account
the organizational model of the minority of the regulatees, 2: takes into account
the organizational model of the majority of the regulatees.
578 0: no crystallization, 1: crystallization with the minority of regulatees, 2:
crystallization with the majority of regulatees.
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A All three perspectives
B+ Legal and economic perspective
B- Legal or economic perspective combined
with sociological perspective
C+ Legal or economic perspective only
C- Sociological perspective only
The following indicators require a yes/no (0/1) answer regard-
ing some indicators and are more elaborated score regarding others.
As some of the avenues have more indicators than others and a possi-
bility of higher scores, the highest possible score on a certain avenue
might be higher than on others. This does not necessarily mean that
the avenue with the lesser possible highest score is less important,
but, in comparison to other initiatives, the overall score is a useful tool
to compare effectiveness. Furthermore, the actual impact on a macro
level (if applicable) and micro level (both in figures) should be assessed
in order to assess macro and micro-economic efficiency of existing in-
ternational private regulation. Existing international private regula-
tion is more effective compared to other private regulation if it has a
higher score on the legal and sociological perspectives and shows posi-
tive economic impact. It is less effective if it shows positive economic
impact but a lower score on the other two avenues and least effective if
it shows negative economic impact as well as a lower score on the other
two avenues. Furthermore, the effectiveness comparison reflects effec-
tiveness at a certain moment in time. It might well be that a certain
initiative gains effectiveness later on. The ex post model might be de-
fined as follows:





Articulate specific and assessable objectives 0-3
Objectives are effectively achieved 0-3580
579 Unless indicated otherwise (see for the explanation of the elaborated
indicators lacking a footnote the footnotes in the ex ante model).
580 0: objectives are not met, 1: it is not possible to assess whether objectives are
met, 2: criteria/indicators indicate that the objectives are met, 3: verifiers indicate
that the objectives are met.
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Existing (public or private) regulation does not reach 0-6
these objectives
Entails "conflict of law" rules 0-6
Regular evaluation of the regulation and its functioning 0-4
(and if necessary) review of the regulation
Enforcement
The existence of an supervisory body to 0-3
which parties are accountable and the
power of supervisory body to pass
judgment and impose sanctions
A supervisory body which controls
access to scarce resources
(A) serious (threat of) contractual 0-3
enforcement or other means of
enforcement or endorsement if
necessary through state legislation
and/or enforcement by states
Specific rules/standards 0-9
Sufficient bureaucratic capacity
Sufficient (legal) knowledge of the
private rule maker
An effective complaint and dispute 0-9
management mechanism
Certification or assessment of 0-6
compliance by third parties supported
by a reporting requirement
Susceptibility of a certain industry to
negative (social) media attention and




I The degree of knowledge and application of regulation 0-2
Acceptance [has to be assessed
per (group of) stakeholder(s)]






Shared vision on 0-2
relevant issues
The degree to which 0-2
the actions of a
governing body are
581 0: no susceptibility, 1: susceptibility of less than 50% of a certain industry, 2:
susceptibility of more than 50% of a certain industry.

















Effective mode of transmission 0-3




Macro level (if (Administrative) burdens by international private
applicable) regulation according to the Standard Cost Model
Changes in the growth of gross domestic product
caused by international private regulation
Additional consumer detriment
Impact on competitiveness and trade
Impact on the potential for innovation and
technological development
Impact on labor conditions and social welfare
Additional detriment to the public interest
Micro level PAccsr - PBccsr > 0 and
[(private) AEC + ASC = 0583




but at level of
individual
enterprise]582
582 If international private regulation has impact on more than one regulatee, this
impact should preferably be assessed by aggregating the impact on individual
regulatees.
583 In which formula PAccr is the company's profit after implementation of a
certain private CSR initiative, PBccr is the company's profit before
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6.3 Conclusion
To conclude, the outline of a methodology has been developed
to assess the effectiveness of international private regulation in the
CSR arena. This methodology is useful to evaluate and perhaps, where
necessary, to abandon the plethora of existing international private
regulation in the CSR arena and to design new private CSR regula-
tion. To perform this function, public data needs to be collected to en-
able external assessment of the effectiveness of international private
regulation in the CSR arena. However, it seems substantial work re-
mains ahead. The outline of the methodology has been described, but
the details still need elaboration.5 s4 Furthermore, for example, the ef-
fectiveness of complaint and conflict resolution mechanisms requires
further research. I expect to elaborate these topics in future research.
implementation, AEC is the change of environmental consequences of the
company's operations, and ASC is the change of social consequences of the
company's operations.584 E.g., how to assess the macro-economic factors and sociological indicators men-
tioned properly.
